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Abstract
This report covers regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2003. Its submission to the
Ministry of Trade and Industry by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is
stipulated in section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. Nuclear safety regulation focused
on the design and operation of Finnish nuclear facilities as well as on nuclear waste
management and nuclear materials.
No events occurred at the nuclear power plants that would have endangered the safe use
of nuclear energy. At the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, the number of plant conditions in
non-compliance with the Technical Specifications was higher than usual. These had note-
worthy common features, such as shortcomings in adherence to regulations, administra-
tion of periodic inspections, monitoring of plant states and identification of the require-
ments of the Technical Specifications. The licensee has launched the necessary develop-
ment measures.
The doses of all nuclear power plant workers were below the individual dose limit. The
collective occupational dose was low internationally. Radioactive releases were low and the
dose calculated on their basis for the most exposed individual in the vicinity of Loviisa and
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was well below the limit established by Government Resolu-
tion.
The nuclear safety indicators describing the effectiveness of STUK’s activities did not
indicate changes that would have warranted STUK’s immediate reaction, with the excep-
tion of the above indicators pertaining to anomalies at Olkiluoto plant.
No events endangering safety occurred at the FiR 1 research reactor either. In addition,
the radiation doses of those working at the research reactor and radioactive releases into
the environment were clearly below set limits.
The regulation of nuclear waste management focused on spent fuel storage and prepara-
tion of final disposal as well as the treatment, storage and final disposal of reactor waste.
No events occurred in nuclear waste management that would have endangered safety. In
the field of nuclear material safeguards, the use of nuclear materials in accordance with
current regulations and the completeness and correctness of nuclear material accounting
were verified.
STUK verified that nuclear liability in the event of nuclear damage has been taken care of
according to legislation.
The total costs of nuclear safety regulation in 2003 were 8.7 M€. The total costs of opera-
tions subject to a charge were 7.2 M€, the full amount of which was charged to the licen-
sees and licence-applicants.
TOSSAVAINEN Kirsti (ed.). Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland 2003.
STUK-B-YTO 233. Helsinki 2004. 50 pp. + Appendices 60 pp.
Avainsanat: nuclear energy, nuclear facility, nuclear waste, regulatory control,
safety performance indicators
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1 PrefaceThe Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK) regulates the use of nuclear energy in
Finland, as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act
(990/1987). STUK’s responsibilities also include
control of physical protection, and emergency
planning as well as control of the use of nuclear
energy necessary to prevent nuclear proliferation.
This is a report on regulatory control in the field
of nuclear energy submitted by STUK to the Min-
istry of Trade and Industry once a year, as stipu-
lated in section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree.
It covers the regulatory control of nuclear
facilities, nuclear waste management and nuclear
materials, which is the task of two STUK depart-
ments: Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear
Waste and Materials Regulation.
Nuclear safety regulation mostly focused on
the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units
owned by Fortum Power and Heat Oy and the
Olkiluoto 1 ja 2 units owned by Teollisuuden
Voima Oy as well as their nuclear waste manage-
ment and nuclear materials. Fortum Power and
Heat Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy are later in
the text also referred to as licensee or utility. The
planning and later implementation of the final
disposal of nuclear fuel, which is part of nuclear
waste management, is taken care of by Posiva Oy.
Subject to regulatory control were also the re-
search reactor operated by the VTT Technical
Research Centre of Finland, small-scale users of
nuclear materials as well as the transport of
radioactive materials. In addition, matters relat-
ing to the new reactor in planning were dealt
with.
Loviisa 1 began generating electricity to the
national grid in 1977 and Loviisa 2 in 1981. Their
operating permits were renewed in 1998 and willexpire at the end of 2007. The highest allowable
reactor nominal thermal power for each unit,
according to a permit granted by the Government,
is 1500 MW. The permits cover also facilities for
waste management. The nominal values for elec-
trical power 510 MW (gross) and 488 MW (net)
correspond to this reactor power.
Olkiluoto 1 began generating electricity to the
national grid in 1979 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1982. The
operating permits of the Olkiluoto plant units
were renewed in 1998. They will expire at the end
of 2018 and cover also spent fuel intermediate
storage as well as low and intermediate level
reactor waste storage. According to the permits,
the highest allowable reactor nominal thermal
power for each Olkiluoto plant unit is 2500 MW. A
corresponding nominal gross electrical power is
870 MW and net electrical power 840 MW. The
permit conditions require that the licensee makes,
by the end of 2008, an extensive intermediate
safety assessment for the Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant. Requirements for the contents of the as-
sessment are set by STUK.
This report’s section on nuclear reactor regula-
tion describes assessment of Loviisa and Olkiluo-
to’s safety as well as plant modifications control
and of operation of licensee organisations. The
efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safety regu-
lation is analysed using STUK’s Safety Perform-
ance Indicator System. This report contains a
description of the operation of Finnish nuclear
power plants, the most important operational
events and safety improvements at the plants.
Radiation safety at the plants is analysed by
looking at occupational and collective doses at the
facilities as well as at the outcome of monitoring
for radiation in releases and the environment.7
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deals with nuclear fuel intermediate storage and
preparation for final disposal as well as treatment
of reactor waste.
The chapter on regulatory control of nuclear
materials describes nuclear material control at
the Finnish nuclear facilities and plans for the
safeguarding of final disposal of spent fuel as well
as regulation of radioactive materials transport.
Strengthening of nuclear material safeguards and8implementation of the CTBT are included as well.
In addition, the report discusses the develop-
ment of regulatory guides and nuclear safety
regulation as well as functions in support of nucle-
ar safety regulation, such as safety research,
emergency response, communications, and devel-
opment projects. Participation in international co-
operation in the field of nuclear safety is described
as well.
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2 Regulatory guides
Pekka Salminen
Figure 1. Number of yearly published  YVL guides.
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The guides are detailed safety regulations for nu-
clear facilities, issued by STUK on the basis of the
Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and the Govern-
ment Resolution (395/1991) on the general safety
regulations for nuclear power plants. The guides
describe STUK’s regulatory procedures as well.
STUK decides, case by case, how new guides apply
to facilities already in operation. Such decisions,
made in 2003, are discusssed in sub-sections 3.1.1
and 3.2.1.
A total of about 45 guides were being prepared
or reviewed in YVL guide working groups, with 12
guides completed by the end of the year. The
number of YVL guides published in 1999–2003 is
given in Fig. 1. Four guides were translated into
English and two into Swedish. They were issued
in print and on the Internet; the Swedish lan-
guage versions were only available on the Inter-
net, however. Principles that apply to the long-
term revision of the YVL guides were incorporat-
ed in the STUK strategy and in a separate regula-
tory guide action plan.
The project to construct a new nuclear power
plant has made it necessary to speed up the
preparation of some YVL guides having a bearing
on nuclear power plant design. In so far as the
guides were not completed on schedule, the li-
cense applicant was regularly sent reports on
their status. In addition, the license applicant was
informed about any new requirements planned in
the guides under revision.During 2003, an amendment was prepared in
the Nuclear Energy Act to establish a special fund
arrangement for research in the field of nuclear
safety. It took effect on 1 January 2004. It serves
to ensure a high level in domestic research and
the preservation of expertise. No amendments
were prepared to the general nuclear safety regu-
lations issued as Government Resolutions.
Nuclear safety recommendations are also giv-
en by international organisations, such as the EU,
the IAEA, the OECD/NEA and various countries’
national authorities. They did not give any cause
to update the Finnish nuclear legislation. STUK
prepared to the IAEA statements on three draft
safety guides.
The Commission of the European Communi-
ties is preparing directives on the arrangement of
nuclear waste management in Member Countries
and on fundamental nuclear safety requirements.
STUK has followed the status of this work and
assessed for its part the contents of the drafts.9
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3 Nuclear facilities regulation
Kirsi Alm-Lytz, Timo Eurasto, Tarja K. Ikäheimonen, Marja-Leena Järvinen,
Tapani Koljander, Seppo Klemola, Jouko Mononen, Ilkka Niemelä, Matti Ojanen,
Suvi Ristonmaa, Pekka Salminen, Seija Suksi, Heimo Takala, Petteri Tiippana,
Kirsti Tossavainen, Keijo Valtonen, Reino Virolainen, Tapani Virolainen, Kaisa Åstrand3.1 Loviisa nuclear power plant
3.1.1 Overall safety assessment
Implementation of regulations
STUK has introduced a procedure for application
of new or revised YVL guides to operating nuclear
facilities. According to it, the publication of a YVL
guide does not, as such, change STUK’s previous
decisions. It is only after having heard those con-
cerned that STUK will give a separate decision on
the application of a new or revised YVL guide to
an operating nuclear facility, or to one under con-
struction as well as to a licensee’s operation. The
guides apply as such to new nuclear power plants.
In considering the application of new safety
requirements given in YVL guides to operating
nuclear facilities, or those under construction,
STUK takes into account a principle stipulated in
section 27 of the Government Resolution (395/
1991). It prescribes that, to further improve safety,
measures shall be implemented justifiable consid-
ering operating experience, safety research and
development of science and technology.
Decisions to implement the below YVL guides
were made in accordance with the new procedure
• Guide YVL 5.5, Instrumentation systems and
components of nuclear facilities, 13 September
2002
• Guide YVL 6.7, Quality management of nucle-
ar fuel, 17 March 2003.
For implementation of Guide YVL 5.5, Fortum
Power and Heat Oy carried out an extensive as-
sessment by comparing Loviisa plant’s I&C sys-
tems and administrative procedures with the re-
quirements of the new guide. Established short-
comings and the procedures to eliminate them
were presented in an action programme which
was confirmed by STUK. Should any differences
be observed in the systems’ implementation, most10of them will be fixed in connection with the I&C
system upgrading of the Loviisa plant in the near
future.
STUK noted in its decision to implement Guide
YVL 6.7 that the nuclear fuel quality management
and assurance procedures used by Loviisa plant
cover well the requirements of the revised guide.
In so far as they remain unfulfilled, Fortum Pow-
er and Heat Oy presented an action plan with
schedules, which STUK confirmed.
Annual safety assessment
The annual safety assessment for Loviisa nuclear
power plant looks at observations made in regula-
tory work pertaining to plant modifications, avail-
ability and organisational operation. The various
areas contained in the assessment are discussed
in more detail in this report’s chapters dealing
with nuclear regulation and in its appendices.
Two significant plant improvements were com-
pleted at both Loviisa nuclear power plant units in
2003: upgrading of the severe accident manage-
ment system and the plant’s radiation measure-
ment system. The utility made an important deci-
sion pertaining to management of the plant’s
ageing, ie to entirely upgrade the plant’s I&C
systems in 2006–2014. Conceptual design planning
for the upgrading was launched by the utility in
2000.
STUK detected no significant safety-related
shortcomings in 2003 during its work to ascertain
the availability of Loviisa nuclear power plant.
The number of plant conditions in non-compliance
with the Technical Specifications was low and only
one operational event required a special report.
The annual maintenance outages of Loviisa nucle-
ar power plant were refuelling outages and no
significant safety-related observations were made
during them. Of inspections conducted during the
outage, worth mentioning are: an inspection of
ST U K - B - Y TO 2 3 3the area containing the temperature sensors of
the protection pipes of control rod drives and also
replacement of some shroud tubes due to crack-
ing.
No individual occupational dose at the plant
exceeded the individual dose limit. The collective
occupational radiation dose was low international-
ly. Radioactive releases were low, too, and the
radiation dose calculated on their basis for the
most exposed individual in the vicinity of Loviisa
nuclear power plant was clearly below the limit
given in a Government Resolution.
The Loviisa nuclear power plant strategy de-
fines 50 years as the plant’s service life. In con-
nection with the renewal of the plant’s organisa-
tion, ageing management is considered the organ-
isation’s essential working process, which is de-
scribed in procedures completed in 2003. No sig-
nificant safety defects surfaced in inspections per-
taining to the ageing of mechanical components,
electrical and I&C systems and structures. The
safety indicators for Loviisa plant’s maintenance
showed a deteriorating trend in 2003.
The qualification of methods for the periodic
inspection of the most important mechanical com-
ponents by non-destructive testing is important in
assuring the reliability of data on ageing manage-
ment.  The qualification of ultrasonic and eddy
current testing has not been developed as quickly
as STUK required, based on European recommen-
dations. To repair the situation, new domestic
arrangements have been agreed upon with both
utilities for the carrying out of the qualification
processes.
The renewal of Loviisa power plant’s organisa-
tion plus the associated renewal of the plant’s
quality management system emphasise safety and
the management of plant service life to assure
plant safety and reliability. Assurance of personnel
competence in connection with change of genera-
tion is related to this matter. Loviisa power plant
has drawn up a plan to assure preservation of
knowledge concerning the plant and its safety
with the operating organisation.
The periodic inspection programme of the
Loviisa power plant, implemented by STUK, re-
vealed no significant safety defects.
STUK did not start any new investigation into
the plant’s operation in 2003.Annual assessment of deterministic safety
analyses
The licensees update the nuclear power plants’
deterministic safety analyses in connection with
the renewal of operating permits. The analyses
are updated also in connection with plant modifi-
cations, or whenever operational events warrant
it. STUK reviews the licensee’s analyses and con-
ducts, or commissions the conducting, where nec-
essary, of its own reference analyses. In 2003, no
deterministic safety analyses on the Loviisa plant
were submitted to STUK for review.
Annual assessment of probabilistic safety
analyses
STUK reviewed Loviisa plant’s updated annual
maintenance outage risk analysis. It contains
analyses of onsite initiating events, heavy lifts and
flooding during outages. As measures reducing
risks during outages, modifications decided upon
for other reasons, e.g. the construction of a prima-
ry circuit shutdown cooling system, procedural
modifications as well as changes in inspections and
testing had been identified.
The risk of cold shutdowns, 6.5 · 10-5/year, con-
stitutes over 90% of the risk estimated so far for
brief annual maintenances, or those of normal
duration. Total outage risk, hot shutdowns includ-
ed, is 7.1 · 10-5/year. The risk assessed for cold
shutdowns mainly divides between the four initi-
ating event groups below:
• Drops of heavy load lifts in the reactor hall
(21%)
• Dilution of primary coolant boron concentra-
tion (19%)
• Flooding (19%)
• Loss of service water system (18%)
Modifications were implemented at the Loviisa
plant in 2003 to reduce risk during outages. A
temporary dam is always constructed on the sea
water outlet channel during outages, which pre-
vents flooding in the lower compartments of the
building during their inspection. An inspection was
added to the work permit routines during outages
to assure a sufficiently high dam. The new inspec-
tion procedure was first used in the 2003 annual
maintenance.
A sampling system piping modification was11
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primary circuit water sample analysis even during
cold shutdowns and refuelling outages. The modi-
fication improves control of situations involving
unplanned dilution of the primary coolant boron
concentration and thus reduces the risk from this.
To further decrease risk during outages, emer-
gency bonnets were made for the valves of the
recirculation lines of the emergency core cooling
system and they are to be kept easily available.
The bonnets are installed without delay on the
flange of a valve opened for maintenance if main-
tenance work is interrupted or a water or steam
leak occurs through it. The modification reduces
the risk of a leak through the valve during main-
tenance.
In addition to the modifications implemented,
an analysis of the remaining service life of the
reactor hall crane is under way. The objective is to
reduce the risk from heavy lifts, which accounts
for about 21% of outage risk.
Safety performance indicators
The requirements set for the safety performance
indicators for nuclear power plants were fulfilled
at Loviisa power plant as regards occupational dos-
es, radioactive releases and population exposure.
Releases into the sea were reduced to the current
level in 1992 when caesium separation equipment
were commissioned at the plant.
No events occurred at the Loviisa plant units
that would have endangered plant safety.  The
objective set for the risk-importance of the inoper-
ability of components with a bearing on accident
risk, max 5 %, was exceeded at both Loviisa nuclear
power plant units. This was due to back-up diesel
generator latent defects and auxiliary feed water
system maintenance work. No special action by
STUK was required.
The number of events reported in accordance
with Guide YVL 1.5 was decreasing compared
with the previous year.
The indicators showed a deteriorating trend
for maintenance at the Loviisa power plant in
2003. The failures of components subject to the
Technical Specifications were apparent in multiple
technical fields and no special problem area could
be pointed out. It will be apparent in the future,12whether an actual change has taken place in the
previously decreasing trend.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers
containing radioactive releases is good. There
have been no fuel leaks at the Loviisa plant units
for years now. The combined leakage rate of
containment penetrations and airlocks increased
but the limit was not exceeded. The leaktightness
of the rubber bellows of the penetrations had been
problematic and the Loviisa power plant had pro-
posed their conversion to metal structures.
The effectiveness of STUK’s operations is eval-
uated by means of indicators describing plant
safety. The outcome for 2003 is given in Appendix 1.
It also gives some background for the indicators
and the procedures for acquiring them.
3.1.2 Oversight of plant modifications
Oversight of plant modifications consisted of the
definition of regulatory scope, the handling of doc-
uments pertaining to the modifications as well as
the supervision of their implementation and com-
missioning. Modifications to improve the safety of
the plant units are described in Appendix 2. Dur-
ing the 2003 annual maintenance outage, system
modifications were completed at the plant that
were part of a project in provision against severe
accidents. A project to replace radiation measure-
ments was also completed. STUK supervised the
carrying out of component and structural modifi-
cations by inspections at the plant sites and the
manufacturers’ premises as well as by reviewing
documents submitted by the licensees.
Modifications oversight included STUK/licen-
see meetings in which the licensees’ representa-
tives accounted for modifications planned, those
due for implementation in the next annual main-
tenance, or later, and also the status of ongoing
modifications. In many of these meetings, the
planned I&C systems upgrading was discussed.
Modifications were also regularly dealt with at
STUK internal oversight meetings and topical
meetings.
In consequence of modifications already imple-
mented at the plant, several documents changed
that describe the plants’ operation and structure -
such as the Technical Specifications, the Final
Safety Analysis Report and the operating and
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Figure 2. Load factors of the Loviisa plant units.
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Loviisa 1 Loviisa 2maintenance instructions. STUK supervised the
document revisions and generally followed the
updating of plant documentation after the modifi-
cations. A computer-based plant modifications reg-
ister was used to follow the status of safety-
significant modifications. In 2003, seven new mod-
ifications at the Loviisa plant unit were entered
into the register. On the register, several uncom-
pleted modifications, registered previously, were
also followed. In addition, the register was utilised
in monitoring the implementation of document
revisions pertaining to modifications. This result-
ed in the observation that document revisions
relating to modifications made in 2002, which
were followed on the register, were completed at
the Loviisa plant in 96% by the annual mainte-
nance of 2003 (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.6).
3.1.3 Oversight of plant operability
Compliance with the Technical
Specifications
Compliance with the Technical Specifications at
the Loviisa power plant was controlled by witness-
ing operations onsite. Subject to oversight were in
particular the testing and repair of components
subject to the Technical Specifications. After com-
pletion of the annual maintenance outages, the
plant unit’s compliance with the Technical Specifi-
cations was established before startup. The licen-
see is obliged to immediately report to STUK all
plant situations that are in non-compliance with
the Technical Specifications.
One situation occurred at the Loviisa plant
units during which a plant unit did not comply
with the Technical Specifications (Appendix 1, in-
dicator A.I.2). This was in connection with the
renewal of radiation measurements. The event is
looked into in more detail in Appendix 3. The
licensee has planned actions to prevent recur-
rence.
The Technical Specifications were also deviat-
ed from by applying in advance for STUK’s ap-
proval of non-compliances. In 2003, the licensee
applied for approval of 21 deviations from the
Technical Specifications. (Appendix 1, indicator
A.I.2). After having analysed the deviations’ safety
significance, STUK approved all the applications.Ten exemptions pertained to deviations from the
Technical Specifications caused by plant modifica-
tions. Two approvals were granted for a deviation
pertaining to a specific testing or fault detection.
The other six related to non-compliances during
repairs and maintenance.
Operational events
The Loviisa plant units operated reliably in 2003.
The load factor of Loviisa 1 was   92.4 % and that
of Loviisa 2 was 87.9%. Fig. 2 gives the plant
units’ load factors for 1994–2003. The duration of
the annual maintenance outage at Loviisa 1 was
23.5 days and 16.5 days at Loviisa 2. There were
no other production breaks at the plant units. In
May Loviisa 2 operated for about 20 days at about
50% power to repair a leak in the hydrogen cool-
ing system of the plant unit’s other generator and
to find out the cause of an elevated turbine sup-
porting bearing temperature. Loviisa 2 operated
at about 50% even after the annual maintenance
outage for replacement of the generator stator of
the plant unit’s other generator. The power reduc-
tion lasted for about 41 days. In July–August pow-
er at both plant units had to be reduced due to
exceptionally high sea water temperature.
Figure 3 gives the daily average gross powers
of the plant units in 2003. Production losses in
nominal output caused by component failures
were 0.1% at Loviisa 1 and 2.6% at Loviisa 2.
Production losses from component failures in a
longer time period are depicted by indicators in
Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.1g).
At the Loviisa plant units, one event warrant-
ed a special report and five operational transients13
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curred at the plant units (Appendix 1, indicator
A.II.1). In addition to event reports, the Loviisa
power plant submitted to STUK daily reports,
quarterly reports, annual reports, outage reports,
annual environmental safety reports, monthly in-
dividual dose reports, annual operational feed back
reports and nuclear safeguards reports.
The special report submitted by the Loviisa
plant concerned an event during which three
ventilation stack monitors were simultaneously
inoperational for about 20 hours during the re-
newal of radiation measurements at Loviisa 2.
The event was classified INES Level 0. The event
is explained in more detail in Appendix 3. Figure 4
gives the number of INES Level 1 events in 1994–
2003. During this time period, no events exceed-
ing INES Level 1 occurred at the Loviisa plant.
Annual maintenance outages
The annual maintenance outages of the Loviisa
plant units were refuelling outages, which means
that, in addition to refuelling, only necessary
maintenance, repairs, testing and minor modifica-
tions were carried out. The Loviisa 1 annual14
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Figure 3. Daily average gross power of the Loviisa plant umaintenance outage was on 2 to 25 August, 2003.
It lasted 23.5 days, whereas its planned duration
was 16.5 days. The extension was due, among oth-
ers, to the commissioning of new reactor pit wash-
ing equipment and the repair of a regulator valve
in the primary coolant pump sealing water system
during startup. The Loviisa 2 annual maintenance
outage was on 23 August to 9 September 2003. It
lasted 16.5 days. During it a replacement of the
stator of the other generator was started, which
was continued after the annual maintenance.
The licensee inspected areas of the control rod
drive mechanism protection pipes around their
temperature measurement devices, since cracking
had been detected in the protection pipes previ-
ously (Annual Report 2002, STUK-B-YTO 224). At
Loviisa 1, defects in three protection pipes were
found and the pipes were replaced. Seven defec-
tive protection pipes were found at Loviisa 2. The
temperature measurement device insulation
shield boxes, which gather humidity thus causing
stress corrosion, have now been removed from
about half of all the protection pipes. The rest of
the shield boxes are due for removal and the
protection pipes are due for inspection in the 2004Loviisa 1, 2003
7 8 9 10 11 12
4
Loviisa 2, 2003
7 8 9 10 11 12
4
nits in 2003.
ST U K - B - Y TO 2 3 3outages. Removal of insulation lowers the meas-
ured temperature value by a few degrees, which
will be taken into account in assessment of the
measurement results. The protection pipes are
visually inspected every two weeks during opera-
tion. Even very small leaks are detectable by the
boric acid crystallised on the pipe surfaces. Poten-
tial minor leaks would not endanger plant safety
but it would have to be placed into cold shutdown
for repairs.
Safety improvements made during the annual
maintenance outage are described in Appendix 2.
The collective radiation dose incurred in out-
age work was 0.56 manSv at Loviisa 1 and
0.29 manSv at Loviisa 2. The highest individual
dose during Loviisa 1 annual maintenance was
7.7 mSv and that for Loviisa 2 was 4.4 mSv. Fig-
ure 5 presents the collective radiation dose in-
curred in annual maintenance outage work in
1999–2003. Radiation safety at the Loviisa plant
units as a whole is described separately in this
chapter.
Regulatory oversight by STUK focused, among
others, on the administrative arrangements of
outage work, the activities of the operating and
maintenance personnel, refuelling as well as in-
spections and tests by the licensee and sub-con-
tractors. Attention was also paid to the implemen-
tation of radiation protection, control room opera-
tions and housekeeping. Prior to the start of a
new fuel cycle, safety analyses made for each
plant unit were reviewed. In addition, it was
inspected that the fuel assemblies were loaded
into the reactor according to plan. The nuclearFigure 4. Loviisa plant's INES classified events (INES
Level > 0).
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INES 1material inventory was inspected prior to the
closing of the reactor pressure vessel head.
During the annual maintenance outages,
STUK carried out inspections required in the
Pressure Equipment Act. In addition, the periodic
inspections of pressure vessels and other pres-
sure-bearing components were controlled by re-
viewing programmes pertaining to them and wit-
nessing inspections onsite.
STUK controlled also the bringing of the plant
units into a shutdown state and their subsequent
startup. STUK approved on 25 July 2003 the
starting of a Loviisa 1 refuelling outage and on 22
August 2003 the starting of a Loviisa 2 outage.
The permission to start up Loviisa 1 was granted
on 18 August 2003. STUK’s inspectors ascertained
the plant unit’s start-up readiness onsite on 24
August 2003. Loviisa 1 was connected to the na-
tional grid on 25 August 2003. The permission for
Loviisa 2’s start-up was given by STUK on 7
September 2003 and the plant unit’s start-up read-
iness was established onsite on 8 September 2003.
Loviisa 2 was connected to the national grid on 9
September 2003.
The regulatory oversight of Loviisa facility’s
annual maintenance outages onsite took 128 work-
ing days. One resident inspector was regularly
working on the site as well.
Ageing
The strategic objective for Loviisa power plant’s
service life management currently is 50 years’ op-
erating life. Service life management is one of the
main tasks of the power plant engineering divi-15
Figure 5. Collective occupational doses incurred in
annual maintenance outage work at the Loviisa plant
units
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Table I. Occupational radiation dose distribution at
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units in 2003.
Dose range Number of persons by dose range
(mSv)
Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0.5 220 450 620
0.5–1 115 267 335
1–2 118 224 328
2–3 50 80 130
3–4 37 26 68
4–5 24 14 47
5–6 13 9 29
6–7 11 3 19
7–8 8 2 14
8–9 2 – 9
9–10 2 – 6
10–11 2 – 5
11–12 1 – 1
12–13 – – 1
13–14 – – 2
14–15 – – 2
15–16 – – –
16–17 – – 4
17–18 – – 2
18–19 – – 1
19–20 – – –
20–21 – – –
21–25 – – –
> 25 – – –
* The data in these columns also include Finnish workers who
have received doses at Swedish nuclear power plants. The
same person may have worked at both Finnish nuclear power
plants and in Sweden.
Source: STUK’s dose registersion set up at the Loviisa plant in the utility re-
organisation of 2002. The procedure for service
life management was revised in early 2003. It di-
vides the plant’s systems, components and struc-
tures into four classes, based on their service life
management. Those in the highest class are deci-
sive for plant service life. In connection with the
upgrading of the plant’s information management
systems, the service life management information
system to be upgraded has been defined, which is
due for commissioning during 2004.
Significant measures in 2003 affecting the serv-
ice life of the Loviisa plant were the signing of
conceptual design agreements on the upgrading of
the plant’s I&C systems. They are due for upgrad-
ing in 2006–2014.
STUK’s oversight of plant service life manage-
ment comprised the following actions: review of
follow-up reports on the ageing of mechanical
components and electrical and I&C systems; and
of the procedures for service life management;
plus the making of periodic inspections of mechan-
ical components, electrical and I&C systems and
structures.
Inspection methods are to be qualified to im-
prove the reliability of the in-service inspection of
the most important mechanical components by
non-destructive methods. Qualification according
to the national model applied so far has proved
inefficient and time-consuming. In 2003, based on
STUK’s requests, a review of qualification proce-
dures was started and also discussion about a
possible renewal of the qualification organisation.
Radiation safety
Occupational radiation exposure
The radiation doses of all those who worked at
Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2003 were below
the 50 mSv annual limit. The distribution of indi-
vidual doses in 2003 is given in Table I. The high-
est individual dose at Loviisa nuclear power plant
was 12.7 mSv. It accumulated during work at Lovii-
sa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. The high-
est individual dose incurred at Loviisa nuclear
power plant alone was 11.6 mSv. Individual radia-
tion doses did not exceed the dose limit of 100 mSv
defined for any period of five years. The highest16individual dose to a Finnish nuclear power plant
worker in the 5-year period 1999–2003, 71.6 mSv,
was received at Loviisa nuclear power plant.
The collective occupational radiation dose at
both Loviisa plant units in 2003 was 0.94 manSv.
The collective occupational dose was 0.61 manSv
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guidelines state that the threshold for one plant
unit’s collective dose averaged over two successive
years is 2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of net electri-
cal power. This means a radiation dose of
1.22 manSv per one Loviisa plant unit. The value
was not exceeded at either plant unit. The collec-
tive occupational radiation doses over the past
years are given in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.4).
Radioactive releases
Radioactive releases from Loviisa nuclear power
plant were well below authorised limits in 2003.
Releases of radioactive noble gases were ca 7 TBq,
ie about 0.03% of authorised limit. The releases of
radioactive noble gases were dominated by argon-
41, ie the activation product of argon-40, originat-
ing in the air space between the reactor pressure
vessel and the biological shield. The releases of
radioactive iodine isotopes were about 4 MBq, ie
approx 0.002% of authorised limit. Aerosol releas-
es were approx 80 MBq, tritium releases approx
0.2 TBq and carbon-14 releases approx 0.3 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents, 15 TBq,
is about 10% of the release limit. The total activity
of other nuclides released into the sea was about
0.3 GBq, ie about 0.03 % of the release limit.
The release limits are to maintain individual
annual radiation exposure in the surrounding pop-
ulation of plants clearly below the threshold value
(100 microSv) determined by the Government
Resolution (395/1991). The calculated radiation
dose of the most exposed individual in the vicinity
of the plant was about 0.05 microSv, ie less than
0.1% of the set limit. Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.5)
gives radioactive releases and calculated radiation
doses to the most exposed individual in the plant
vicinity over the past years.
Environmental radiation monitoring
Environmental radiation monitoring around a nu-
clear power plant comprises on- and off-site radia-
tion measurements as well as determination of
radioactive substances to establish public exposure
and radioactive substances in the environment.
In the environment of Loviisa nuclear power
plant, 293 samples were analysed in accordancewith a monitoring programme. Radioactive sub-
stances originating in  Loviisa nuclear power plant
were measured in two samples of deposition, one
sample of bottom fauna, nine samples of aquatic
plants, seven samples of sinking matter and seven
samples of sea water.
Cobalt-60, the dominating radioactive sub-
stance originating in power plants, was measured
in all of the aforementioned kinds of sample. The
total number of observations was 19. The next
most dominant were the radioactive isotope of
silver (silver-110m, 7 observations) and tritium
(7 observations). Also cobalt-58, the activation
product of nickel (2 observations), was detected in
some samples as well as manganese-54, originat-
ing in iron, (2 observations) and antimonium (Sb-
124, 1 observation).
All the detected concentrations were low and
had no bearing on radiation exposure.
Radioactive strontium and caesium isotopes
(strontium-90, caesium-134 ja -137, plutonium 238,
239 and 240) originating from the Chernobyl acci-
dent and the fallout from nuclear weapons tests
are still measurable in environmental samples.
Natural radioactive substances (ia beryllium 7,
potassium-40 as well as uranium and thorium
with their decay products) are also detected. Their
concentrations usually exceed those of nuclides
originating from the power plant or fallout.
Dosimeters for external radiation measure-
ment have been placed in about ten locations and
15 continuous-operation radiation dose rate meas-
uring stations at a distance of two and five kilome-
tres from the plants. The measurement data from
these stations are transferred to the power plants’
control rooms and to the national radiation-moni-
toring network.
3.1.4 Oversight of organisational operation
Safety management
A periodic inspection pertaining to safety manage-
ment was conducted at the Loviisa plant in 2003.
It yielded positive results as regards organisation-
al development, quality management, develop-
ment of personnel and self-assessment. Explicit
goals had been set up in all these fields at the17
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are being acted upon. The plant’s management
follows the status of the activities.
Information accumulated during document re-
view and other inspection activity at the Loviisa
plant was examined in 2003 with a view to the
management of plant safety. No significant prob-
lems were observed in plant safety management.
Quality management system
Loviisa nuclear power plant has systematically
maintained and developed its quality management
system according to own plans. In 2002 and 2003,
the system was updated to correspond to the or-
ganisational and procedural changes implemented
at the plant. In addition, Fortum Power and
Heat Oy has updated the guidelines describing the
quality management system for the nuclear ener-
gy section of the Fortum Group.
The licensee has compared the quality man-
agement system of the Loviisa plant with, among
others, the ISO Standard and the safety require-
ments and guidelines of the IAEA over the past
three years. Based on this, the system has been
further developed by, among others, management
reviews and self-assessment.
The Loviisa plant regularly evaluates the func-
tionality of its quality management system by
means of an internal audit programme and a
separate, independent inspection procedure.
STUK oversaw quality management by docu-
ment reviews and periodic inspection. The quality
management system of the licensee and Loviisa
power plant was found acceptable. The procedures
in use at the Loviisa plant were also found to be
in compliance with the plant’s own quality man-
agement system. Remarks were given during the
inspections, mostly on further development of the
system and definition of detail.
Personnel qualifications and training
An organisational rearrangement took place at the
Loviisa plant in 2002. It was in preparation of,
among others, change of generation, and done by
offering a chance to knowledge transfer from sen-
ior to junior personnel in expert tasks and by as-
signing junior personnel to line organisation man-
agement tasks. Several persons, who had worked
for a relatively short time for the Loviisa plant,18participated in Finland in a 6-week basic profes-
sional training course on nuclear safety.
Within the framework of the periodic inspec-
tion programme, STUK oversaw the appropriate-
ness and adequacy of Loviisa nuclear power plant’s
organisation and its personnel training. In a sepa-
rate inspection on training, the plant procedures
to assure personnel competence were reviewed
and their sufficiency identified. This was in prepa-
ration of a discussion on human resources devel-
opment in connection with safety management
inspection.
Upon application by Fortum Power and Heat
Oy, STUK authorised two persons to function as
deputies to the responsible manager at Loviisa
nuclear power plant, as referred to in section 79 of
the Nuclear Energy Act (990/87) and sections 122–
127 of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/88).
In addition, upon application by the licensee,
STUK authorised persons in the licensee’s employ
to work as shift managers or operators at the
power plant. Twelve persons employed at the
Loviisa plant were authorised. Both authorisa-
tions and reauthorisations took place.
Operational experience feedback
Licensee operational experience feedback consist-
ed of the handling of events at own and other
plants. Even events at plants abroad were dealt
with in special operational feedback working
groups. The objective of operational experience
feedback is to prevent recurrence of events that
endanger plant safety.
STUK’s oversight of operational feedback ac-
tivities was by periodic inspection and review of
operational reports and the annual operational
feedback report submitted by the licensee. The
Loviisa plant has systematic and regulated proce-
dures for event investigation, assessment and
implementing of corrective action. In a periodic
inspection, requirements were put forth for the
further development of operations.
Furthermore, STUK evaluated the appropri-
ateness of experiences learned from events abroad
for consideration at Finnish plants. Event infor-
mation was obtained through the Incident Report-
ing System (IRS) of the IAEA and the OECD. In
2003 twenty event reports were reviewed, eight of
which lead to detailed inspection after preliminary
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ate action from the licensees. At the Loviisa plant,
two events led to consideration of lessons learnt
in the course of normal STUK inspection activity.
Periodic inspection programme
In 2003 STUK carried out 21 periodic inspections
at the Loviisa plant. Safety management, the
main processes of operation and also procedures
as well as the technical acceptability of systems
were looked into. Compliance of safety assess-
ment, operation, maintenance and protection ac-
tivities (ia radiation protection, fire protection and
physical protection) with the requirements of nu-
clear safety regulations was verified by the inspec-
tions. The annual inspection programme was
brought to the attention of the licensee at the
beginning of 2003 and inspection dates were
agreed upon with licensee representatives. Inspec-
tions contained in the periodic inspection pro-
gramme are listed in Appendix 4.
Information was acquired through oral reports
requested from representatives of the power
plants, personnel interviews, document reviews,
walk rounds, observing of working as well as
various measurements, ia to establish accuracy of
measuring equipment. None of the observations
made had an immediate bearing on the safety of
the plant units. Actions were initiated onsite to
repair the defects observed.
Authorisation of pressure equipment
manufacturers as well as inspection and
testing organisations
Upon application by Fortum Power and Heat Oy,
and in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act,
STUK authorised three manufacturers of nuclear
pressure equipment.
In addition, upon application by Fortum Power
and Heat Oy, testers employed by four separate
testing organisations were authorised to carry out
in-service inspection of mechanical components
and structures at the Loviisa plant units. Previous
decisions pertaining to manufacturers and testing
organisations are valid, as mentioned in the deci-
sions.
Inspection Organisation Loviisa YVL, author-
ised in 2002, continued in operation.The manufacturers as well as testing and in-
spection organisations authorised by STUK were
subject to oversight by STUK.
Nuclear liability
The users of nuclear energy must have acquired
liability as stipulated in the Nuclear Liability Act
(484/1972), or other financial guarantee, for a pos-
sible accident at a nuclear facility that would harm
the environment, population and property. Fortum
Power and Heat Oy has prepared for damage from
a nuclear accident as prescribed by law by taking
out an insurance policy for this purpose mainly in
the Finnish Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In case of an accident, the funds available for
compensation come from three sources: the licen-
see, the country of location of the facility and the
international liability community. In 2003, a total
of about 425 000 000 € was available for compensa-
tion from all these sources.
The ascertaining of the contents and condi-
tions of a licensee’s insurance arrangements in
Finland belongs to the Insurance Supervisory Au-
thority. It has approved Fortum Power and
Heat Oy’s liability insurance and STUK has veri-
fied its existence in accordance with section 55 of
The Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987).
The Nuclear Liability Act covers also the
transport of nuclear materials. STUK has ascer-
tained that all nuclear material transport has
liability insurance approved by the Insurance Su-
pervisory Authority.
3.2 Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
3.2.1 Overall safety assessment
Implementation of regulations
STUK has introduced a procedure to apply new or
revised YVL guides to operating nuclear facilities.
A new YVL guide does not, as such, change
STUK’s decisions made before its publication.
Only after STUK has heard those concerned, it
decides how a new or revised YVL guide applies to
operating nuclear facilities, or those under con-
struction and to licensee operations. New guides
apply as such to new nuclear facilities.
When STUK decides how new safety require-
ments in YVL guides apply to operating nuclear19
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into account a principle stated in section 27 of the
Government Resolution (395/1991); namely, that
to further improve safety, measures are to be
implemented that are justifiable considering oper-
ational experience, safety research and the devel-
opment of science and technology.
Implementation decisions in accordance with
the new procedure were made on the below guides
• Guide YVL 5.5, Instrumentation systems and
components of nuclear facilities, 13 September
2002
• Guide YVL 6.7, Quality management of nucle-
ar fuel, 17 March 2003.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy gave its assessment of how
the requirements of the new Guide YVL 5.5 have
been implemented at Olkiluoto plant. STUK con-
sidered the assessment insufficient and requested
a more detailed assessment of the fulfilment of
the new requirements. Consideration of the re-
quirements of the new guide were required partic-
ularly as regards the planned control room renew-
al of the Olkiluoto units.  Assessment pertaining
to implementation continued towards the end of
2003, based on a report submitted by Teollisuuden
Voima Oy.
It was established that the requirements of the
revised Guide YVL 6.7 were fulfilled, except for
the licensee’s required auditing of the fuel manu-
facturer. STUK did not approve of the compensato-
ry procedure presented by Teollisuuden Voima Oy
but in its decision requested adherence to the
procedure given in the revised guide.
Annual safety assessment
The annual safety assessment for Olkiluoto nucle-
ar power plant looks at observations made during
the regulation of plant modifications, plant opera-
bility and organisational operation in 2003. The
areas of assessment are dealt with in more detail
in this report’s chapters dealing with nuclear reg-
ulation, and in its appendices.
Minor modifications were made at Olkiluoto
power plant in 2003 to improve, among others,
the user interface of the plant’s process computer
in the control room.
The number of plant situations in non-compli-20ance with the Technical Specifications at Olkiluoto
nuclear power plant was higher than usual. There
were significant common factors underlining
them, ie shortcomings in adherence to instruc-
tions, in management of periodic inspections, in
monitoring of plant state and in identification of
the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
The licensee has undertaken the necessary devel-
opment measures.
The annual maintenance outages of Olkiluoto
power plant were refuelling outages by nature and
no significant safety-related observations were
made during them.  Inspections conducted by the
licensee during the annual maintenance of
Olkiluoto 2 revealed fault indications in one of
four feed water assemblies. This lead to additional
inspections of feed water assemblies in the 2003
annual maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 1. Two
fuel assemblies were removed in the Olkiluoto 1
annual maintenance outage: one was leaking and
on the other corrosion products had accumulated.
No individual occupational radiation dose ex-
ceeded the limit set for nuclear power plant work-
ers. The collective occupational radiation dose was
low by international comparison. Radioactive re-
leases were low, too, and the radiation dose calcu-
lated on their basis to the most exposed individual
in the vicinity of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
was clearly below a limit set by Government
Resolution.
At Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, long-term
follow-up on the plant’s ageing has been reorgan-
ised during 2003. Reporting on the maintenance
function has been developed so as to enhance the
options for ageing follow-up. In 2003, a turbine
plant upgrading project was started that is consid-
ered important for the service life management of
the Olkiluoto facility. Significant safety defects
have been detected in inspections relating to the
ageing management of mechanical components
and of electrical and I&C systems and structures.
Maintenance indicators for the Olkiluoto plant
showed an improved maintenance function that
was indicated ia by shorter failure repair times.
No common cause failures occurred that would
have prevented the plant’s operation.
Qualification of the periodic inspections of the
most important mechanical components by non-
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the reliability of data on ageing management.
Qualification of ultrasonic and eddy current in-
spections has not been developed as promptly as
required by STUK, based on European recommen-
dations. To repair the situation, new national
arrangements for enforcement of qualification
have been agreed upon with both utilities.
At Olkiluoto power plant, the number of opera-
tional events and events warranting a special
report has increased from the year 2000, and has
remained high. The high number of events indi-
cates a weakened safety and quality culture in
plant operation. The high number of events could
also arise from the fact that safety culture was
highlighted onsite in 2003. Some of the events
relate to the observation of previous errors. In a
STUK periodic inspection pertaining to plant oper-
ation, development needs were observed relating
to improvement of the effectiveness of operational
feedback activities and to allocation of sufficient
resources for the tasks in question. The licensee
has taken the necessary immediate corrective
action and started the necessary improvements.
In 2003, new personnel were recruited to
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant who will contribute
to both the design, construction and commission-
ing of the new plant unit and the planning of
modifications to operating power plants. This as-
sures the effective transfer of knowhow acquired
in the course of the planning of the new plant unit
to the modernisation projects of operating plant
units, provided that sufficient resources are re-
served for both tasks.
No new investigations into plant operation
were started by STUK in 2003.
Annual assessment of deterministic safety
analyses
The licensees update deterministic safety analyses
for nuclear power plants in connection with the
renewal of the plants’ operating permits. The anal-
yses are also updated in connection with plant
modifications or operational events, where neces-
sary. STUK reviews licensee analyses and con-
ducts, or commissions, own reference analyses,
where necessary. No deterministic safety analyses
were submitted to STUK for review in 2003.Annual assessment of probabilistic safety
analyses
A review of Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis
(PSA) for the Olkiluoto plant was completed. Level
2 analysis assesses the amounts of radioactive sub-
stances released into the environment in the ear-
ly phases of a severe accident and also the proba-
bilities of the releases. From the viewpoint of re-
sults interpretation, the most important observa-
tion made during the review was that Teollisuu-
den Voima Oy has defined as caesium-137 equiva-
lents the radioactive release resulting from a se-
vere accident, whereas the Government Resolu-
tion (395/1991) on the general requirements for
nuclear power plant safety define the release
threshold only as an inventory of the caesium-137.
The calculation method used by Teollisuuden Voi-
ma Oy is stricter than that defined in the Govern-
ment Resolution. Therefore, the frequency
(6.4 · 10-6 / year) of a major release (100 TBq) in
the early phase of an accident, as calculated by
Teollisuuden Voima Oy, is somewhat higher that
that (4 · 10-6 /year) calculated in accordance with
the definition contained in the Government Reso-
lution.
Safety performance indicators
The requirements set for the safety performance
indicators for nuclear power plants were fulfilled
at Olkiluoto power plant as regards occupational
radiation doses, radioactive releases and popula-
tion exposure. Releases into the sea reduced to
the present level in 1998 when new equipment for
process water purification and treatment were in-
troduced.
No events occurred at the Olkiluoto plant
units that would have endangered safety. One
reactor scram occurred at Olkiluoto 1 that was
classified an initiating event. All safety systems
functioned according to design during it. The
objective, max 5%, set for the risk -importance of
the inoperability of components affecting accident
risk was exceeded at Olkiluoto 2. This was due to
the repair of ceilings of the pump sumps of the
shutdown reactor service water systems at both
plant units under an exemption granted by STUK.
In addition, one stand-up diesel generator latent
defect occurred Olkiluoto 2, which was somewhat21
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measures from STUK. At the same time, indica-
tors on the quality of maintenance showed higher
efficiency and better quality.
The increasing trend at Olkiluoto power plant
in the number of operational events and events
warranting a special report, plant conditions in
non-compliance with the Technical Specifications
included, for three years in succession indicates a
weakened safety and quality culture in plant oper-
ation. This was also evident from the four INES
Level 1 events that occurred at the plant within a
short period of time towards the end of 2003. The
effectiveness of STUK’s regulatory activities is
also assessed by adherence to the Technical Speci-
fications. Based on the events, STUK has started
discussions with the management of Teollisuuden
Voima Oy, underlining the need for a common
effort in the overall development of safety culture
in nuclear power plant operation.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers to
contain radioactive releases has been good. The
number of fuel leaks at Olkiluoto plant has been
small. In the operating cycle 2002–2003, unidenti-
fied leaks from the primary circuit increased,
being at Olkiluoto 2 as much as 9.4% from the
limit of the Technical Specifications, compared
with the previous operating cycle. This was attrib-
uted to leaking check valves in the relief system
of the main steam system during the entire oper-
ating cycle. The licensee is devising a new sealing
solution for the valves.
The outcome of the indicators on plant safety,
used in assessment of the effectiveness of STUK’s
operations, in 2003 are given in Appendix 1. In
addition, some background is given to the indica-
tors and the procedures used in their acquisition.
3.2.2 Oversight of plant modifications
Oversight of modifications made at the Olkiluoto
plant comprised definition of their regulatory
scope, handling of documents pertaining to them
and control of their implementation and commis-
sioning. Safety modifications are described in Ap-
pendix 2. STUK oversaw the implementation of
component and structural modifications by inspec-
tions onsite and at the component manufacturers’22premises as well as by licensee documents. Per-
taining to the modifications oversight were meet-
ings between STUK and the licensee as well as
meetings internal to STUK, as described in sub-
section 3.1.2.
The status of safety-significant modifications
was followed on a computer-based plant modifica-
tions register held at STUK. In 2003 the number
of new modifications at the Olkiluoto plant units,
entered in the register, was nine. Several unfin-
ished modifications, registered earlier, were moni-
tored on the register as well. It was also utilised
specifically in monitoring the implementation of
modifications-related document revisions. As a re-
sult of the follow-up, it was noticed that 86% of
the document revisions made after plant modifica-
tions at the Olkiluoto plant in 2002 had been
completed by the next annual maintenance.
3.2.3 Oversight of plant operability
Compliance with the Technical
Specifications
Adherence to the Technical Specifications at
Olkiluoto power plant was controlled by witness-
ing operations onsite. Specific areas of control in-
cluded the testing and repair of components sub-
ject to the Technical Specifications. When the an-
nual maintenance outages had ended, the plant
unit’s state in compliance with the Technical Spec-
ifications was ascertained prior to start-up. The
licensee is responsible for reporting to STUK
without delay all situations deviating from the re-
quirements of the Technical Specifications.
At the Olkiluoto plant units, eight situations
occurred, mentioned in the “Operational events”,
during which the plant unit was in non-compli-
ance with the Technical Specifications. Two devia-
tions were detected in the course of STUK’s
regulatory inspections.
The number of plant conditions in non-compli-
ance with the Technical Specifications at the
Olkiluoto plant has increased (Appendix 1, indica-
tor A.I.2). “Operational events” presents their
causes and “Safety management” in subsection
3.2.4 looks into them from the viewpoint of organ-
isational operation.
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from also by applying in advance for STUK’s
approval of a deviation. In 2003 the licensee
applied for approval of seven situations in non-
compliance with the Technical Specifications (Ap-
pendix 1, indicator A.I.2). After an analysis of
their safety significance, STUK approved them all.
Four of the exemptions were deviations from the
Technical Specifications due to modifications, re-
pairs or maintenance. One exemption was granted
for a deviation due to a specific test.
Operational events
Both Olkiluoto plant units operated reliably. The
load factor of Olkiluoto 1 was 97.0% and that of
Olkiluoto 2 was 95.5%. Figure 6 gives the load
factors of the plant units in 1994–2003. The annu-
al maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 1 was nine
days and that of Olkiluoto 2 was 14 days. The
progress of the outages and the measures taken
during them are described later in this chapter.
A reactor scram occurred at Olkiluoto 1 from
low reactor water level during post-outage start-
up. Since the reactor control rods were inside the
reactor at the time, no actual scram occurred but
only scram-related safety systems actuated. The
event is explained in more detail in Appendix 3. In
addition to the annual maintenance outage,  a brief
break in production occurred at Olkiluoto 1 to re-
pair a leaking sealing in the inspection opening of
a moisture separator and at Olkiluoto 2 to balance
the turbine and to repair a leaking valve in the
feed water system. In July–August, power of bothFigure 6. Load factors of the Olkiluoto plant units.
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Olkiluoto 1 Olkiluoto 2plant units had to be reduced due to exceptionally
high sea water temperatures.
Figure 7 gives the daily average gross powers
of the plant units in 2003. Production losses from
component failures were 0.2% at Olkiluoto 1 and
0.4% at Olkiluoto 2. The indicators given in Ap-
pendix 1 look at production losses from compo-
nent failures for a longer period (indicator A.1.1.g).
Eight events warranting a special report, one
reactor scram and eight operational transients
reported to STUK occurred at the Olkiluoto plant
units (Appendix 1, indicator A.II.1). In addition to
event reports, Olkiluoto plant submitted to STUK
daily reports, quarterly reports, annual reports,
outage reports, annual environmental safety re-
ports, monthly individual radiation dose reports,
annual operational feedback reports and safe-
guards reports.
Events at the Olkiluoto plant, on which a
special report was drawn up, and their INES
classification, are as follows:
• Deterioration of the containment isolation
function due to the failure to operate of  a
steam line isolation valve at Olkiluoto 1. INES
Level 1.
• Inoperability of emergency coolant pumps at
Olkiluoto 2 during annual maintenance.
INES Level 1.
• A strainer clogged up at Olkiluoto 1 during
annual maintenance. INES Level 0.
• The rate-of-change limit for reactor water tem-
perature given in the Technical Specifications
was exceeded at Olkiluoto 1. INES Level 1.
• Inoperability of a fire damper in the staircase
of the Olkiluoto 2 reactor building. INES
Level 1.
• Inoperability of a fire pump at Olkiluoto nucle-
ar power plant. INES Level 1.
• The floor drainage level measurement function
at the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage was not
inspected. INES Level 1.
• High vibration levels on emergency coolant
pumps at Olkiluoto 1. INES Level 1.
Event descriptions can be found in Appendix 3.
None of the events endangered plant safety.
However, common factors underlying them, ia
shortcomings in adherence to instructions, in ad-
ministration of periodic inspections, monitoring of23
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of the Technical Specifications. Event initiation
has also been affected by the insufficiency in
operational feedback activities to identify event
causes and thus prevent recurrence. Underlying
causes include also factors relating to safety cul-
ture and procedures. The licensee set up a work-
ing group to look into the development measures
necessary because of the events. Several of them
have already been implemented to prevent recur-
rence.
Figure 8 gives the number of INES Level 1
events in 1994–2003. No events above that oc-
curred.
Annual maintenance outages
The refuelling and maintenance outage of Olkiluo-
to 2 was on 11 to 26 May, 2003 and that of Olkiluo-
to 1 on 27 May to 6 July, 2003. Olkiluoto 1 discon-
tinued electricity generation for about nine days
and Olkiluoto 2 for about 14 days.
At Olkiluoto 1, a fuel leak detected on 27
February 2003 was localised during the annual
maintenance outage to one leaking fuel bundle. In
addition, one fuel bundle with an exceptional24
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850amount of corrosion products was detected. The
bundles were removed from the reactor. Fuel
cladding integrity over the past years is examined
in Appendix 1 (indicator A.III.1).
In a periodic inspection during annual mainte-
nance, an indication along the pipe centre line
was detected at Olkiluoto 2 in one of four reactor
pressure vessel feedwater assemblies. This is ex-
plained in more detail in Appendix 3. An internal
inspection of feedwater assemblies was conducted
at Olkiluoto 1, too, because of the event, even if it
was not due according to the 2003 inspection
programme. No reportable indications were de-
tected at Olkiluoto 1, however.
Safety improvements made in the annual main-
tenance outage are explained in Appendix 2.
The collective occupational dose during the
outage was 0.20 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and
0.71 manSv at Olkiluoto 2. The highest individual
radiation dose at Olkiluoto 1 during the outage
was 2.5 mSv and 7.9 mSv at Olkiluoto 2. Figure 9
presents the collective radiation doses incurred in
annual maintenance in 1999–2003. Radiation safe-
ty at the Olkiluoto plant overall is separately
described in this chapter.Olkiluoto 1, 2003
7 8 9 10 11 12
nits.
Olkiluoto 2, 2003
7 8 9 10 11 12
ST U K - B - Y TO 2 3 3Regulatory oversight by STUK focused ia on
the administrative arrangements of outage work,
the activities of the operating and maintenance
personnel, refuelling as well as inspections and
tests by the licensee and sub-contractors. Atten-
tion was also paid to the implementation of radia-
tion protection, control room operations and
housekeeping. Prior to the start of a new fuel
cycle, safety analyses made for both plant units
were checked. In addition, it was checked that the
fuel assemblies were loaded into the reactor ac-
cording to plan. The nuclear material inventory
was inspected prior to the closing of the reactor
pressure vessel head.
During the annual maintenance outages,
STUK carried out inspections required in the
Pressure Equipment Act. In addition, periodic
inspections of pressure vessels and other pres-
sure-bearing components were controlled by re-
viewing programmes pertaining to it and witness-
ing inspections onsite.
In addition, STUK controlled the plant unit’s
placement in a shutdown state and its subsequent
startup. On 8 August 2003 STUK approved the
starting of refuelling -related measures. A corre-
sponding approval was granted to Olkiluoto 1 on
22 May 2003. The permission to start up Olkiluo-
to 2 was granted on 23 May 2003. STUK’s inspec-
tors ascertained the plant unit’s start-up readiness
onsite on 25 May 2003. Olkiluoto 2 was connected
to the national grid on 26 May 2003. The permis-
sion for Olkiluoto 1’s start-up was given on 3 June
2003 and the plant unit’s start-up readiness was
ascertained onsite on 3–4 June 2003 by STUK’s
inspectors. A minor water leak from the cable
penetrations of a primary circulation pump wasFigure 8. INES classified events at Olkiluoto plant
(INES Level > 0).
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INES 1detected in start-up inspections and the plant unit
was brought back to cold shutdown for repairs.
During the plant’s cooling down a reactor scram
occurred from erroneous operational action (see
Appendix 3 for a separate description). The leak-
ing penetrations were fixed after which start-up
continued. Olkiluoto 1 was connected to the na-
tional grid on 6 June 2003.
One hundred and thirteen working days were
spent onsite on the regulatory oversight of the
annual maintenance outages of the Olkiluoto plant
units. In addition, two resident inspectors were
working on the plant site.
Ageing
In the organisation of Olkiluoto power plant, re-
sponsibility for the long-term monitoring of com-
ponents, structural and systems ageing in the 2003
organisation has been with the technical depart-
ment. The maintenance unit of the department of
operation monitors and reports ageing phenome-
na observed during maintenance activities. Re-
porting on maintenance activities and the related
database were reorganised at Olkiluoto in 2003 to
facilitate monitoring of component ageing.
A project significant for the service life of the
Olkiluoto plant units was started in 2003, namely
turbine plant upgrading, which includes replace-
ment of the steam driers inside the reactor pres-
sure vessel.
STUK has reviewed follow-up reports on the
ageing of mechanical components as well as of
electrical and I&C systems and carried out period-
ic inspections pertaining to the monitoring of
ageing in which also the monitoring of structural
ageing was assessed.25
Figure 9. Collective occupational doses during annual
maintenance at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
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ST U K - B - Y TO 2 3 3Inspection methods are to be qualified to im-
prove the reliability of the in-service inspection of
the most important mechanical components by
non-destructive methods. Qualification according
to the national model applied so far has proved
inefficient and time-consuming. In 2003, based on
STUK’s requests, a review of qualification proce-
dures was started and also discussion about a
possible renewal of the qualification organisation.
Radiation safety
Occupational radiation doses
The radiation doses of those who worked at
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2003 were below
the 50 mSv annual limit. The distribution of indi-
vidual doses in 2003 is given in Table I. The high-
est individual dose at Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant was 7.9 mSv. Individual radiation doses in
1999–2003 were below the 100 mSv dose limit de-
termined for any period of five years.
In 2003 the collective occupational dose was
0.27 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.76 manSv at
Olkiluoto 2; the total for both plant units being
1.03 manSv. STUK guidelines state that the
threshold for one plant unit’s collective dose aver-
aged over two successive years is 2.10 manSv.
This value was not exceeded in either plant unit.
The collective occupational radiation doses in-
curred over the past years are given in Appendix 1
(indicator A.I.4).
Radioactive releases
Radioactive releases into the environment from
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were well below au-
thorised limits in 2003. The releases of noble gas-
es into the atmosphere were about 0.1 TBq, ie
approx 0.0008% of authorised limit. Iodine releas-
es into the atmosphere were approx 17 MBq, ie
approx 0.02% of authorised limit. Aerosol releases
into the atmosphere were approx 33 MBq, tritium
releases into the atmosphere approx 0.3 TBq and
carbon-14 releases into the atmosphere approx
0.7 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents released
into the sea, ie 1 TBq, is approx 6% of the annual
release limit. The total activity of other nuclides26released into the sea was 0.6 GBq, ie approx 0.2%
of the plant-site specific release limit.
The calculated radiation doses of the most
exposed individual in the environment of the
Olkiluoto plant was approx 0.04 mikroSv, ie less
than 0.1 % of the limit prescribed by a Govern-
ment Resolution (100 mikroSv). Appendix 1 (indi-
cator A.I.5) presents radioactive releases and the
radiation doses calculated for the most exposed
individual in the plant’s environment over the
past years.
Environmental radiation monitoring
Radiation monitoring in the environment of a nu-
clear power plant encompasses those on- and off-
site radiation measurements and determination of
radioactive substances that are carried out to es-
tablish population radiation exposure and radioac-
tive substances in the environment.
In the environment of Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant, 288 samples were analysed. Radioactive
substances originating in Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant were measured in one sample of lichen, two
samples of fish, two samples of bottom fauna, in
17 samples of aquatic plants and in 15 samples of
sinking matter. The dominating power plant-based
radioactive substance, cobalt-60, was measured in
all of the aforementioned samples. The total
number of observations was 37. Apart from cobalt,
silver-110m was measured in one sample of sink-
ing matter and manganese-54 and antimonium-
124 in one sample of aquatic plants each. In
addition to cobalt-60, one sample of aquatic plants
contained also cobalt-58, the activation product of
nickel, and manganese-54, the activation product
of iron.
All the detected concentrations were low and
had no bearing on radiation exposure.
Dosimeters for external radiation measure-
ment have been placed in about 11 locations and
10 continuous-operation radiation dose rate meas-
uring stations at a distance of about five kilome-
tres from the plants. The measurement data from
these stations are transferred to the power plants’
control rooms and to the national radiation-moni-
toring network. The monitoring of external radia-
tion is complemented by dose rate and spectro-
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urements were made in the environment of the
Olkiluoto plant.
3.2.4 Oversight of organisational operation
Safety management
Information on Olkiluoto nuclear power plant,
which had accumulated in the course of document
reviews and other inspection activity, was looked
at during 2003 with a view to plant safety manage-
ment.
A relatively large number of deviations from
the procedures were observed during the annual
maintenance outage, which were due to either
human error or organisational factors, or due to
which trouble shooting and repairs were problem-
atic. The number of operational events was higher
than usual also after annual maintenance. A meet-
ing was therefore arranged on 25 September 2003
in which the licensee presented their own view on
the event causes and the necessary measures.
STUK did not consider the licensee’s explanation
sufficient and the matter will be dealt with again
in 2004.
In the autumn of 2003, several measures to
improve organisational operation were started at
the Olkiluoto plant. The licensee set up ia a
separate working group to develop its operations,
employed more personnel for operational feedback
tasks and commissioned analyses and training to
external consultants. In addition, the licensee will
carry out a safety culture self-assessment based
on IAEA guidelines.
Quality management system
The licensee has systematically maintained and
developed the quality management system of the
Olkiluoto plant in accordance with their own
plans. A new quality management system, based
on the ISO-9001 Standard, was commissioned in
2001.
The licensee regularly assessed the functional-
ity of their quality management system by means
of an internal audit programme and a separate
individual inspection procedure.
STUK oversaw quality management by docu-
ment reviews and periodic inspection. In the in-
spections it was established that the licensee’squality management programme is acceptable.
STUK has established that the operation of Teol-
lisuuden Voima Oy complies with the plant’s own
quality management system. Remarks were given
during the inspections, mostly on further develop-
ment of the system and definition of detail.
Personnell qualifications and training
Within the framework of the periodic inspection
programme, in two periodic inspections, STUK
oversaw the appropriateness and adequacy of
Olkiluoto power plant’s organisation and its per-
sonnel training. Both inspections focused on the
plant’s operating unit. The objective is to ascer-
tain, by regular inspection, that sufficient person-
nel is kept at the  operating Olkiluoto plant units
in both direct operations and their support opera-
tions during the design, construction and commis-
sioning of the new nuclear power plant unit.
Personnel recruitment by Teollisuuden
Voima Oy has continued, mostly for the purpose of
the new nuclear power plant. Experienced operat-
ing personnel from the operating plant units have
moved to tasks pertaining to the new plant unit
and new employees have been recruited in their
place. Several persons recently employed by Teol-
lisuuden Voima Oy participated in a 6-week basic
professional training course on nuclear safety or-
ganised in Finland.
Upon licensee application, several of their em-
ployees were authorised to act as shift managers
or operators at the nuclear power plant. A total of
28 authorisations were granted for the Olkiluoto
plant, which mostly pertained to a new 3-year
period.
Operational experience feedback
Licensee operational experience feedback consist-
ed of the handling of events at own and other
plants. Even events at plants abroad were dis-
cussed in a special operational feedback working
group. The objective of operational experience
feedback is to prevent recurrence of events that
endanger plant safety.
The Olkiluoto plant units reported 16 opera-
tional events to STUK in 2003. Several internal
reports on minor anomalies or operational events
were drawn up at the plant as well.27
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tivities was by periodic inspection and review of
operational reports and the annual operational
feedback report submitted by the licensee. The
Olkiluoto plant has systematic and regulated pro-
cedures for event investigation, assessment and
conducting of corrective action. In a periodic in-
spection, requirements were put forth for the
further development of operations.
Furthermore, STUK evaluated the appropri-
ateness of experiences learned from events abroad
for consideration at Finnish plants. Event infor-
mation was obtained through the Incident Report-
ing System (IRS) of the IAEA and the OECD. In
2003 twenty event reports were reviewed, eight of
which lead to detailed inspection after preliminary
assessment. No event in 2003 warranted immedi-
ate action from the licensee. At the Olkiluoto
plant, three events lead to consideration of les-
sons learnt in the course of normal STUK inspec-
tion activity.
Periodic inspection programme
In 2003 STUK carried out 17 periodic inspections
at Olkiluoto plant. Inspections contained in the
periodic inspection programme are listed in Ap-
pendix 4. Safety management, the main processes
of operation and also procedures as well as the
technical acceptability of systems were looked
into. Compliance of safety assessment, operation,
maintenance and protection activities (ia radiation
protection, fire protection and physical protection)
with the requirements of nuclear safety regula-
tions was verified by the inspections. The annual
inspection programme was brought to the atten-
tion of the licensee at the beginning of 2003 and
inspection dates were agreed upon with licensee
representatives.
Information was acquired through oral reports
requested from representatives of the power
plants, personnel interviews, document reviews,
walk rounds, witnessing of working as well as
various measurements, ia to establish accuracy of
measuring equipment. None of the observations
made had an immediate bearing on the safety of
the plant units. Actions were initiated onsite to
repair the defects observed.28Authorisation of pressure equipment
manufacturers as well as inspection and
testing organisations
Upon application by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, and
in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK
authorised three manufacturers of nuclear pres-
sure equipment. In accordance with the Act,
STUK also authorised one testing organisation to
carry out non-destructive testing of mechanical
components and structures at the Olkiluoto plant
units. Testers employed by six different testing
organisations were authorised to carry out in-serv-
ice inspection of mechanical components and
structures at the Olkiluoto plant units. Previous
decisions pertaining to manufacturers and testing
organisations are valid, as mentioned in the deci-
sions.
The inspection organisation of Teollisuuden
Voima Oy, authorised in 2002, continued in opera-
tion. By a decision made upon application by
Teollisuuden Voima Oy, the scope of activities of
the inspection organisation was extended to cover
periodic inspection and tests that are part of
preventive maintenance.
The manufacturers as well as testing and in-
spection organisations authorised by STUK were
subject to oversight by the Authority.
Nuclear liability
The users of nuclear energy must have acquired
liability as stipulated in the Nuclear Liability Act
(484/1972), or other financial guarantee, for a pos-
sible accident at a nuclear facility that would harm
the environment, population and property. Teollis-
uuden Voima Oy has prepared for damage from a
nuclear accident as prescribed by law by taking
out an insurance policy for this purpose mainly in
the Finnish Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In case of an accident, the funds available for
compensation come from three sources: the licen-
see, the country of location of the facility and the
international liability community. In 2003, a total
of about 425 M€ was available for compensation
from all these sources.
The ascertaining of the contents and condi-
tions of a licensee’s insurance arrangements in
Finland belongs to the Insurance Supervisory Au-
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liability insurance and STUK has verified its exist-
ence in accordance with section 55 of The Nuclear
Energy Act (990/1987).
The Nuclear Liability Act covers also the
transport of nuclear materials. STUK has ascer-
tained that all nuclear material transport has had
liability insurance approved by the Insurance Su-
pervisory Authority or in accordance with the
Paris Convention and approved by the authorities
of the sending state.
3.3 New nuclear power plant project
Oversight planning
Preparation for the oversight activities of the new
nuclear power plant continued. Parliament had in
2002 left in force the Decision-in-principle on the
construction of a new nuclear power plant as pro-
posed by the Government. Teollisuuden Voima Oy
thereafter launched a bidding competition for the
construction of the new plant. In December 2003
Teollisuuden Voima Oy announced that the win-
ning bid came from Framatome ANP who offered
a 1600 MWe pressurised water reactor (EPR).
Because of the extent of the execution of
regulatory oversight pertaining to the new plant,
an oversight project comprising 11 sub-projects
had been set up in STUK in 2002. Project and sub-
project managers were designated and the project
group line-up was established in the spring of
2003.
The project plan, which describes responsibili-
ties and procedures as well as essential tasks for
implementation of regulatory oversight, was
drawn up. In addition, a process description of the
licensing process was made. The most essential
tasks in preparing for oversight were the estab-
lishment of project and sub-project specific over-
sight plans and discussions with the licensee to
facilitate a smooth licensing process. Revision of
YVL guides was of essential importance as well.
YVL guides revision is dealt with in Chapter 2. In
the plans for sub-projects, specifically tasks most
important in the handling of the construction
permit application have been identified and priori-
tised and also resources required for the reviewand oversight have been identified. The plans
address identification of sub-project interfaces to
ascertain the full scope of oversight. In addition,
sub-projects mapped what external support was
needed.
In addition to oversight plans, plans were
drawn up to monitor the licence applicant’s quali-
ty management during the project and principles
were set up for an inspection programme during
the plant’s construction and its implementation.
An important task for the project group was to
develop requirements management for the sys-
tematic control of safety requirements for the
entire project. In addition to the development
work, the task contained the incorporation into
the requirements management system of YVL
guides having the most bearing on the plant’s
safety design,. The system is for monitoring of the
fulfilment of requirements during the plant’s de-
sign, construction and commissioning. Commer-
cial tools for requirements management were
assessed and an own application was developed.
Co-operation with domestic and foreign
liaison groups
There was co-operation with domestic liaison
groups within the framework of the oversight
project. Licensing-related discussions were had
with the Ministry of Trade and Industry. STUK
informed the Ministry on the status and results of
work being done in preparation for the oversight
work. A plan to develop analysis capabilities were
drawn up and executed together with VTT State
Technical Research Centre of Finland. The objec-
tive was to gain readiness to analyse, during the
review of the construction permit application, the
different plant alternatives brought forth during
the bidding competition. Potential research needs
and expert opinions in other fields of technology
to support STUK’s regulatory work were also dis-
cussed. STUK presented YVL guides and their re-
quirements to sub-contractors potentially partici-
pating in the project. There were over 200 partici-
pants in two training events.
Experiences were exchanged with the authori-
ties of different countries (ia the USA, the Czech
Republic, France, Belgium) on the licensing of29
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requirements pertaining to the various plant al-
ternatives and plant construction experiences. In
addition, options for future co-operation were
mapped. Apart from regulatory co-operation, po-
tential foreign consultants for areas in which
there is no domestic expertise, or where a poten-
tial external third party is required, were charted.
STUK underwent preliminary discussions with ia
US, German, French and British consultants and
technical support organisations. Topics included ia
automation, accident analysis and the control
room.
Liaison with the license applicant
The detailed contents requirements of the licence
documents and their supply schedules as well as
the time STUK needs to review them were dis-
cussed with the license applicant. STUK and the
license applicant arranged a quality seminar in
which the license applicant presented the princi-
ples applied to quality management and STUK
those applied to regulatory oversight.
Essential topics of discussion were the inter-
pretation of safety requirements for the plant
alternatives. STUK met vendors upon the license
applicant’s request. In the meetings the vendors
introduced plant designs and the modifications
made to meet Finnish safety requirements. STUK
gave its opinion of designs unacceptable from the
Finnish safety requirements point of view.
Upon the license applicant’s request STUK
participated also in the handling of reactor pres-30sure vessel material manufacturing. STUK gave
the license applicant a statement on the starting
of the material’s manufacturing and took part in
the assessment of the manufacturers’ quality man-
agement systems. In addition, external statements
were requested on the quality management sys-
tems.
3.4 FiR 1 research reactor
STUK regulates electricity-generating nuclear
power plants as well as the FiR 1 research reactor
operated by the VTT Technical Research Centre of
Finland. The reactor is located in Otaniemi, Es-
poo, and its maximum thermal power is 250 kW.
The reactor is used for fabrication of radioactive
tracers, activation analysis, student training and
Boron Neutron Capture Therapy (BNCT) as well
as the development of BNCT.
STUK’s periodic inspection in 2003 focused on
ia the reactor’s quality management, operation,
radiation protection, radioactive releases and safe-
guards. On the proposal of the VTT Processes,
four reactor foremen and one operator were au-
thorised. No significant problems were observed
in the reactor’s operation in 2003. Occupational
radiation doses and radioactive releases into the
environment in 2003 were clearly below set limits.
3.5 Other nuclear facilities
The regulatory control of nuclear facilities relat-
ing to nuclear waste management, such as stor-
age space, is dealt with in Chapter 4.
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4 Nuclear waste management regulation
Esko Ruokola4.1 Spent nuclear fuel
4.1.1 Interim storage
STUK’s regulatory control of spent nuclear fuel
storage included regular inspections and review of
plans and other documents. No safety-endanger-
ing events occurred in the operation of the stor-
age facilities. The volume of spent nuclear fuel
onsite the Olkiluoto plant in the end of 2003 was
5786 assemblies (1019 tU, tonnes of original urani-
um) with an increase of 256 assemblies (45 tU) in
2003. Corresponding accumulation in the Loviisa
plant was 2755 assemblies (330 tU) including 210
assemblies (25 tU) placed in storage in 2003.
STUK made an assessment of the condition of
spent nuclear fuel assemblies during storage as
well as of the appropriateness of the condition of
fuel intermediate storage. The conclusion was
that the integrity of spent nuclear fuel bundles is
not expected to be essentially compromised during
the planned approx. 40 years of interim storage.
Some fuel assemblies with a fuel channel have
become somewhat bent or warped, which makes
their manoeuvring in the storage positions less
easy. The monitoring programmes are mostly ap-
propriate and only minor adjustments in them are
required.
4.1.2 Preparation for final disposal
Posiva Oy, a company owned by Teollisuuden
Voima Oy and Fortum Power and Heat Oy, carries
out R&D and technical design aiming at imple-
mentation of spent fuel disposal at a later date.
Upon the company’s application, the Government
made a Decision-in-principle on the construction
of a final disposal facility in Olkiluoto. The goal of
the R&D and design programme is to ascertain
the suitability of the repository site, to design the
necessary facilities and to acquire the research
data necessary for assuring the safety of final dis-
posal.Teollisuuden Voima Oy and Fortum Power and
Heat Oy applied for an amendment in the Minis-
try of Trade and Industry’s policy decision on the
schedule of activities leading to the disposal of
spent fuel in so far as it applies to the presenta-
tion of construction permit -related reports and
plans to the regulatory authority. STUK in its
statement was in favour of postponing the planned
target date from 2010 to 2012, which was also set
as the new objective in the Ministry’s decision of
23 October 2003.
Repository site investigations and
underground research facilities
Posiva Oy continued to carry out geological re-
search programmes in Olkiluoto. The aim was to
complement the baseline data of the site and, spe-
cifically, to investigate in detail the area of the
underground research facility to be constructed on
the site. Facility construction is due to start in
mid-2004. It may later become part of the reposi-
tory proper, which has to be considered in the
application of regulatory oversight on its imple-
mentation. STUK gave Posiva and the Ministry of
Trade and Industry its assessment of Posiva’s re-
port on the facility’s location and its access route
designs and gave to the Eurajoki board of con-
struction a statement on Posiva’s application for a
municipal construction permit for the facility.
Posiva published reports describing the base-
line of conditions on the site of the research
facility, the plan for its technical implementation
and the related research and monitoring pro-
grammes as well as the disturbances in the bed-
rock caused by the construction project. STUK
reviewed the reports, supported by external teams
of experts on bedrock structures, geohydrology,
geochemistry and rock movements. The review
was given to Posiva and the Ministry of Trade and
Industry in February 2004.
Posiva commissioned a microseismic measur-31
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tectonic earthquakes within approx. one square
kilometre and, in the future, even seismicity
arising from the excavation of the underground
research facility. The measurement data yields
additional information on bedrock structure and
stability.
Encapsulation and disposal technology
Posiva continued technical R&D on spent fuel en-
capsulation and disposal. Two siting options for
the encapsulation facility exist: either the reposi-
tory site or in connection with the Olkiluoto inter-
im storage for spent fuel. STUK gave Posiva and
the Ministry of Trade and Industry its assessment
of the two alternative disposal facilities. Posiva
completed an Olkiluoto-specific encapsulation and
final disposal facility plan that also examines facil-
ity operation and provision for accidents.
In co-operation with the Swedish nuclear waste
company SKB, Posiva continues to develop waste
canister manufacturing techniques. Posiva is re-
sponsible for the development of the pierce-and-
draw method for fabricating the copper shell in
which progress was made in manufacturing tests
in Germany. Promising results have also been
reported in manufacturing tests based on the
extrusion-and-forging method that SKB is respon-
sible for.
In addition, development and manufacturing
tests of the cast-iron inner part of the waste
canister continued. In a manufacturing test at
Rautpohja, commissioned by Posiva, the desired
metallurgical composition of the casting was not
reached. SKB was more successful in its corre-
sponding manufacturing tests.
Posiva is responsible for the development of
electron beam welding of the lid of the copper
canister. Welding tests in Germany failed due to
problems with equipment and Posiva therefore co-
operates with Patria Aviation to modernise the
electron beam welding equipment in Linnavuori
for future testing there.
Posiva also participates in the development of
friction stir welding of copper ia at SKB’s Oskar-
shamn laboratory where full-scale equipment were
installed in 2003. The Posiva–Outokumpu venture
on narrow gap arc welding supported by National
Technology Agency of Finland (TEKES) has been32completed with the conclusion that the method
cannot be applied to closing a 50 mm -thick copper
canister.
4.2 Reactor waste
The utilities in 2003 followed earlier practices in
carrying out their intermediate and low-level
waste maintenance activities. A solidification facil-
ity is Loviisa power plant’s most important nucle-
ar waste project, the Preliminary Safety Analysis
Report of which STUK approved in 2001. A modifi-
cation plan for the plant was submitted to STUK
for approval but the facility’s construction was
postponed until early 2004, in which case it could
be commissioned in 2007 at the latest.
STUK inspected the handling, storage and dis-
posal of reactor waste at both plant sites. Specific
attention was paid to the storage of highly activat-
ed spent core internals on both nuclear power
plant sites as well as the sufficiency and appropri-
ateness of the handling and storage facilities for
intermediate and low-level waste at Loviisa power
plant.
No safety-related problems occurred in the
treatment, storage and disposal of reactor waste.
Currently approx. 44% of the waste from the
Loviisa plant and approx. 91% of that from the
Olkiluoto plant has been disposed of. The volume
of reactor waste onsite the Loviisa plant at the
end of 2003 was 2685 m3 with an additional 183 m3
in 2003. Corresponding waste accumulation at the
Olkiluoto plant was 4335 m3 with an added 123 m3
in 2003.
4.3 Other regulatory activities
STUK gave the Ministry of Trade and Industry a
statement, as referred to in section 78 of the Nu-
clear Waste Energy Decree, about the licensees’
nuclear waste management measures and plans.
The statement assesses how, in preparing for nu-
clear waste management, the licensees have pro-
ceeded in relation to goals set out by the Govern-
ment. STUK also gave statements, as referred to
in section 90 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, about
making financial provision for the costs of nuclear
waste management, which assess the technical
plans based on which the financial provision is
made.
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5 Regulatory control of nuclear materials
Marko Hämäläinen, Arto Isolankila, Elina Martikka, Jaakko Tikkinen5.1 Nuclear material safeguards
5.1.1 Safeguards at Finnish nuclear facilities
International safeguards were implemented by the
IAEA and the Euratom Safeguards of the EU.
IAEA safeguards are based on the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty and the Safeguards Agreement (IN-
FCIRC/193) signed by the non-nuclear EU mem-
ber states. Euratom safeguards are based on the
Euratom Treaty and Commission Regulation 3227/
76 given by virtue of the Treaty. STUK’s safe-
guards activities aim to assure regulatory control
of the use of nuclear energy necessary to prevent
nuclear proliferation. In addition, STUK’s tasks
include control related to international agree-
ments in the field of nuclear energy signed by
Finland.
In so far as nuclear power plants are con-
cerned, STUK’s safeguards activities are mostly
focused on fuel import, transport, storage, inter-
nal transfer and refuelling. The utilities submit to
STUK activity programmes, advance notifications
and reports relating to safeguards according to the
requirements.
A total of 13 inspections were made at Loviisa
power plant in 2003 and 20 inspections at Olkiluo-Table II. Amounts of nuclear material in Finland on 31 Dece
Location
Natural 
uranium (kg)
Enriche
uranium
Loviisa plant – 405 
Olkiluoto 1 – 224 
Olkiluoto 2 – 207 
Olkiluoto / Spent-fuel 
storage (KPA)
– 755 
VTT: FiR 1 research reactor 1511
OMG Kokkola Chemicals 712.6 –
Others (non-nuclear) 84to power plant. Euratom ja the IAEA participated
in 25 of them.
In addition to domestic nuclear power plants,
minor amounts of nuclear materials are used at
other facilities. The most significant of these is
FiR 1, the research reactor operated by the VTT,
where one inspection was conducted in 2003. The
Laboratory of Radiochemistry of the University of
Helsinki, OMG Kokkola Chemicals and STUK
also have small amounts of nuclear materials in
their possession. They were all inspected. STUK,
the IAEA and Euratom participated in the inspec-
tions. STUK made one inspection at OMG Kokko-
la Chemicals without the IAEA and Euratom. The
amounts of nuclear materials are given in Table II.
Licences and approvals in accordance with the
Nuclear Energy Act are given in Appendix 5.
Nuclear material safeguards employ several
methods to verify that data on nuclear materials
reported by the operator, such as burn-out and
cooling time, are correct and complete. Other
nuclear-safety related data, from operational safe-
ty to final disposal, can also be verified by meas-
urements. In 2003 STUK verified by non-destruc-
tive methods 76 and 349 spent fuel assemblies at
Olkiluoto and Loviisa power plant respectively. In33
mber 2003.
d 
 (kg)
Depleted 
uranium (kg)
Plutonium 
(kg)
Torium 
(kg)
597 – 3 224 –
771 – 1 089 –
057 – 936 –
326 – 6 150 –
60 < 1 – –
– – –
1.7 471 0,005 4
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30 dummy elements removed from the reactors of
the Loviisa plant, which contained no nuclear
material.
Every material balance area operated in com-
pliance with STUK-approved manuals and in a
way facilitating STUK’s fulfilling of the obligations
of international agreements signed by Finland.
In 2003 STUK authorised nine Euratom and 23
IAEA inspectors to make inspections in Finland.
5.1.2 Strengthening of the IAEA safeguards
Measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards be-
gan after the disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear weap-
ons programme. By way of administration, safe-
guards strengthening is based on the Model Proto-
col Additional (INFCIRC/540). Finland signed the
Protocol together with other EU countries in Sep-
tember 1998. The Protocol comes into force after
all EU member states and the Commission have
ratified it. Finland ratified it in the summer of
2000. In December 2003 Italy and Ireland, the last
countries in the EU to ratify, announced its ratifi-
cation, making possible its coming into force in
2004.
In 2003 STUK mapped the information availa-
ble from Loviisa, VTT and STUK for inclusion in
site declarations, as required in the Model Proto-
col Additional (article 2a (iii)). A declaration of the
Olkiluoto site will be available in early 2004. In
Olkiluoto’s case, it is to be considered how the
construction of the new plant unit and the excava-
tion of the research tunnel to be connected to the
planned final disposal facility affect definition of
the site. In addition, STUK charted R&D activities
in the nuclear field (article 2a (i)) and also new
undertakings subject to oversight after the com-
ing into effect of the Protocol.
Together with the IAEA and Euratom, STUK
arranged a meeting in which the final report of a
VTT field trial was approved. A field trial of
safeguards implementation in accordance with the
Protocol was carried out at VTT in 2000–2002,
with participation from the IAEA, Euratom, VTT
and STUK. Based on the experiences gained from
this, STUK has been able to essentially affect
safeguards implementation in accordance with the
Protocol within the entire EU.
A STUK expert participated in an IAEA meet-
ing in London in which a revision of IAEA guide-34lines on the implementation of safeguards in ac-
cordance with the Protocol was prepared. STUK’s
experts also took part in a Euratom Safeguards
meeting in Luxembourg where the launching of
safeguards in accordance with the Protocol within
the EU was discussed. Notifications to the IAEA
in accordance with the Protocol and a Euratom
proposal for the harmonisation of the flow of
information were addressed. STUK’s opinion is
that the proposal would not support the imple-
mentation of effective IAEA safeguards, quite the
contrary. STUK submitted its written comments
on the proposal to the Commission.
The Commission provided the member states
with a revised version of Euratom Regulation
3227/76 for comments in 2002. The Regulation’s
revision is important now ia due to safeguards in
accordance with the Protocol, the EU’s enlarge-
ment and the reporting format in use today. A
working group of the Council’s Atomic Questions
Group, AQG, has discussed the Regulation’s revi-
sion. It met 13 times in 2003. STUK was active in
its meetings.
5.1.3 Safeguards of nuclear fuel final disposal
The final disposal of nuclear fuel in an under-
ground repository presents new challenges to safe-
guards implementation since, after encapsulation,
nuclear material verification will be impossible in
practice. In so far as safeguards on final disposal
are concerned, STUK had started work on creat-
ing national requirements for an encapsulation
and final disposal facility. The objective is to estab-
lish safeguards criteria covering both national and
international regulatory needs.
Under the auspices of an IAEA support pro-
gramme funded by the Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs, STUK arranged an international meeting on
safeguards of final disposal (SAGOR). Its objective
was to chart safeguards methods for long-term
final disposal and to devise procedures particularly
for the Olkiluoto final disposal concept. STUK’s
experts came forth with a preliminary plan for the
control of final disposal by the Finnish regulatory
system and for co-operation with the IAEA.
STUK sent the IAEA a letter about the start of
construction of an underground research facility,
because that facility is envisaged to become a part
of a spent fuel repository in 2004. At the same
time STUK requested a statement from the IAEA
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also looked into the applicability of new safe-
guards methods, such as satellite imagery, seismic
measurement and remote sensing methods, for
control applied during the construction of the final
disposal facility. In early 2004, the finishing touch-
es will be applied to a plan on safeguards control
during the construction of the underground re-
search tunnel.
5.2 Supervision and control of
radioactive materials transport
About 20 000 radioactive packages are transported
in Finland every year. STUK is not aware of any
transport accidents involving radioactive materi-
als, or of any other safety hazards in 2003. The
transport of nuclear materials require a licence
from STUK. Nuclear liability insurance and suffi-
cient physical protection, among others, are condi-
tions for the licence. STUK approved four trans-
port plans, three of which for the import of fresh
fuel and one for the export of irradiated fuel rods
for analysis. Six types of packaging were approved
for use in Finland. Three of these approvals had
been applied for potential transits that did not
take place, however. The most significant forms of
nuclear material transport in 2003 were the im-
port of fresh fuel to the Finnish nuclear power
plants from Germany, Sweden, Spain and Russia
as well as the export of three irradiated nuclear
fuel rods to Sweden for analysis. Of the consign-
ments of nuclear material transported in 2003,
one batch of nuclear fuel was picked up for de-
tailed inspection. No remarks were made in the
inspection. In addition, one consignment was ap-
proved for transport subject to special arrange-
ments.
The import of radioactive and nuclear materi-
als is subject to a licence. No related smuggling
attempts were detected at the Finnish border in
2003.
No illicit consignments containing radioactive
material were turned back at the border in 2001–
2003. The highest number, 23 consignments, wasturned back in 1997. The reason was typically
radioactivity measured in scrap metal. The de-
crease in number is partly due to the most signifi-
cant consignors now measuring the radioactivity
of their scrap metal. On the other hand, consign-
ments of scrap metal to Finland have decreased.
Safeguards as well as supervision and control
of nuclear material transport are looked into in
detail in the report Nuclear Safeguards in Finland
2003 (STUK-B-YTO 231).
5.3 The Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) prohibits all nuclear testing. The Treaty
was opened for signing in 1996. It enters into force
after ratification by 44 separately designated
states. Finland ratified it in 1999. Adherence to
the Treaty is monitored by means of an interna-
tional observation network, which will comprise
321 monitoring stations.
The National Data Centre (NDC) in conjunc-
tion with STUK, which is based on the CTBT,
contributed to the work of the preparatory com-
mission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in establishing a
cost-effective organisation functional also from the
Finnish point of view. The NDC’s own automatic
routine monitoring was in operation for the whole
year. It is facilitated by an alarm system transmit-
ting data on unusual observations to the NDC
personnel. The NDC observed on abnormal activi-
ty in 2003.
A database was developed for data yielded by
the Centre’s analysis programme.
In 2002 STUK signed an agreement with the
makers of the analysis programme about its hand-
ing over to the national data centres of other
countries for use in CTBT work. In 2003 the
programme was forwarded to the national data
centres of Estonia and Lithuania. In addition, the
national data centres of Rumania, Iceland and
Algeria requested for the programme.35
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6 Safety research
Esko Eloranta, Harri HeimbürgerSTUK-financed safety research focuses on two ar-
eas: development of safety assessment methods
and expertise as well research in direct support of
regulatory decisions. The former benefits first of
all from the national nuclear power plant safety
and waste research programmes SAFIR and KYT.
Excluded from these programmes is research com-
missioned by STUK pertaining to its own deci-
sions, which must be independent of similar re-
search by licensees or licence-applicant. In addi-
tion to these two main areas, STUK commissions
independent research to develop regulatory con-
trol.
STUK’s experts controlled and monitored the
SAFIR and KYT programmes and contributed to
the support and managing group work of the
SAFIR programme. The framework of SAFIR is
based on the multiple safety challenges to nuclear
power plants indentified for the current decade
due to the ageing of operating facilities and the
new nuclear power plant.
The general research topics of the SAFIR pro-
gramme, which started in 2003, were fuel and
reactor core; primary circuit; containment and
process safety functions; automation; control room
and information technology; organisations and36safety management; and risk-informed safety
management. The programme was arranged into
18 research projects whose results are available at
http://www.vtt.fi/pro/tutkimus/safir/, where also
information about the SAFIR programme can be
found. In the field of reactor safety, STUK contrib-
uted to several projects within the OECD/NEA
and also worked with the US NRC. Of STUK-
commissioned research projects outside the SAFIR
programme, the most significant pertained to the
development of analysis facilities needed in the
regulatory oversight of the new nuclear power
plant and the plant’s safety analyses.
The focus of the KYT programme in 2003 was
similar to that of the earlier JYT2001 programme
ie earth sciences, technical barriers, migration of
radioactive substances, safety analyses and techni-
cal solutions. Information on the programme can
be found at www.vtt.fi/pro/tutkimus/kyt/.
Appendix 6 lists STUK-financed safety research
completed in 2003. It was commissioned to exter-
nal organisations, which too, are listed in this
Appendix. The cost of nuclear safety research in
1999–2003 is given in Fig 10. Growth is due to
research project orders pertaining to the new
nuclear power plant.
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Figure 10. The cost of nuclear safety research.
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7 Nuclear facilities regulation and
its development
Kaisa Koskinen, Pekka Salminen, Arja Tanninen, Reino Virolainen,
Kaisa Åstrand7.1 Processes and structures
Document handling
A total of 1520 documents were submitted to
STUK for review in 2003. The number of docu-
ments submitted in 2003 and earlier, whose re-
view was completed in 2003, was 1619. The figure
includes licences granted by STUK in accordance38
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Figure 12. Distribution of time spent on preparing
decisions about the Loviisa plant units.with the Nuclear Energy Act, which are listed in
Appendix 5. Average document review time was
51 days. The number of documents and their aver-
age review times in 1999–2003 are given in Fig 11.
Figs 12 and 13 give the distribution of the review
times of documents on the Loviisa and Olkiluoto
plant units.0 %
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Figure 13. Distribution of time spent on preparing
decisions about the Olkiluoto plant units.
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The renewal of STUK’s strategy was completed.
The new strategy for 2003–2006 considers the fol-
lowing factors in the field of nuclear safety regula-
tion as affecting ia regulatory control: ageing of
operating nuclear power plants, construction of
the new nuclear power plant and de-regulation of
the electricity market as well as spent fuel final
disposal and the coming into force of the IAEA
Additional Protocol. An important task in 2003 was
the development of working processes and compe-
tence. Processes essential for nuclear safety regu-
lation were determined: overall safety assessment,
plant projects and modifications control, plant op-
erability control and organisational operation con-
trol. They divided into 7–9 sub-processes. The non-
proliferation process includes safeguards, control
of radioactive materials transport and control
based on the CTBT. The nuclear waste process
includes control of nuclear waste management op-
erations as well as of R&D and planning activities
in the area of nuclear waste management. Proc-
ess and sub-process owners were designated and
the drawing up of process descriptions were start-
ed. Sub-sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this report are
structured along these processes.
An IRRT (International Regulatory Review
Team) of the IAEA visited STUK from 31 August
to 9 September 2003. Comprised of six experts, its
task was to find out if STUK’s operations have
been improved in accordance with recommenda-
tions given in an assessment of its regulatory
operations in 2000. The Review Team established
that the majority of recommendations it had given
in 2000 had lead to improved operations. The
Team gave STUK two more recommendations and
18 proposals to consider whether certain matters
could be taken care of better, using the alterna-
tive method proposed. The recommendations giv-
en dealt with the strengthening of the legal basis
for the regulation of spent fuel final disposal
planning and research as well as of radioactive
materials transport.
The Team identified 14 procedures worth point-
ing out to other authorities. These pertained to
the planning of own operations and the develop-
ment of nuclear power plant and nuclear waste
regulation. Based on the recommendations and
proposals, STUK assessed the necessary further
actions.Ideas for development of own operations were
obtained also from international operational expe-
riences. An extensive fuel failure during mainte-
nance operations at Paks nuclear power plant,
Hungary, showed that requirements for the licen-
cee’s indivisible responsibility for safety and their
ability to supervise their sub-contractors is to be
emphasised in regulations. The licensees in Fin-
land have been outsourcing their operations while
their own operations have focused on key know-
how. Supervision of sub-contractors by the licen-
sees has become topical in Finnish safety regula-
tion.
Document management
A STUK long-term document management project
moved to the realisation phase. In 2003, several
types of document management software offered
by various suppliers were compared and visits
made to suppliers and also to companies where
such software had been commissioned. Choice was
made after a call for bids and a detailed compari-
son of products with the help of a consultant. The
software main components included a portal, a
document management application, a team work
application and an archiving application.
In 2003, identification and assessment of all
STUK departmental processes and the associated
flow of documents, presupposed by the new soft-
ware, were also launched. It was specifically iden-
tified what types of document pertain to each
work process, the meta data presupposed by them
as well as the information resources to be trans-
ferred to the new system. Definition of the por-
tal’s functionality and content has also been start-
ed. The new system is due for commissioning in
2004.
Safety culture
STUK has target-orientedly aimed at strengthen-
ing Finnish safety culture in the whole of the nu-
clear field. In support of this, co-operation in re-
lated questions has been organised between Finn-
ish safety authorities.
A seminar was held at STUK in June dealing
with the bases for and procedures of the regulato-
ry oversight of safety management and culture.
The participants, of which there were 50, were
from STUK, the Safety Technology Authority
(TUKES), the Finnish Rail Administration, the39
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tional safety unit of the Ministry for Social Affairs
and Health. The starting point for the seminar
was awareness of the fact that there are latent
risk factors in technical systems, in the operation
and management of the objects of regulation,
legislation, regulatory activities and the global
economy, which contribute to, and when worst
comes to worst, lead to accidents. A well operating
and managed organisation with a strong safety
culture is capable of identifying risks and operat-
ing safely. The role and tasks of authorities in
safety regulation are undergoing change and it
looks necessary to focus oversight specifically to
assuring organisational operating capability.
The common challenge Finnish safety authori-
ties are now facing is how to evolve from technical
inspectors to overseers and promoters of the safe-
ty operations of organisations. The seminar dealt
with abstract and practical questions pertaining to
safety management and safety culture. Presenta-
tions and general discussion looked for a common
opinion on how insufficient safety in technology
and human activity come about and how they can
be prevented by safety management. The seminar
was a good means of sharing knowledge and
experiences on the regulatory procedures used in
the oversight of technical systems and organisa-
tional procedures.
STUK’s representatives have contributed to
international opinion exchange on safety culture
in the nuclear field. The role of authorities in
particular in the strengthening of safety culture
was discussed at an IAEA meeting in September.
An authority is to foster positive development in
the safety culture of other organisations by set-
ting a good example in its own field and being
consistent in regulatory work.
STUK has aimed to add transparency and
practicality to the concept of safety culture and
the associated concept of safety management.
Safety management and, more widely, manage-
ment research has served as a source of concrete
information as to what affects safety behaviour
and organisations’ safety results and what man-
agement teams in safety critical fields are to
consider. A master’s thesis on this topic is under
way at STUK. The data thus obtained has been
utilised in the revision of YVL guides as well.40Risk-informed regulatory control
Risk-informed quality management
A piece of research was completed in 2003 in how
to use risk analysis to support the establishment
of a quality management system and classification
(Graded QA). Both utilities participated by submit-
ting the material on what was chosen as an exam-
ple and the VTT State Technical Research Centre
of Finland conducted the related research. Both
utilities have already classified certain organisa-
tional functions such that eg a function’s safety
significance and related operational experiences
and requirements for operability have been con-
sidered in defining a task’s requirement level.
However, classification has been case by case and
probabilistic safety analysis has not been utilised
in the assessment of a task’s safety significance.
The research done showed that the utilisation of
risk analysis in the classification of organisational
functions makes possible the focusing of a utility’s
resources to where the risk from the plant’s oper-
ation can be most effectively reduced.
Risk-informed development of the Technical
Specifications
In 2003, a Technical Specifications development
project was completed. It yielded a calculation
method for identifying transients during which a
change in the plant operating state may entail a
bigger risk than component repair during power
operation. However, prior to its commissioning,
reliable reference analyses are yet to be conduct-
ed requiring a major contribution from experts in
the field.
Development of the FinPSA computer program
The risk assessment program FinPSA proceeded
to its test operation phase. Almost all features
pertaining to management of the Level 1 PSA
model have been completed. The most important
numerical calculation routines (minimal cuts,
their importance measures and those of basic
events) have been established. The Olkiluoto
plant’s risk model was transferred to an entirely
new program.
PSA information system
STUK has developed a Probabilistic Safety Analy-
sis Information System (PSAIS) as a tool for risk-
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system provides detailed data on the results of
risk analyses, methods, conclusions made, their
application and utilisation in nuclear safety regu-
lation. PSAIS is an information system from whose
hypertext environment the information needed
can be extracted in several ways. The system will
be made available in STUK’s intranet.
The first phase of PSAIS was completed in
2003 and it contains the below thematic entities
on Olkiluoto nuclear power plant:
• PSA level 1 main results
• Systems analyses
• Accident progress and plant response
• General (initiating events, success criteria in
various initiating events, etc)
A plan was devised for transferring this informa-
tion to STUK’s intranet. System programming and
preparation of its intranet pages is under way.
7.2 Renewal and working ability
A competence analysis, which was started in 2002,
was completed and, on the basis of its results,
competence development programmes were drawn
up. The survey gathered information on compe-
tence relating to special skills and to general
working skills; it defined the target situation and
the current state of affairs; and their most essen-
tial gaps. On the basis of the results, training and
development programmes to enhance know-how
will commence.
Facilities and competence relating specifically
to the new nuclear power plant in planning were
developed. With this in mind STUK participated
in the preparation and execution of a basic profes-
sional training course on nuclear safety with oth-
er organisations in the field. The 6-week course
commenced in September 2003 and continued in
2004. Over 50 junior experts in the nuclear field
from various organisations participated, eleven of
which were from STUK.
A survey on well-being at the workplace was
carried out at STUK. Actions to enhance it were
agreed upon based on the results of the survey.
Some actions could be realised right away and the
implementation of some will continue in 2004.7.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation includ-
ed basic operations subject and not subject to a
charge. Basic operations subject to a charge most-
ly comprised of the regulatory control of nuclear
facilities, with their costs charged to those subject
to control. Those basic operations not subject to a
charge included international and domestic co-op-
eration as well as emergency response and com-
munications. Basic operations not subject to a
charge are publicly funded. Overheads from rule-
making and support functions (administration, de-
velopment projects in support of regulatory activi-
ties, training, maintenance and development of ex-
pertise, reporting as well as participation in nucle-
ar safety research) were carried forward into the
costs of both types of basic operation and of con-
tracted services in relation to the number of work-
ing hours spent on each function.
In 2003, the costs of the regulatory control of
nuclear safety subject to a charge were 7.2 M€.
The total costs of nuclear safety regulation were
8.7 M€. Thus the share of activities subject to a
charge was 83%.
The 2003 income from nuclear safety regula-
tion was 7.2 M€. Of this, 2.3 M€ and 3.9 M€ came
from the inspection and review of Loviisa and
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants, respectively. In
addition to the operating plant units, the income
for Olkiluoto’s part includes regulatory control of
the new reactor in planning. The regulation of
Posiva Oy’s operations yielded 1.0 M€. The in-
come from other objects of regulation (ia regula-
tion of the FiR 1 research reactor, regulation of
small-scale users of nuclear materials) was
0.01 M€. Figure 14 gives the annual income and
costs of nuclear safety regulation in 1999–2003.
The time spent on the inspection and review of
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 10.3 man-years,
ie 12.2% of the total working time of the regulato-
ry personnel. For Olkiluoto nuclear power plant it
was 10.0 man-years, which accounts for 11.8% of
total working time. In addition to the oversight of
the operation of domestic nuclear power plants,
the figure includes nuclear material control. The
time spent on nuclear waste management inspec-
tion and review was 2.5 man-years. Preparation of
the regulatory oversight of the new nuclear power41
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Table III. Distribution of working hours (man-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Basic operations subject to a charge 25.3 26.4 26.3 27.6 29.2
Basic operations not subject to a charge 5.5 7.5 7.4 6.9 6.4
Contracted services 7.0 5.4 4.4 3.8 4.9
Rule-making and support functions 24.6 25.5 28.5 27.1 28.2
Holidays and absences 14.8 15.0 16 16.2 15.9
Total 77.2 79.8 82.6 81.6 84.6plant took 5.0 man-years and that of the FiR 1
research reactor 0.1 man-years.
Distribution of yearly working time of the
nuclear regulatory personnel according to duty
areas is given in Table III. Figure 15 presents the
distribution of working time spent on main func-
tions in 1999–2003.
The number of inspection days onsite and at42
Figure 14. Income and costs of nuclear safety regulation.
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Figure 15. Working time spent on main functions.
Figure 16. Number of inspection days onsite and at component manufacturers premises.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Basic operation subject to a charge Basic operation subject not to a charge Contracted services
530
586 588
495 510517
569
635 679
811
1321
117412231155
1047
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
man-day
Resident inspectors (time spent on nuclear safety regulation)
Other STUK inspectors
Total
ST U K - B - Y TO 2 3 3
8 Emergency preparedness
Tuulikki SillanpääSTUK arranged several training events and exer-
cises to test and develop its own emergency re-
sponse. In addition, STUK controls preparedness
of the operating organisations of nuclear power
plants to act in unusual situations. No such situa-
tions occurred in 2003.
Emergency response at nuclear power plants is
under continuous development during plant oper-
ation and regularly tested in emergency exercises
as part of emergency preparedness training.
STUK has approved the emergency plans of Lovii-
sa and Olkiluoto plants and yearly reviews the
implementation of the emergency preparedness
regime, including training and emergency exercis-
es.
Two domestic emergency exercises were ar-
ranged in 2003 which STUK participated in. On 25
November 2003, over 30 domestic authorities and
co-operators, media and Nordic nuclear and radia-
tion safety authorities participated in an extensive
emergency exercise of Loviisa nuclear power
plant. STUK went in full-scale, with approx. 120
participants. The exercise tested inter-authority
co-operation, the forming of an overall picture of
the accident situation and the dissemination of
information for the public and media. Tested were
also the emergency plan, operation and manage-
ment of the Rescue Region of Itä-Uusimaa to be
established. Nordic radiation and nuclear safety44authorities assessed the need for mild protective
measures in the Nordic countries in the emergen-
cy event in question, based on the overall picture
of the accident situation communicated by STUK.
Protective measures could include ia travelling
restrictions to Finland, measures imposed on
trade and transportation as well as communicat-
ing information to visitors from own country to
Finland.
The Olkiluoto annual emergency exercise was
carried out on 19 November 2003 as a classroom
exercise, with all parties taking part. The preced-
ing training session went through the changes in
operation brought about by the new emergency
response centre system and the rescue region.
Fire drills were organised at Loviisa nuclear
power plant on 21 May 2003 and 12 November
2003. A fire drill was organised at the Olkiluoto
plant on 10 November 2003.
STUK also participated in nuclear power plant
emergency exercises of international scale, which
in 2003 contained no actual analysis of plant
situations. A series of four EU-funded emergency
exercises, held on 27 May 2003, tested the support
systems to decision-making that are employed
during a nuclear power plant accident to assess an
accident’s harmful effects in the plant’s environ-
ment and the benefits of protective measures.
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9 Communications
Risto IsakssonIn 2003 STUK issued 14 press releases on nuclear
safety regulation. The press release of 26th No-
vember on the unusually high number of INES
Level 1 events at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
got the most attention. Another press release re-
porting events at domestic plants was about a leak
in the hydrogen system of a Loviisa 2 generator;
the plant unit’s other turbine was stopped to re-
pair the leak. Two press releases routinely report-
ed the plants’ annual maintenance outages.
STUK’s international co-operation and events
abroad were reported in the form of press releas-
es. Topics included eg CTBT and assessment of
nuclear waste programmes internationally. The
fuel failure at Paks nuclear power plant, Hungary,
was dealt with in one bulletin and in a comple-
menting memorandum at STUK’s web site. Infor-
mation about the opening for public access of the
Nuclear Events Web-based System (NEWS) was
disseminated as well.
Together with its partners in co-operation,
STUK in September started a basic professional
training course on nuclear safety. The need for
this arises from not only change of generation in
the field but also from the challenges set by the
new nuclear power plant. This was reported in apress release and in the STUK magazine Alara.
The composition of the new Advisory Committee
on Nuclear Safety was the topic on one September
press release.
All the bulletins on STUK’s safety regulatory
effort in 2003 exceeded the news threshold but
caused no big headlines. The power plants dissem-
inated information about their annual mainte-
nances at the same time, so it cannot be said that
STUK made them headlines.
In addition to press releases, the operation of
and events at the domestic nuclear power plants
were dealt with in quarterly reports on nuclear
safety, which were sent to the media and interest
groups. The reports were also available at STUK’s
web site.
Issue 4/2003 of the STUK periodical Alara
focuses on issues of nuclear safety. It contained
largish articles on how STUK is preparing for the
safety assessment of the new nuclear power plant,
on the accident at Paks, Probabilistic Safety Anal-
ysis as well as spent nuclear fuel safeguards and
the Model Protocol Additional. Other 2003 issues
of Alara carry shorter articles on current topics.
In early 2003, a popular review of nuclear
power plant safety was published.45
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10 International co-operation
Ilari Aro, Juhani Hyvärinen, Elina Martikka, Matti Ojanen, Hannu Ollikkala,
Esko Ruokola, Pekka Salminen, Kirsti Tossavainen, Olli VilkamoCo-operation with the IAEA
The IAEA continued revision of its nuclear safety
guidelines (formerly Nuclear Safety Series NUSS).
The revision is almost done and is expected to be
completed in the coming years. STUK prepared
for the IAEA several statements on draft guide-
lines requested from Finland. It also contributed
to the work of teams preparing the draft guide-
lines. A representative of STUK continued as
chairman of the NUSSC (nuclear safety) commit-
tee. In addition, STUK-representatives were ac-
tive in the WASSC (waste safety) and RASSC (radi-
ation safety) committees.
The first review meeting on the Joint Conven-
tion on the safety of spent nuclear fuel manage-
ment and on the safety of radioactive waste man-
agement was held in Vienna in November 2003.
The Convention requires the submission, every
three years, of a report on how its obligations
have been met. STUK was responsible for the
drawing up of Finland’s country report and a
delegation headed by STUK participated in the
review meeting into which 33 countries participat-
ed. Finland’s written and oral reports were re-
ceived rather favourably: several good practices
were referred to and the recommended safety
improvements were the ones already mentioned
in the country report.
STUK was Finland’s liaison organisation for
the below information exchange systems for nu-
clear facilities maintained by the IAEA:
• Incident Reporting System (IRS)
• Incident Reporting System for Research Reac-
tors (IRSRR)
• International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)
• Power Reactor Information System (PRIS)
• Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System
(NFCIS)46• Net enabled Waste Management Database
(NEWMDB)
• Directory for Radioactively Contaminated Sites
(DRCS)
• Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB)
• Events that have arisen during the Transport
of Radioactive Material (EVTRAM).
A report was forwarded to the IRS system about
cracking in the shroud tubes of control rod drives
connecting to the Loviisa 2 primary circuit, de-
tected towards the end of 2001 and in 2002. No
events reportable to the INES and IRSRR systems
occurred. Yearly information on the operation of
the Finnish nuclear power plants was forwarded
to the PRIS system.
The Director General of STUK was invited as
Vice Chairman of the International Nuclear Safe-
ty Advisory Group INSAG for the next four year
period. The Group provides information and ad-
vice to the Director General of the IAEA in
nuclear safety issues and gives recommendations
for safety improvements in the IAEA member
countries.
Funded from the IAEA’s safeguards support
programme, a STUK-representative worked as a
co-ordinator to East and Middle European assist-
ance programmes. The programme is financed by
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and executed by
STUK. Its objectives include development of the
IAEA’s safeguards procedures, training of inspec-
tors and provision of expert assistance. Expert
assistance will not continue in this form in 2004.
In IAEA expert capacity, a STUK representa-
tive participated in the IRRT assessment of the
Bulgarian and Slovakian nuclear and safety au-
thorities as well as the investigation of the exten-
sive fuel failure at Paks nuclear power plant in
Hungary.
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International co-operation in nuclear safety re-
search was mostly channelled through the OECD/
NEA. The organisation also facilitated an ex-
change of opinions about current nuclear safety
questions. STUK was represented in all of the
organisation’s main committees dealing with radi-
ation and nuclear safety. The main committees
are as follows
• Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installa-
tions (CSNI)
• Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities
(CNRA
• Committee on Radiation Protection and Public
Health (CRPPH), and
• Radioactive Waste Management Committee
(RWMC).
STUK’s Director General acted as chairman of the
CNRA.
STUK took part also in the work of the below
CNRA and CSNI Working Groups
• Working Group on Inspection Practices (WGIP)
• Task Group on Regulatory Effectiveness Indi-
cators (CNRA/TGRE) and Task Group on Safety
Performance Indicators (Joint CNRA/CNSI/TG-
SPI)
• Working Group on Public Communication of
Nuclear Regulatory Organisatios (WGPC)
The CSNI Working Groups’ fields of activity were
as follows
• Working Group on Operating Experience
(WGOE)
• Working Group on Integrity of Components
and Structures (IAGE)
• Working Group on Accident and Analysis
(GAMA)
• Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK)
• Special Expert Group on Human and Organisa-
tional Factors (SEGHOF)
• Special Expert Group on Fuel Safety Margins
(SEGFSM).
A STUK-representative was chairman of the
CRPPH Expert Group on Effluent Release Options
(EGRO). The final report on this work was pub-
lished in 2003.Co-operation with the EU
The Atomic Questions Group (AQG) of the Council
of the European Union in the autumn of 2003 sent
out an expert group to Bulgaria to gain insight
into safety improvements made at Kozloduy nu-
clear power plant and the reorganisation of the
country’s nuclear sector in accordance with the
requirements of EU membership. A STUK repre-
sentative contributed to the preparation, execu-
tion and results assessment of this mission. The
Group’s final report will be completed in the spring
of 2004.
STUK participated in the work of three work-
ing groups of the NRWG. One of the groups
looked into the suitability of Risk Informed In-
Service Inspection (RI-ISI) for the drawing up of a
piping inspection programme for nuclear power
plants. Represented in the working group are also
authorities from France, Spain, Belgium, Sweden,
Germany, England and Switzerland. The working
group has been in close contact with the utilities’
ENIQ working group, corresponding working
groups of the OECD and the IAEA as well as the
organisations that developed the methods (West-
ing house and EPRI) and utilities. It has drawn up
a draft report describing the contents of various
RI-ISI methods, European and American applica-
tions, differences/similarities between traditional
methods and RI-ISI methods. In addition, the
report assesses the pros and cons of the RI-ISI
procedures from a regulatory point of view.
Another NRWG working group, to whose work
STUK participated, dealt with the qualification of
non-destructive examination. The group’s task
was to exchange experiences in the implementa-
tion and development of qualification in European
countries and to follow and assess inspection qual-
ification with an eye to regulatory work. Based on
a survey it conducted, the working group prepared
a report describing the status of qualification in
nuclear EU countries and applicant countries.
STUK took part in the operation of an NRWG
working group on safety-critical software. The
group’s task is to gather common position of EU
authorities on requirements of safety-critical soft-
ware.
STUK contributed to the work of the advisory
Expert Group A31 of the Commission of the Euro-47
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protection.
In the field of nuclear material safeguards,
STUK participated in the operation of the
European Safeguards R&D Association (ESARDA).
ESARDA’s task is to promote and harmonise
European R&D in nuclear material control.
ESARDA offers a forum for information and ideas
exchange to authorities, researchers and nuclear
power plant operators.
Via the activities of the Regulatory Assistance
Management Group (RAMG) of the EU, STUK
participated in Phare and Tacis co-operation in
support of East European regulatory organisations
and their support organisation. There were two
meetings of the group in 2003. It assessed the
appropriateness of projects prepared by the EU to
support regulatory work. STUK contributed to the
then-ongoing Phare and Tacis projects. STUK
participated in the work of the CONCERT work-
ing group consisting of the heads of nuclear safety
authorities of the EU member states and appli-
cant countries. The group assembled twice to
discuss EU-related questions touching on regula-
tory work.
NKS co-operation
The new research programme of NKS, Nordic co-
operation in nuclear safety, commenced in 2002. It
is headed by two responsible programme manag-
ers. For the first part of 2003, STUK’s representa-
tive was responsible for the programme’s sub-area
of reactor safety, after which responsibility was
handed over to a representative of Fortum Nucle-
ar Services Oy. STUK participated in the work of
the sub-area of emergency preparedness and envi-
ronmental safety. In addition, STUK has a repre-
sentative in the NKS management team.
Projects on reactor safety relate well to Fin-
land’s national research programme and needs.
Several experts from STUK work with the emer-
gency preparedness and environmental safety pro-
gramme that includes focus areas important to
Finland.
The new programme’s content in its entirety
serves well co-operation between the Nordic au-
thorities, which is a permanent objective of NKS
co-operation.48Bilateral co-operation
A representative from STUK was a permanent
member of the Reactor Safety Committee assist-
ing the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate
(SKI). A representative of SKI was an invited ex-
pert in the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety
that functions in conjunction with STUK. Co-oper-
ation with SKI continued, with regular meetings
during which current questions of nuclear safety
regulation were discussed. Information exchange
with the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSI)
continued as regards doses to Finns who had
worked at nuclear power plants in Sweden and to
Swedes who had worked at Finnish plants.
A representative of STUK was chairman of a
nuclear safety committee that supports the Bel-
gian nuclear safety authority and participated as a
permanent member in the work of a correspond-
ing Lithuanian advisory committee.
STUK’s co-operation with the USNRC focused
on information exchange in nuclear safety matters
of interest to both parties. A STUK representative
worked at the USNRC as a visiting expert for one
year. STUK continued, in co-operation with
USNRC and VTT, development of the FRAPTRAN/
GENFLO code for fuel transients. Additionally,
and in co-operation with Fortum Service, Argonne
National Laboratory (ANL) was provided with
Zr1%Nb cladding material for the USNRC’s LOCA
tests. Discussions on the licensing of new nuclear
power plants and experiences in their
construction were had with US authorities.
Discussions were had with the French authori-
ty (DGSNR) and the Czech Republic’s auhtority
(SUJB) on the licensing of new nuclear power
plants and experiences on their construction.
An expert on I&C technology from the Swiss
authority (HSK) worked at STUK for six weeks.
The visit’s topic was regulatory control and super-
vision of extensive I&C modifications at nuclear
power plants, in which the Swiss have gained
experience in the past few years.
Co-operation between STUK and the Russian
nuclear safety authority Gosatomnadzor (GAN) in
nuclear material and waste control continued,
based on a co-operation arrangement signed in
1998. For the part of nuclear waste, the develop-
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interest.
Safeguards co-operation between STUK and
the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation
Office (ASNO) continued. STUK provided ASNO
with information about nuclear materials import-
ed to and kept in Finland as agreed.
Other forms of co-operation
STUK participated in the work of the Western
European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WEN-
RA). In 2000, a working group on harmonisation
had been set up to develop a method for drawing
up uniform nuclear safety requirements. In ac-
cordance with the recommendations of the work-
ing group’s final report, an extensive nuclear safe-
ty requirements development project was com-
menced in early 2003. It serves to establish nucle-
ar safety requirements for 19 safety issues plus
their status in the 17 participating countries.
STUK in 2003 actively contributed to the projectia by drawing up draft requirements for licensee
training and qualilfications approval as well as
probabilistic safety analysis related areas.
The VVER Regulators Forum in 2002 set up a
working group of authorities to compare the risk
analyses (PSA) conducted for VVER facilities and
to analyse their causes. The working group met
twice in 2003; one of the meetings was held in
STUK. The working group consists of national
nuclear safety authorities from Armenia, Bulgar-
ia, Ukraina, Russia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Finland. In 2003 each participating
country drew up a summary report of the PSA for
their own country’s VVER plants and, based on
their PSA, analysed in more detail one initiating
event leading to an accident plus a subsequent
accident chain.
STUK participated in the work of the Network
of Regulators of Small Nuclear Programs (NERS).
NERS met once in 2003.49
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11 The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety
Pekka SalminenIn accordance with section 56 of the Nuclear En-
ergy Act (990/1987), the preliminary preparation
of matters relating to the safe use of nuclear ener-
gy is vested with the Advisory Committee on Nu-
clear Safety. It is appointed by the Government
and functions in conjunction with STUK. Its term
of office is three years. The Committee was ap-
pointed on 16 August 2000 and its term of office
ended on 15 August 2003. A new Committee was
appointed on 10 September 2003.
In early 2003 the Committee’s Chairman was
Professor Pentti Lautala (Tampere University of
Technology) and its Vice-Chairman was Head of
Research Rauno Rintamaa (VTT Technical Re-
search Centre of Finland). In 2003 the members
were Senior Researcher Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki
(VTT), Director Ulla Koivusaari (Pirkanmaa Re-
gional Environment Centre), Director Olli Pahka-
la (Ministry of the Environment), Professor Rain-
er Salomaa (Helsinki University of Technology),
Branch Manager Paavo Vuorela (the Geological
Survey of Finland). Professor Jukka Laaksonen,50Director General of STUK, was a permanent
expert to the Committee. Invited experts were
Doctor of Technology Antti Vuorinen and Director
Christer Viktorsson (the Swedish Nuclear Power
Inspectorate).
Mr Olli Pahkala and Mr Rainer Salomaa left
the Committee during the year. In their place, the
Government assigned Director Timo Okkonen
(TUKES) and Senior Researcher Ilona Lindholm
(VTT). Mr Pentti Lautala continues as Chairman
and Mr Rauno Rintamaa as Vice-Chairman. Mr
Antti Vuorinen and Mr Christer Viktorsson con-
tinue as invited experts.
The Committee convened eight times in 2003.
The Committee has three divisions for prepar-
atory work: a Reactor Safety Division, a Nuclear
Waste Division as well as an Emergency Prepar-
edness and Nuclear Material Division. In addition
to the Committee members proper, distinguished
experts from various fields have been invited to
the Divisions. A total of twelve Division meetings
were held in 2003.
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Summary of the results of STUK’s safety
performance indicatorsBackground for indicators
Overall assessment of nuclear power plant safety
by inspection and safety reviews is complemented
by the STUK indicator system. The indicators of
the system can be used to illustrate that certain
safety factors under scrutiny have remained at a
desired level and to gain insight into their possible
changes and trends in the long run. Declining
trends indicate a possible need to enhance per-
formance and organisational operation of the
plants and STUK’s regulatory effort. The aim is to
recognise, as early on as possible, trends in the
safety-significant functions of a nuclear power
plant or STUK. Even the effectiveness of actions
commenced based on indicator results can be mon-
itored by means of these indicators.
The indicator system divides into two principal
groups: external indicators for the safety of nucle-
ar facilities and internal indicators for the regula-
tory effort. External indicators divide into three
principal subgroups: safety and quality culture;
operational events; and structural integrity. These
principal subgroups have a total of 14 indicator
areas having 46 specific indicators.
The development of STUK’s safety indicator
system began in 1995. A couple of years from this,
some safety and performance indicators were in-
corporated in the target plan of the Department of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation YTO (NRR). These
indicators have been systematically calculated,
interpreted and reported, resulting in some mea-
sures (event investigation 1/00). Other indicators
have not been calculated and used so systematic-
ally. They have resulted in individual clarifica-
tions. The information thus gathered has mostly
been utilised as background for inspections.
The development of indicators, anchored to the
STUK strategy, began in 2001 and they were
included in the new STUK strategy, revised in
early 2003. Of the effectiveness indicators for52STUK’s activities, the below apply to the NRR:
occupational doses, radioactive releases from nuc-
lear facilities and the resultant population expo-
sure in the vicinity of the plants, safety-endanger-
ing events at nuclear facilities, condition of com-
ponents relevant to the accident risk of nuclear
facilities, updating of YVL guides, customer satis-
faction and number of complaints. The last three
indicators describe the NRR’s own activities and
are incorporated in the indicator area for regula-
tory activities. Indicators for plant safety, incorpo-
rated in the STUK strategy, have quantitative
limits contained in legislation, YVL guides or the
NRR’s own objectives. Currently, all plant safety
indicators are contained in the effectiveness sec-
tor of the NRR strategy.
Guide YTV 1.4, “Calculation, assessment and
utilisation of the NRR indicators”, in the NRR
Quality Manual, defines responsibilities and proce-
dures for data collection and calculating of indica-
tors for the NRR; and for assessing, reporting and
utilising their values. Appendix 1 of the guide
describes the NRR’s external indicators (indicators
for safety of nuclear facilities); their definitions
and data acquisition; person responsible for the
updating of each indicator (person in charge of
indicator); and person who maintains the indicator
system (administrator). Indicator definitions,
graphs and results interpretation can be found on
the NRR site in STUK’s intranet.
An intermediate assessment of the STUK indi-
cator system was conducted in 2003. The assess-
ment’s objective was to improve the definition and
reliability of specific indicators and find ways of
enhancing the system utilisation and implement-
ing the indicator process as a part of oversight of
nuclear safety. As a result, the definitions of some
indicators were made more specific. A decision
was made to introduce new event risk-significance
indicators. It was decided to implement changes to
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Indicator maintenance and reporting was changed
such that they are updated quarterly and the
yearly indicator report is attached to the Annual
report on regulatory control of nuclear safety in
Finland submitted to the Ministry of Trade and
Industry.
Indicator results for 2003
Safety and quality culture
STUK’s safety performance indicators for nuclear
power plants in 2003 showed a deteriorating trend
in the maintenance function of the Loviisa power
plant in 2003. The number of failures and preven-
tive maintenanace operations of components sub-
ject to the Technical Specifications at the plant
was on the increase, as was the average time
spent on work to be completed during three days.
The failures distributed to multiple technical fields
and no specific problem area could be pointed out.
The future will show whether an actual change
has taken place in the previously declining trend.
In addition to the aforementioned indicators, the
Olkiluoto plant followed quality of maintenance on
the basis of maintenance errors and their types.
These indicators, specific to the Olkiluoto plant,
indicated an enhanced maintenance function and
improved quality. The number of failures of com-
ponents subject to the Technical Specifications at
the Olkiluoto plant grew a little.
Safety systems unavailability was followed by
means of international indices provided by the
licensees. Monitored at the Loviisa power plant
were the high pressure emergency make-up water
system, the auxiliary feedwater system and the
back-up diesel generators; Olkiluoto monitored
the containment spray system, the auxiliary feed-
water system and back-up diesel generators. The
diesel generator unavailability index of the Lovii-
sa power plant showed a deteriorating trend for
the third year in succession. At the Olkiluoto
plant, the unavailability index of the auxiliary
feedwater system was on the increase.
At the Olkiluoto plant, a deteriorating trend
for the third successive year was evident in 2003
in the safety indicator system area “Safety and
quality culture”, which shows the degree of adher-
ence to the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).
Two out of a total of eight Olkiluoto deviationsfrom the Tech Specs were detected by STUK. At
the Loviisa plant, only one plant condition oc-
curred in 2003 that did not conform to the Tech
Specs. The Tech Specs non-conformances at
Olkiluoto, as well as other plant events there,
were mostly due to human error. Adherence/non-
adherence to the Tech Specs shows the ability of
the plant operating organisation to follow rules
and its safety attitude. The effectiveness of
STUK’s regulatory effort is assessed also based on
how the Tech Specs are adhered to.
In 2003 the Loviisa plant found it necessary to
deviate, in a planned manner, from the Tech
Specs during maintenance and modifications al-
most twice as often as in 2002. STUK granted the
Loviisa plant some twenty exemptions from the
Technical Specifications for this purpose. The
number of events was affected by a project to
replace the fixed radiation protection monitoring
system, which could not be done without devia-
tions in any plant operating state. The number of
exemptions granted to the Olkiluoto facility was
on a slight increase but remained on a par with
previous years. The exemptions granted did not
warrant re-evaluation of the Tech Specs.
The licensees’ ability to keep plant documenta-
tion current pertaining to plant modifications im-
proved in 2003, particularly at the Loviisa plant.
The modest improvement in the safety perform-
ance indicator of the Olkiluoto plant was partly
affected by a new data procurement method. Dur-
ing the calculation of the safety performance indi-
cator of the Olkiluoto plant, shortcomings were
observed in the use of document follow-up forms
as regards safety classification documents and
diagrams. If only based on the plant’s own follow-
up method, the indicator would have yielded a
very weak value. For Loviisa’s part, identification
of document updates pertaining to electrical and
I&C systems was problematic due to the fact that
document revision needs are presented in sepa-
rate installation plans not submitted to STUK.
For the part of the Loviisa plant, the question
surfaced of updating the Final Safety Analysis
Report during extended modification projects when
modifications at both plant units are time-phased.
The plant units’ safety performance indicator
for investments on improvements and modifica-
tions only indicates relative fluctuation in invest-
ments. Sums given in euros are the utilities’53
ST U K - B - Y TO 2 3 3 STUK’S SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR NPPS IN 2003  APPENDIX 1business secret not to be published here. The 2003
amount of investments was close to the average
for both facilities. This safety performance indica-
tor was included in the STUK indicator system in
2000 to indicate the potential effect of deregulated
electrical markets on investment.
STUK works to affect, both directly and in-
directly, the radiation doses of nuclear power plant
workers and the calculated doses of surrounding
populations arising from releases. This involves
low radioactive releases into the environment.
The safety performance indicators for radiation
exposure in 2003 showed, for both plant sites, a
decrease in radiation dose for workers and the
surrounding population from releases. According
to the safety performance indicators, releases into
the sea from the Olkiluoto plant decreased fur-
ther. Releases into the atmosphere from both
nuclear facilities were in the magnitude of the
previous year. Argon-41 was the dominant noble
gas at the Loviisa plant; it does not originate from
fuel or corrosion but is the activation product of
argon in the atmosphere between the reactor
pressure vessel and the biological shield. A fuel
leakage at Olkiluoto 1 had a bearing on the
modest growth of the safety performance indica-
tors for the plant’s noble gas and iodine releases.
The safety performance indicators for radiation
exposure indicate the success in 2003 of organisa-
tional units responsible for the ALARA pro-
grammes, which strive to restrict radiation expo-
sure onsite and releases into the environment,
and radiation protection.
Operational events
The safety performance indicators of Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant indicated a deteriorating trend
in operation. The number of events at Olkiluoto,
of which special reports have been written, devia-
tions from the Technical Specifications included,
has almost doubled in two years’ time compared
with the long-time average. They were caused by
non-compliance with regulations, non-recording of
failures and an incorrect use of computer pro-
grams. The number of reports on operational dis-
turbances at Olkiluoto plant grew compared with
last year. All of Olkiluoto’s operational disturbanc-
es occurred at Olkiluoto 2 and originated in elec-
trotechnical malfunctions of the main circulation54pumps. One reactor scram occurred at Olkiluoto 1
in 2003. No reactor scrams occurred at the Lovii-
sa plant. The number of other events, reported in
accordance with STUK Guide YVL 1.5, at Loviisa
nuclear power plant was on the decrease com-
pared with 2002. Human-error induced events at
the Loviisa plant were decreasing, whereas, at
Olkiluoto, they were on the increase for the third
successive year, owing to the growth in the total
number of events. No actual fires occurred at
either plant.
The effect of the unavailability of safety sys-
tems, or their sub-systems, caused by component
failures, preventive maintenance and deviations
from the Tech Specs approved by STUK, on annu-
al accident risk in 2003 exceeded its target value,
ie 5%, for both Loviisa plant units and Olkiluoto 2.
This was partly due to planned one-time mainte-
nance jobs executed under exemption permits,
and partly to latent component failures. At both
Loviisa plant units, it was caused by back-up
diesel generator latent failures and unavailability
of the diesel generators, which also increased the
“Unavailability of safety systems” indicator. At
Olkiluoto 2 this was due to the repair, under an
exemption order from the Tech Specs granted by
STUK, of the ceilings of the shutdown reactor
service water system suction channels and a die-
sel generator latent defect.
New safety performance indicators were intro-
duced in 2003 to represent the risk-importance of
events. Events were grouped to three categories
according to their risk significance (Conditional
Core Damage Probability – CCDP); namely, the
most risk significant events (CCDP ≥ 1E–7), other
significant events (1E–8 ≤ CCDP < 1E–7) and other
events (CCDP < 1E–8). In addition, the events
were divided into three groups: 1) unavailabilities
due to component failures, 2) planned unavailabili-
ties, and 3) initiating events. The safety perform-
ance indicator is the number of events in each
risk class. The most significant event at the
Olkiluoto plant in 2003 was a reactor scram at
Olkiluoto 1, regardless of the fact that all safety
systems operated as planned during it. In 2003,
six other events of the same risk category oc-
curred at the Olkiluoto plant and 13 at the Loviisa
plant. These figures show an increase in events
for both plant sites. The number of events as-
APPENDIX 1  STUK’S SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR NPPS IN 2003 ST U K - B - Y TO 2 3 3signed in the middle category, both at the Olkiluo-
to and Loviisa plants, was on a par with the
previous year, ie approx. 20 events. The Olkiluoto
events were mostly planned unavailabilities, in-
cluding those caused by work executed under
exemption from the Tech Specs and preventive
maintenance. The Loviisa events were mostly
caused by component failures.
Structural integrity
In the safety performance indicator area, the leak-
tightness of multiple barriers (fuel, primary cir-
cuit, containment) is monitored. The objective is
that leaktightness complies with the require-
ments; deteriorating trends are not allowed, as
assessed according to STUK’s safety performance
indicators. Based on the 2003 indicators, the set
limits on barriers preventing the spread of radio-
active releases were not exceeded. Fuel integrity
has been good, particularly at the Loviisa plant,
where not a single fuel leak has occurred in re-
cent years. Primary circuit integrity is monitored
by international chemistry performance indices
used by the utilities. At the Olkiluoto plant, leak-
ages from the primary circuit are monitored by
operating cycle as well. The chemistry indices in-
dicated that operational chemistry control had
been successful at Olkiluoto plant. Compared with
the previous operating cycle, unidentified leakag-
es in the primary circuit at Olkiluoto plant in-
creased in the operating cycle 2002–2003, being
9.4% of the limit set in the Tech Specs. This was
due to leaks from check valves of the relief sys-
tem of the main steam lines, which took place for
the whole operating period. The utility is planning
on a new seal structure for the valves.
Containment integrity has been good both in
Olkiluoto and Loviisa. The overall as-found leak-
age of containment outer isolation valves was
below set limits at the Loviisa plant units and at
Olkiluoto 1. The overall leakage of Olkiluoto 2
isolation valves was twice that of the previous
year. Over half of it was caused by a leaking
isolation valve in the reactor pressure vessel
spray system. Overall leakage through contain-
ment penetrations grew at Loviisa but the set
limit was not exceeded. The leaktightness of the
rubber bellows of the penetrations had been prob-
lematic and the Loviisa power plant has initiated
their replacement with metal bellows.Conclusions made from the results of
the 2003 indicators
The data gathered from 2003 for nuclear plant
safety indicators did not indicate such changes in
individual indicators, indicator areas or the three
main areas as would have warranted an immedi-
ate reaction from STUK, with the exception of
indicators pertaining to unusual plant conditions
at the Olkiluoto facility. The requirements set for
the effectiveness indicators of STUK’s activities
were fulfilled as regards occupational dose, radio-
active releases and population exposure. Releases
into the sea from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto facili-
ties reduced to the present level with the intro-
duction into use of equipment to minimise these
releases. No safety-endangering events occurred
at the nuclear facilities.
The indicators for the maintenance function of
the Loviisa plant showed a deteriorating trend for
2003. The future will show whether an actual
change has occurred in the previously declining
trend. An increasing fault trend would indicate a
degrading plant condition and problems in compo-
nent service life management.
The Olkiluoto performance indicators show an
improved maintenance function and quality.
A growing trend, for the third year in succes-
sion, in the number of Olkiluoto plant’s operation-
al events and events warranting a special report,
including plant conditions in non-compliance with
the Tech Specs, indicated a degraded safety and
quality culture in plant operation. This was evi-
dent also in the four INES Level 1 events that
occurred within a short period of time towards the
end of the year. The effectiveness of STUK’s
regulatory work is assessed also by means of
adherence to the Tech Specs. STUK has started
discussions with the management of Teollisuuden
Voima Oy underlining the need for overall deve-
lopment of safety culture in the plant’s operation.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has commenced the neces-
sary development measures.
The number of situations in non-compliance
with the Tech Specs at the Loviisa plant has
remained low. The number of other reportable
events has been on the decrease, too, for several
years in succession.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers
containing the release of radioactive substances
has remained good.55
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Introduction to indicators and their definitionGiven next in the report are the definitions, data
acquisition, calculation responsibilities and pur-
pose of the indicators for nuclear power plant safe-
ty in the STUK indicator system; and indicator
values updated on the basis of the 2003 data, their
interpretation and assessment of change.
The NRR has assigned persons responsible for
the acquisition of indicator data as well as for
their calculation and analysis. In 2003, resident
inspectors of the office of safety management
(TUR) were responsible for indicators concerning
failures and preventive maintenance of Tech Spec
components and safety systems availability.
The data on primary circuit leakages for
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was provided by
resident inspectors. The inspectors of TUR gath-
ered and assessed indicators describing the quality
of the maintenance function at the Olkiluoto
plant. TUR maintained an operational events fol-
low-up table and the head of office was responsible
for indicators based on operational events and
reports. The office of risk assessment (RIS) as-
sessed the risk-significance of events. Inspectors
in the office of power plant technology (VLT) were56responsible for indicators describing the function-
ing of the fire alarm system as well as the
integrity of fuel and the primary circuit. The office
of reactor and safety systems (REA) gathered and
calculated indicators describing containment leak-
tightness. The office of radiation protection (SÄT)
gathered dose and release data and the corre-
sponding indicators. The office of plant projects
(HAN) was responsible for the documentation up-
dating and investments indicators. The nuclear
power plant safety indicator system is maintained
in the unit of management support (YJT) and co-
ordinated by the event investigation manager.
During the updating of the previous year’s
indicators, in early 2003, the appropriateness of
individual indicators and the functionality of data
collection were evaluated. Towards the end of
2003, meetings were arranged for further indi-
cator definition and improvement of system func-
tionality. As a result, a decision was made to
change specific indicators, as of the beginning of
2004, such that they would serve, as well as
possible, NRR’s regulatory work and its sub-pro-
cesses.
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Safety performance indicatorsA.I Safety and quality culture
A.I.1 Failures and their repairs
A.I.1a Failures of components subject to
the Technical Specifications
Definition
As indicators, the number of failures of compo-
nents defined in the Tech Specs during power op-
eration is followed.
Source of data
The failure data base (Loviisa NPP) or daily re-
ports submitted by the utility (Olkiluoto NPP).
Purpose
The indicator gives the failure frequency trend of
Tech Spec components at steady state operation.
Responsible unit/person(s)
Safety Management (TUR), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto plant)Number of failures causing unavailability of 
components specidied in Tech Spec, Loviisa NPP
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The number of repairs of Tech Spec components
at the Loviisa plant increased in 2003 by approx.
26% from the previous year. Before this, the year-
ly number of fault repairs had been on a slight
decrease for several years. The failures distribut-
ed to multiple technical fields and no specific prob-
lem area can be pointed out. The increase in the
number of faults is not significant as such; the
future will show whether an actual change has
taken place in the previously downward trend. The
continued growth in the number of faults would
seem to indicate a deteriorating plant condition
and problems with component service life man-
agement.
The number of failures of Tech Spec compo-
nents in Olkiluoto in 2003 increased compared
with 2002. In 2003 problems relating to vibrations
on the pumps of the reactor core spray system
were observed. Investigations of the pump units’
mounting bases revealed that the pumps were not
firmly attached to the base because of the cavities
in the concrete beneath the fastening plate due to
which the pumps had to be isolated for the filling
out of the cavities (indicators A.I.1f and A.1.3).
The number of failures has been 50–60/year over
the past five years.57
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the Technical Specifications
Definition
The ratio of preventive maintenance work orders
to failure repair work orders at steady state ope-
ration and during annual maintenance.
Source of data
The data is available from the work order data
bases of NPPs. The utility supplies the data to the
person responsible.
Purpose
Indicator describes the volumes of failure repairs
and preventive maintenance and illustrates the
conditions of the plant and its maintenance strate-
gy.
Responsible unit/persons
Safety Management (TUR), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto plant)
Interpretation of indicator
The preventive maintenance volume of Tech Spec
components has been stable at the Loviisa plant58
Ratio of the preventive maintenance orders to the
failure repair work orders,  Loviisa 
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fluctuating numerical value does not indicate a
clear indicator trend. The yearly-changing nume-
rical values have been due to a natural fluctuation
in the volume of preventive maintenance and fail-
ures, due to ia annual maintenance length. Since
the number of faults at the Loviisa plant in 2003
was 26% higher than in 2002, the volume of pre-
ventive maintenance at the plant has been at least
twice as much.
At the Olkiluoto plant, the volume of preven-
tive maintenance of Tech Spec components in
relation to the number of fault repairs further
decreased a little compared with 2002. The vol-
umes of preventive maintenance and fault repairs
as a whole were on a par with those of 2002. The
volume of preventive mechanical maintenance
work at Olkiluoto 1 decreased and that at Olkiluo-
to 2 increased compared with the previous year.
The duration of the plant units’ annual mainte-
nance outages in 2002 and 2003 were the same.
Preventive maintenance works during plant oper-
ation are defined in the Tech Specs and their
number thus stays a constant during the year.
Fault repairs and preventive maintenance deter-
mined by outage duration affect the indicator.Ratio of the preventive maintenance orders to the
failure repair work orders, Olkiluoto 
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the Technical Specifications
Definition
Indicator shows how quickly failed Tech Spec com-
ponents are repaired in relation to the repair time
allowed in the Tech Specs. At the Olkiluoto plant,
the monitored repair times vary and the indicator
is an average of the percentage values of repair
times (repair time in relation to that allowed in
the Tech Specs). For the Loviisa plant, only com-
ponents whose allowed repair time is three days
are included.
Source of data
An annual report supplied to STUK by the utility.
For the Loviisa plant, data extracted from the
plant’s failure database.
Purpose
To describe the plant’s maintenance policy and its
ability and aspiration to correct failed Tech Spec
components without delay.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisan plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto plant)Average of real repair times of components with
allowed repair time of 3 days, Loviisa
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Average failure duration of Tech Spec compo-
nents, who’s allowable repair time is three days
(72 hrs), at the Loviisa plant has been 24 hrs on
average, as was the case at Loviisa 1 in 2003.
Average fault repair time at Loviisa 2 increased
to 42.3 hrs. The increase was affected by the fact
that the volume of repair work to be completed in
three days according to the Tech Specs was low in
all, which emphasises an individual fault and
essentially affects the indicator. The emergency
make-up water pump 21TJ11D01 was repaired
based on an exemption to the Tech Specs granted
by STUK. It took 213 hrs and this alone increased
the value of the repair activities indicator by 10.7
hrs. Even without it, the average fault repair time
at Loviisa 2 would have been higher than in 2002.
In comparison to 2002, there was a clear
decrease in the repair times of Tech Spec compo-
nents at both Olkiluoto plant units. The highest
percentage share (26.4% of allowable limit) arose
from when a fire damper of the Olkiluoto 2
reactor building ventilation system failed to open
in a periodical test and when the failure was not
connected to a Tech Spec component there and
then. As a result was a repair time considerably
longer than is allowed for a component requiring
immediate repair.59
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Definition
As the indicator, the number of maintenance er-
rors is followed. It contains also maintenance-er-
ror induced common cause failures and individual
maintenance errors. Common cause failures aris-
ing during operation are included.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is extracted from the fail-
ure databases of utilities. For the time being, the
Olkiluoto plant's common cause failures and indi-
vidual failures have been followed as indicators.
No such procedure exists for the Loviisa plant so
far.
Purpose
To follow the quality of maintenance.
Responsible unit/persons
Safety management (TUR)
Jukka Kupila
Interpretation of indicator
Compared with the previous years, the number of
maintenance failures did not essentially change in
2003. The figure for 2001 is lacking because calen-
dar-yearly monitoring replaced operating-cycle
specific monitoring; no data was available for the
remainder of 2001.
The decreasing number of human-error based60
Number of maintenance failures, Olkiluoto
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003common cause failures, since early 2002, is partly
due to a changed line of assessment. The only
Olkiluoto plant common cause failure in 2003
(safety isolation of emergency coolant pumps dur-
ing annual maintenance) was attributed to human
error. In 2002 only one maintenance failure was
rated as a human based common cause failure
(exceeding of the cloud point limits of the day tank
for stand-up diesel generator fuel oil).
Ten human-based common cause failures were
observed during the fuel cycle of 2000–2001, of
which mentioned here is a programming error of
the optical smoke detectors of the fire alarm
system, which resulted in several failure alarms.
In the operating cycle 1998-1999, the number of
human-based common cause failures increased to
11 and in 1999-2000 their number was 10. They
were of minor importance since not one of them
was assessed to have any bearing on the plant's
operation.
One of the tasks of the investigation team
(1/00), set up in early 2000, was to find out how
the utility assesses human-based common cause
failures and how common cause failures have
been taken into account in plant-specific Probabil-
istic Safety Analysis (PSA) models. This investiga-
tion is described in the annual report on the
regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland
2000 (STUK-B-YTO 208). The investigation is also
reported in the IAEA/NEA Incident Reporting Sys-
tem (IRS report number 7494).Number of human based CCFs caused by
 maintenance and operation, Olkiluoto
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preventing operation
Definition
As the indicator, the number of technical common
cause failures (CCFs) causing the unavailability of
equipment or systems is followed for all plant sys-
tems.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the fail-
ure databases of the utilities. For the time being,
the Olkiluoto indicator has been followed. The li-
censee has submitted the data in Excel files from
which CCFs have been analysed. A corresponding
procedure for the Loviisa plant will be established
after the completion of a study into CCFs.
Purpose
The indicator represents the number of CCFs of a
technical origin. A CCF preventing a function re-CCFs causing unavailabilit
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
OL 1 3 4 3 5
OL 2 0 2 6 4
95-96 96-97 97-98 98-9fers not only to the failure of a safety system but
includes all systems. Thus, conclusions on the
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based on the indicator.
Responsible unit/persons
Safety Management (TUR)
Jukka Kupila
Interpretation of indicator
According to analysis, no CCFs assignable to the
indicator area occurred at either Olkiluoto plant
unit in 2003.
In the operating cycle 2001–2002, the number
of CCFs assigned to this indicator area was half of
that of the previous operating cycle at both
Olkiluoto plant units, the total number of failures
being nine. The most significant of them were
accumulation of dirt on the smoke detector sys-
tem and problems with power supply, which were
calculated as separate CCFs for both plant units.61
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Definition
The indicator is the number of potential CCFs of
technical origin, which have no effect on the avail-
ability of equipment or systems but have a bear-
ing on the reliability of their operation (ia ageing,
wear and tear, corrosion).
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the fail-
ure databases of the utilities. So far, only the indi-
cator for the Olkiluoto plant has been available.
The licensee has submitted the data in Excel files
from which CCFs have been analysed. A corre-
sponding procedure will be established for the
Loviisa plant after the completion of a study into
CCFs.
Purpose
The indicator is an anticipatory sign for failures,
which could have developed into a failure prevent-
ing the operation of equipment or systems.62
Number of potential C
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Safety management (TUR)
Jukka Kupila
Interpretation of indicator
The number of potential CCFs to be assigned to
the indicator decreased at both Olkiluoto plant
units due to a changed line of interpretation in
2003. The most significant problem was the cavi-
ties in the concrete bases beneath safety-impor-
tant pumps, which surfaced only now (indicators
A.I.1a and A.I.3).
The most significant problem in 2002 was the
“bubbling” of the rubber coating of service water
channels. The sealing leakages of the main steam
line isolation valves increased the indicator as
well. The failure events included precipitations in
heat exchangers, valve leakages and measure-
ment failures.CFs of technical origin
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Definition
Loss of power production caused by failures in
relation to rated power (gross).
Source of data
Annual and quarterly reports submitted by utili-
ties.
Purpose
Importance of failures from the point of view of
production.Loss of power production b
rated powe
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Power Plant Technology (VLT)
Kirsti Tossavainen
Interpretation of indicator
Capability losses due to failures at the Loviisa and
Olkiluoto plant units have been relatively small.
The Loviisa 2 indicator value for 1997, which is
an anomaly, was caused by an approx. 7-day long
shutdown to repair the primary circuit and the
2003 anomaly was caused by work to replace the
stator of a plant unit generator, which took 41
days, causing a 2.6% capability loss, ie twice that
of 2002. Capability losses from failures at other
units in 2003 were small (less than 0.5% of rated
power).63
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the Technical Specifications
Definition
The number of non-compliances from the Tech
Specs as well as the number of exemptions grant-
ed by STUK.
Source of data
Data for the indicators are collected from applica-
tions for exemption orders and from event reports.
Purpose
To follow the utilities activities in accordance with
the Tech Specs: compliance with the Tech Specs
and identified situations during which it is neces-
sary to deviate from them; of which conclusions
can be made as regards the appropriateness of the
Tech Specs.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Timo Eurasto
Interpretation of indicator
Eight plant situations in non-compliance with the
Tech Specs occurred at the Olkiluoto plant in
2003, two of which were detected by STUK. The
number of non-compliances with the Tech Specs64
Number of deviations from the Tech Spec., Loviisa
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third consecutive year. Only one plant situation in
non-compliance with the Tech Specs occurred at
the Loviisa plant in 2003. It was in connection
with the renewal of the radiation release mea-
surements of the ventilation stack and radiation
measurement monitors of Loviisa 2. The number
of Loviisa plant’s situations in non-compliance
with the Tech Specs has been on the decrease for
several years. The non-compliances are mostly
caused by human error.
The number of exemptions from the Tech
Specs has grown from the 21 cases in 2002 to 28
in 2003. The number of exemptions granted to
Loviisa nuclear power plant almost doubled from
2002, being of the same magnitude as in 1994.
This was mostly caused by the replacement of
fixed radiation measurement system (the MONU
project), which could not be carried out in any
operational state without deviating from the Tech
Specs. In addition, the Loviisa plant had to apply
for an extension to several applications, which
increased the number of applications. The number
of exemptions granted to Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant has remained at the level of the previous
years. Four of the total of seven in 2003 dealt with
the need to deviate from the Tech Specs to carry
out modifications, repairs and maintenance.Number of deviations from the Tech Spec., Olkiluoto
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Definition
As indicators, the plant-unit specific unavailability
indices of safety systems are followed. The sys-
tems followed at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
are: the containment spray system (322), the aux-
iliary feed water system (327) and back-up diesel
generators (651–656) ; those followed at Loviisa
nuclear power plant are: the high pressure safety
injection system (TJ), auxiliary feed water system
(RL92/93, RL94/97) and back-up diesel generator
(EY).
Essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavailabili-
ty hours and its required availability hours are
calculated as the indicator. Unavailability hours
are the combined unavailability of redundant sub-
systems divided by the number of trains. It does
not indicate the simultaneous unavailability of
several trains. Sub-system unavailability hours
include the time required for planned mainte-
nance of components and unavailability from fail-
ures. The latter includes, in addition to the time
spent on repairs, estimated unavailability time
prior to failure detection. If a failure is assessed to
have occurred in a previous successful testing,
and is assessed to have escaped detection, the
time between periodical tests is added to unavaila-
bility time. If a failure has occurred between tests
such that its date of occurrence is unknown, a half
of the time period between tests is added to
unavailability time. Whenever the failure’s occur-
rence can be identified to an operational, mainte-
nance, testing or other event, the time between
the event and fault detection is added to unavaila-
bility time.
Annual plant criticality hours are the availabil-
ity requirement for the 322, 327, TJ and RL
systems and the requirement for diesels is conti-
nuous ie annual operating hours.
Source of data
Data for the indicators are supplied by the utili-
ties. Licensee representatives submit the neces-
sary data to the relevant person in charge in
STUK.Purpose of indicators
To indicate unavailability of safety systems. By
means of the indicator, the condition and status of
safety systems and the development of trends are
monitored.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of indicator
The unavailabilities of safety systems in the indi-
cator system have been acceptably low. In the
present situation it is not possible to point out,
based on the indicators, a clear and significant
trend in the development of unavailabilities since
even changes taking place in a year, which appear
significant, are partly caused by the method of
calculation.
The unavailability of the containment spray
system (322) of Olkiluoto 2 increased from 2002
due to vibration problems on the system’s pumps.
The pumps’ concrete bases had to filled out be-
cause the original concrete castings proved insuffi-
cient. (see the indices A.I.1a and 1f).
The unavailability of the Olkiluoto auxiliary
feed water system (327) at both plant units was
higher than in 2002 and the trend at Olkiluoto 1
has been on the increase over the past two years.
This is due to the increasing number, at both
plant units, of failures of the hydraulic accumula-
tors and valves of the system’s piping.
The trend indicating the unavailability of the
back-up diesels of the Loviisa plant for the third
year in succession is mostly due to the calcu-
lational effects of unavailability due to variations
in the preventive maintenance programme and
periods of latency of failures. The number of
failures affecting the availability of the diesels has
been six to eight a year over the past four years
and the sum of their yearly repair times has been
from 70 to 200 hrs.65
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Shut-down cooling system / containment spray system
(321 / 322), Olkiluoto
0.0 %
0.1 %
0.2 %
0.3 %
0.4 %
0.5 %
OL 1 0.10 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OL 2 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
321 322
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Diesel generators (EY), Loviisa
0.0 %
1.0 %
2.0 %
3.0 %
4.0 %
5.0 %
LO 1 2.90 3.70 0.30 1.50 0.70 0.21 2.20 2.00 0.20 1.06 1.58 2.24
LO 2 1.30 3.40 2.00 1.10 0.20 0.21 2.20 2.00 0.20 1.06 1.58 2.24
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Auxiliary feed water systems (RL92/93, RL94/97),
Loviisa
0.0 %
2.0 %
4.0 %
6.0 %
8.0 %
10.0 %
12.0 %
LO 1 4.20 2.90 3.70 0.50 2.80 0.12 3.60 10.40 3.20 0.81 3.09 0.98
LO 2 3.00 0.20 1.90 0.70 0.60 0.10 3.60 2.40 3.30 0.80 3.34 0.61
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
High pressure safety injection system (TJ), Loviisa
0.0 %
1.0 %
2.0 %
3.0 %
4.0 %
5.0 %
LO 1 0.00 3.10 4.00 0.20 4.80 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.01
LO 2 0.00 3.10 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
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Definition
As indicators, collective radiation exposure by
plant site and plant unit is followed as well as the
average of ten highest yearly radiation exposures.
Source of data
The data on collective radiation exposure comes
from annual reports of the utilities. The data on
ten highest radiation doses are submitted by the
licensee to the person responsible for the indica-
tor.
Purpose of indicators
Collective radiation doses describe the success of
the plant’s ALARA programme. The average for
ten highest doses indicates how close to the
20 mSv dose limit the individual occupational dos-
es at the plants are, indicating at the same time,
the effectiveness of the plant’s radiation protec-
tion unit.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT)
Suvi Ristonmaa
Interpretation of indicator
The indicators show no significant changes in radi-
ation doses compared with previous years. Most
doses are incurred in work done during outages
and thus outage duration and the number of work
having a bearing on radiation protection affects
the yearly radiation doses.
Occupational doses at nuclear power plants are
below individual dose limits. The Radiation De-
cree (1512/1991) stipulates that the effective dose
to a worker from radiation work may not exceed
the 20 mSv/year average over any period of five
years or 50 mSv in any one year.68If, at one plant unit, the collective occupational
radiation dose average over two successive years
exceeds 2.5 manSv per one GW of net electrical
power, the utility is to report to STUK the causes
of this and any measures possibly required to
improve radiation safety (Guide YVL 7.9).
The reporting limit was exceeded for a few
times at Loviisa nuclear power plant. The reason
was the higher-than-usual collective radiation dos-
es at Loviisa 1 in 2000, 1996 and 1992 as well as
those at Loviisa 2 in 1994. The annual mainte-
nance outages of those years were of long dura-
tion and the work done contributed to radiation
exposure. In the Loviisa 1 annual maintenance
outage 2000, work relating to ia preparation for
severe accidents (the SAM project) was carried out
as well as the replacement of the feedwater collec-
tors of two steam generators. During the 1996
annual maintenance outage, the Loviisa 1 reactor
pressure vessel was annealed and extensive mod-
ernisation, maintenance and inspection work was
carried out. During the 1992 annual maintenance
outage, Loviisa 1 main shutdown valves were in-
spected and repaired and the piping of a steam
generator relief system was replaced.
Early in the Loviisa 2 annual maintenance
outage of 1994, the entire primary circuit was
decontaminated because of elevated radiation le-
vels. Work due earlier at the plant unit had been
postponed to this outage and a 1.53 mSv collective
dose was incurred from it. Eight manSv was
assessed as the collective dose saved thanks to the
decontamination. The collective radiation of those
carrying out the decontamination was small ie
15.3 manmSv.
The occupational radiation exposure at the
Olkiluoto plant has remained below set limits for
the entire indicator analysis period.
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Collective dose (manSv), Loviisa
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
LO 2.815 1.680 3.286 2.159 2.332 1.139 2.637 1.142 2.072 1.360 2.260 1.127 2.610 0.940
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Average of the ten highest doses (mSv), Loviisa NPP
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LO 20.01 14.06 20.73 18.77 15.15 11.44 20.29 14.82 17.38 13.70 17.25 10.94 18.54 9.01
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Olkiluoto 1 and 2
Collective  dose per 1 GW of net electrical capacity
averaged over two succesive years
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
m
an
S
v/
G
W
Olkiluoto 1
Olkiluoto 2
reporting limit  2,5 manSv/GW according to the Guide YVL 7.9
Loviisa 1 and 2
Collective  dose per 1 GW of net electrical capacity
averaged over two succesive years
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Average of the ten highest doses (mSv), Olkiluoto NPP
0
5
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OL 11.09 12.87 14.90 11.44 16.08 9.00 12.34 10.86 11.12 12.60 11.30 9.45 8.41 6.20
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Collective dose (manSv), Olkiluoto
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
OL 1.583 1.397 2.404 1.621 2.403 1.100 1.676 1.666 2.059 0.940 1.720 1.184 1.120 1.030
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
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Definition
As indicators, radioactive releases into the sea and
the atmosphere (TBq) from the plant are followed
and the calculated dose due to releases to the
most exposed individual in the vicinity of the
plant.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the quar-
terly and annual reports of the utilities. STUK’s70
Iodine isotope releases to
1.0E+03
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
LO Iodines 131-I-ekv. 1.7E+05 7.7E+08 9.4E+05 7.2E+04
1994 1995 1996 1997
Noble gas releases
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
1.0E+13
1.0E+14
1.0E+15
1.0E+16
1.0E+17
LO Noble gases 87-Kr-ekv. 1.6E+12 4.6E+12 1.5E+12 5.0E+12 5
1994 1995 1996 1997Research and Environmental Surveillance Depart-
ment (TKO) calculates the dose for the most ex-
posed person in the plant vicinity and submits it
to the person in charge of this indicator.
Purpose of indicator
To monitor the amount and trend of radioactive
releases and assess factors having a bearing on
any changes in them. atmosphere (Bq), Loviisa
3.3E+06 4.5E+07 5.7E+03 0.0E+00 9.9E+05 3.53E+06
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Annual limit 2,20E+11 Bq
 (Bq), Loviisa
.2E+12 6.0E+12 5.6E+12 4.9E+12 5.0E+12 6.49E+12
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Annual limit 2,20E+16
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Radiation protection (SÄT),
Suvi Ristonmaa (release data)
Research and Environmental Surveillance (TKO),
Environment of nuclear power plants (YVL)
Seppo Klemola (dose calculation)Iodine isotope releases to 
1.0E+03
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
OL Iodines 131-I-ekv. 1.1E+09 3.9E+07 2.6E+07 1.7E+07
1994 1995 1996 1997
A
Noble gas releases 
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
1.0E+13
1.0E+14
1.0E+15
1.0E+16
1.0E+17
OL Noble gases 87-Kr-ekv. 3.5E+12 1.7E+13 9.7E+12 2.1E+11 3
1994 1995 1996 1997
AInterpretation of indicator
(releases into the atmosphere)
Radioactive releases into the environment from
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants were
small. They are well below set limits.
Gaseous fission products, noble gases and io-
dine isotopes originate in leaking fuel rods; in the71
atmosphere (Bq), Olkiluoto
2.7E+06 1.4E+07 7.9E+07 0.0E+00 9.8E+06 1.74E+07
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
nnual limit 1,14E+11 Bq
(Bq), Olkiluoto
.0E+11 6.1E+11 3.0E+11 5.7E+10 2.80E+10 1.35E+11
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
nnual limit 1,77E+16 Bq 
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surfaces on fuel cladding during fuel fabrication;
and in reactor surface contamination from earlier
fuel leaks. The number of fuel leaks at the Loviisa
and Olkiluoto plant units and the amounts of
fission products released into the primary circuit
during them has been low. The figures show the
interdependence between iodine releases and fuel
leaks (indicators A.III.1).
Noble gas releases from both nuclear power72
Aerosol releases to atm
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
LO aerosols 2.3E+08 3.4E+08 2.2E+08 2.5E+08 7.3E
1994 1995 1996 1997 19
Aerosol releases to atm
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
OL aerosols 1.3E+08 3.2E+07 1.4E+07 4.5E+07 3.2E
1994 1995 1996 1997 19plants in 2003 were of the same magnitude as in
the preceding years. The noble gas releases from
the Loviisa plant were dominated by argon-41, an
activation product of argon-40, found in the air-
space between the reactor pressure vessel and the
biological shield.
Aerosols released from both plants were of the
same magnitude as in the preceding years. Aero-
sol nuclides (ia activated corrosion products) are
released ia during maintenance work.osphere (Bq), Loviisa
+07 2.7E+07 6.2E+07 4.1E+07 6.7E+07 7.95E+07
98 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
osphere (Bq), Olkiluoto
+07 6.5E+06 1.3E+07 3.3E+07 3.0E+07 3.25E+07
98 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
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(releases into the sea)
Releases into the sea from Loviisa power plant
reduced to their present level after the commis-
sioning of a caesium separation device in 1992. In
1998 and 2001 the plant released clarified evapo-
ration residues from storage tanks into the sea (so
called controlled liquid discharges) in a controlledGamma-activity of liquid
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
1.0E+13
LO other radionuclides 4.1E+08 7.3E+07 5.6E+07 1.2E+07
1994 1995 1996 1997
A
Gamma activity of liquid ef
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
1.0E+13
OL other radionuclides 1.0E+10 2.4E+10 1.6E+10 9.5E+0
1994 1995 1996 1997manner. This shows in the trend figure as a re-
lease value a magnitude higher than usual.
Releases into the sea from Olkiluoto nuclear
power plant reduced to their present level in 1998
when the plant commissioned new process water
purification and treatment equipment, making
possible the recirculation of discharged process
water back into the processes.73
 effluents (Bq), Loviisa
1.2E+09 1.2E+08 1.0E+08 1.3E+09 8.5E+07 3.08E+08
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
nnual limit 8,90E+11 Bq
fluents, Olkiluoto NPP (Bq)
9 2.5E+09 1.8E+09 1.1E+09 8.6E+08 7.5E+08 5.88E+08
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Annual limit 2,96E+11 Bq
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(calculated dose due to radioactive releases)
The calculated radiation doses to the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the nuclear pow-
er plants were of the same magnitude as in the74
The calculated dose of the m
the environment of th
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
LO 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.5
1994 1995 1996 1997 199
The calculated dose of the m
the environment of the
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
OL 0.58 1.20 0.87 0.51 0.1
1994 1995 1996 1997 199previous years. The doses for both plant units are
less than 0.05% (objective less than 1% of limit) of
the 100 microSv limit established in the Govern-
ment Resolution (395/1991).ost exposed individual in
e Loviisa NPP (µSv )
0 0.06 0.06 0.35 0.066 0.047
8 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
ost exposed individual in
 Olkiluoto NPP (µSv)
5 0.11 0.08 0.053 0.053 0.043
8 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
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Definition
This indicator area follows the need to update doc-
uments and their realisation by the next annual
maintenance. The documents to be updated in-
clude: the Technical Specifications, the Final Safe-
ty Analysis Report (FSAR), safety classification
documents and diagrams, PSA documentation,
operation and maintenance procedures, emergen-
cy and disturbance instructions and process flow-
charts. Followed is the ratio of the number of imp-
lemented document revisions to the number of
identified document revisions.
Source of data
The data for indicator calculation is obtained from
STUK’s plant modifications register.
Purpose of indicators
To follow plant quality management and ability to
maintain plant documentation.
Responsible unit/person
Plant projects (HAN)
Tapani Virolainen
Interpretation of indicator
Identification of document amendments and revi-
sions pertaining to modifications at the Loviisa
plant has mostly been by preinspection documentsDocume
0 %
20 %
40 %
60 %
80 %
100 %
LO 72 %
OL 75 %
2000-01and training notices. As a new practice for the
Olkiluoto plant, its indicator is based on the fol-
low-up forms (AV forms) pertaining to modification
documentation onto which the document revision
needs identified are marked. The AV forms’ some-
what lacking information has been made more
specific by the Olkiluoto plant modifications plan-
ning unit, since a review based only on the AV
forms would have yielded a significantly weak re-
sult for Olkiluoto. As regards safety classification
documents and diagrams, the estimate is still
based on an assessment by the person in charge of
the indicator of the need to revise the above docu-
ments in connection with modifications. Teollisuu-
den Voima Oy should also consider the inclusion
of these documents as an entry on the AV form,
since identification of the need to amend and rev-
ice documents is the licensee’s duty.
Of document revisions needed after plant modi-
fications (entered into register) in 2002, 96% and
86% were realised at Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant
units, respectively, by the annual maintenance of
2003.
Corresponding figures for 2001 were 81% at
Loviisa and 77% at Olkiluoto. The improved figure
for the Loviisa plant is mostly due to an updating
of the Final Safety Analysis Report. They were
made only after the completion of extensive modi-
fication projects (SAM, TH pumps, VLOCA modifi-
cations).75
ntation
81 % 96 %
77 % 86 %
2001-02 2002-03
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Definition
Utilities’ annual investments on plant modernisa-
tion and renovations in current value of money
improved by the building cost index.
Source of data
The licensee submits the necessary data direct to
the person responsible for the index.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the amount of investments on plant
maintenance and their fluctuations.76
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Plant projects (HAN)
Tapani Virolainen
Interpretation of indicator
The indicator shows only the relative fluctuation
of investments. Sums in Euro are business infor-
mation of the companies involved, not to be pub-
lished here.
The fluctuation in the indicator shows clearly
the investments made in 1997–2000 in the plants’
power upgrades and modernisation projects. The
number of investments in 2003 is close to the
average at both plant sites.and renovations, Loviisa
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A.II.1 Number of events
Definition
As indicators, the number of events reported in
accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 is followed, ie
events warranting a special report, scrams and
operational transients.
Source of data
The data for the indicators is obtained from
STUK’s document administration system (YTD)
and/or the events follow-up table kept by TUR.Number of Specia
0
1
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8
LO 1 5 4 2 3 3 4
LO 2 2 1 3 4 2 1
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19
Number of Special 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
OL 1 3 2 3 0 2 3 2
OL 2 2 1 1 0 3 2 1
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19Purpose of indicator
To follow the number of events important to safe-
ty.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Timo Eurasto
Interpretation of indicator
In 2003, the number of events at the Finnish
plants, warranting a special report, was nine.
Their number at the Olkiluoto plant has almost
doubled in the past two years, compared with the
long-term average. They have arisen from causes77
l Reports, Loviisa
4 2 2 3 5 3 3 0
0 3 0 4 2 1 0 1
96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Reports, Olkiluoto
0 2 2 2 1 4 7
1 0 2 1 3 3 1
96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
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tions, non-registering of failures and incorrect use
of computer programs. One event warranting a
special report occurred at the Loviisa plant.
In 2003, eight and five operational transient
reports were submitted from Olkiluoto and Lovii-
sa power plants, respectively. The operational
transients of the Olkiluoto plant occurred at
Olkiluoto 2, and seven out of the eight transients78
Number of reactor sc
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
OL 1 1 1 3 2 1 2
OL 2 1 2 6 1 0 3
3 year average 2.33 2.5 2.17 1.5
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1
Number of reactor s
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
LO 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
LO 2 0 0 0 1 1 1
3 year average 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1were attributed to electrotechnical failures of the
main circulation pumps.
Olkiluoto 1 submitted one scram report. It
occurred on 4 June 2003 when a decision had been
made, during post-annual-maintenance start-up,
to bring the plant into a cold shutdown state to
repair a leaking cable penetration of a main
circulation pump motor.
No reactor scrams occurred at Loviisa power
plant in 2003.rams, Olkiluoto
4 3 2 1 0 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0
2 2.67 2.33 1.67 0.83 0.67 0.5 0.67
996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
crams, Loviisa
1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.67 0.33 0.17 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33
996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
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Number of operational disturbance reports, Loviisa
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Number of operational disturbance reports, Olkiluoto
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Two types of indicator describe event importance.
The first one pertains to the risk-significance of
component unavailabilities and the second to their
combined total risk.
Definition
As indicators, the risk-importance of events
caused by component unavailabilities is followed.
As the risk measure, an increase in the Condi-
tional Core Damage Probability (CCDP) associated
with each event is employed. Events are divided
into three groups: 1) unavailabilities due to com-
ponent failures 2) planned unavailabilities, and
3) initiating events. In addition, events are
grouped into three categories according to their
risk-significance (CCDP): the most risk-significant
events (CCDP≥1E–7), other significant events
(1E–8≤CCDP<1E–7) and other events (CCDP<1E–8).
The indicator is the number of events in each
category.
Unavailabilities caused by work for which
STUK has granted exemption orders are in group
2. Possible non-compliances with the Tech Specs
are in group 1, if they can be utilised for this
indicator. Non-compliances with the Tech Specs
are dealt with under indicator A.I.2.
N.B.! Calculations for the Loviisa plant are
based on an internal-initiating-event model, mak-
ing them indicative only of a trend.
Source of data
The data for calculation of indicators is collected
from utility reports and exemption applications.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the risk-importance of component un-
availabilities and to assess risk-significant initiat-80ing events and planned unavailabilities. Special
attention is paid to recurring events, CCFs, simul-
taneously-occurring failures and human error. In
addition, an objective in event analysis is to sys-
tematically identify signs of deteriorating organi-
sational and safety culture.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS),
Ari Julin (PSA computation)
Safety Management (TUR) (failure data)
Interpretation of indicator
Loviisa
The most significant events at both Loviisa plant
units related to latent failures of stand-up diesel
generators and maintenance operations of the
back-up emergency feed water system (RL94/97).
The events analysed are considered part of
nuclear power plant normal operation and no
further measures were required from STUK.
Olkiluoto
One reactor scram occurred at Olkiluoto 1 in both
2002 and 2003. All safety systems functioned ac-
cording to design, the causes of the scrams have
been determined and action has been taken to
reduce the probability of their recurrence.
Other significant events at both plant units
related to the repairs of the ceilings of the suction
channels of the shutdown service water systems
(712) under an exemption order from STUK. One
stand-up diesel generator latent failure occurred
at Olkiluoto 2, which had some risk-significance.
The events analysed are considered part of
nuclear power plant normal operation and no
further measures were required from STUK.
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permanent objectives
The STUK indicators were coupled together with
the new strategy of 2003. Incorporated in the indi-
cators for the effectiveness of STUK’s activities is
ia the below objective that considers the condition
of components having a bearing on the accident
risk of nuclear facilities: “The risk-significance of
nuclear power plant component failures, preventive
maintenance and non-compliance with the Tech
Specs is less than 5% of basic-level severe accident
annual risk.
Definition
As indicators, the PSA-computed risk-significance
of operational events caused by unavailabilities ofRisk contribution of the safety s
(percentage of the average 
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1995 1996 1997 1998safety systems is followed. The areas under scruti-
ny include exemptions to the Tech Specs, Tech
Spec component failures, preventive maintenance
of Tech Spec components and other planned isola-
tions. Each indicator is the combined total risk
contribution of unavailability to annual core melt
risk in the follow-up areas.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of indicators are collected
from utility reports and applications for an exemp-
tion order.
Purpose of indicator
The indicators follow the risk-significance of Tech
Spec component unavailabilities and monitor the83
ystem unavailability at Loviisa
annual core damage risk)
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maintenances.
Responsible unit/person
Risk analysis (RIS), Ari Julin (PSA analyses)
Safety Management (TUR) (failure data)
Interpretation of indicators
The effect of unavailabilities caused by component
failures, preventive maintenance and deviations
from operation and maintenance procedures on
annual accident risk exceeded its 5% target value
at both Loviisa plant units and at Olkiluoto 2 in84
Risk contribution by una
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1995 1996 1997 19982003. This was partly due to planned, one-time
maintenance jobs carried out under an exemption
order, partly to latent component failures.
The effect of component unavailability on acci-
dent risk was approx. 11.2% and approx. 10.9% at
Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2, respectively, in 2003. The
increase in the indicator is due to the random
nature of the events and requires no action from
STUK. The exceeding of target values at both
Loviisa plant units was caused by diesel generator
latent failures and maintenance work done on the
auxiliary feed water system (RL94/97).vailability of TechSpec
res, Olkiluoto 
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model in the future, which covers a much larger
number of analysed events. In that case, the risk-
significance of the unavailabilities of the auxiliary
feed water system (RL94/97) for example will be
considerably smaller from what it is now, since
the analysis considers ia the use of a TK/RY
coupling.
The annual total risk from component unavail-
abilities (failures, preventive maintenance and ex-
emption orders) was approx. 4.7% at Olkiluoto 1
and approx. 7.4% at Olkiluoto 2 in 2003. The mostRisk contribution caused by u
preventive main
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1995 1996 1997 1998significant event at Olkiluoto in 2003 was a react-
or scram at Olkiluoto 1. The target value was
exceeded at both plant units due to the repair of
the ceilings of the suction channels of the shut-
down service water system (712) carried out under
an exemption order granted by STUK. In addition,
one back-up diesel generator latent failure oc-
curred at the Olkiluoto 2 plant unit, which was
some risk-significant.
The events analysed are considered part of
nuclear power plant normal operation and no
further measures were required from STUK.85
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Definition
As indicators, the direct causes of events reported
in accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 are followed.
The event causes are divided into technical fai-
lures and erroneous operational and maintenance
actions (non-technical, human errors).
Source of data
Data for the indicators are collected from special
reports, scram reports and operational transient
reports and are entered on to an event follow-up
table maintained by TUR.
Purpose of indicators
To follow the division of the causes of reported
events into technical and non-technical. “Non-
technical causes” denote failures caused by erro-
neous operational and maintenance actions. TheDirect causes of e
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1998 1999 2000indicator may be descriptive of an organisation’s
operation.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Timo Eurasto
Interpretation of indicator
A total of six events were reported from Loviisa
power plant in 2003, three of which were classified
technical and three as caused by human error.
Olkiluoto power plant submitted 17 event reports.
Nine events were caused by a technical fault and
the main reason for/significant contributor to
eight of them was human error (two events were
assigned as having been caused by technical fai-
lure, too).
The events at the Olkiluoto plant, whose caus-
es are human-error based or organisational, have,
for a third year in succession, shown an increas-
ing trend.
vents, Loviisa87
16 6 3
5 4 3
2001 2002 2003
ents, Olkiluoto
4 5 9
5 8 10
2001 2002 2003
ST U K - B - Y TO 2 3 3 STUK’S SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR NPPS IN 2003  APPENDIX 1A.II.4 Number of fire alarms
Definition
As indicators, the number of fire alarms and actu-
al fires is followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators are collected from the utili-
ties. The licensees submit the data needed for the
indicator to the person responsible for the indica-
tor at STUK.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the effectiveness of fire protection at the
nuclear power plants.
Responsible unit/person
Power Plant Technology (VLT)
Heikki Saarikoski88
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No actual fires occurred onsite at either plant.
The correct actuations of the fire alarm system
of the Loviisa plant were mostly caused by un-
known reasons (47 alarms) or incorrect procedures
(43 alarms). The number of alarms actuated by
smoke or humidity, arising from reasons other
than incorrect procedures, was 13 at the Loviisa
plant. The number of alarms triggered by compo-
nent failures was also 13.
In early 2002, the automatic fire detectors of
both Olkiluoto plants were replaced and commis-
sioned in their entirety. The dominating fire
alarms at Olkiluoto in 2003 were still those trig-
gered by component failures (96 alarms). The
number of alarms triggered by smoke, steam,
humidity or heat totalled 52.larms, Loviisa
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A.III.1 Fuel integrity
Definiton
As indicators, the maximum activity concentra-
tion of the plant unit’s primary coolant on even,
steady-state operation as I-131 equivalents
(kBq/m3) (Olkiluoto; I-131 only) is followed as well
as the number of leaking fuel assemblies removed
from the reactor in each annual maintenance out-
age.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is obtained from the utili-
ties’ monthly and quarterly reports (reactor opera-
tion and fuel behaviour). The licensees also sub-
mit the indicator values directly to the person in
charge of the indicator at STUK.
Purpose of indicator
The indicators depict fuel integrity and the fuel
leakage volume during the operating cycle.
Responsible unit/person
Power Plant Technology (VLT)
Kirsti TossavainenNumber of  fuel bundles detected annually leaking,
Loviisa
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(number of leaking fuel assemblies)
Since 1995, fuel leakages have been uncommon at
the Loviisa plant units. The large number of fuel
leakages at Loviisa 2 in 1995 was caused by corro-
sion products accumulating in the fuel assemblies
after a decontamination of the primary circuit sur-
faces in the 1994 annual maintenance outage.
Crud gradually attaching to the fuel assemblies
and their spacer grids reduced coolant flow and
brought about vibration in the assemblies. Fuel
rod damage resulted from when the spacer grids
touched the rods.
Fuel leakages have occurred almost every year
at the Olkiluoto plant units. They have been small
and the leaking assemblies have been removed in
annual maintenance outages following leak detec-
tion. The combined 3-year average for the plant
units shows a decreasing trend, however.
No leaking assemblies were detected at the
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units in the 2002–2003
operating cycle or late 2003. A fuel leak was
detected at Olkiluoto 1 on 27 February 2003. The
leaking assembly and the assembly symmetrically
positioned to it were removed from the reactor in
an annual maintenance outage. Leak detection
during the annual maintenance outage discovered
an above-normal amount of crud in one assembly;
this assembly and the one symmetrically posi-
tioned to it were removed from the reactor.89
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(primary coolant activity concentration)
The I-131 activity concentration of Loviisa 1 pri-
mary coolant has remained unchanged. A 1998
fuel leakage occurred about a week before the
annual maintenance outage during which the leak-
ing assembly was removed from the reactor. The
leak was so small that it did not have any actual
significance for the primary coolant I-131 activity
concentration. The effect of Loviisa 2 fuel leakag-
es is clearly seen in the activity concentration of
the primary coolant. Even during fuel leakages,
activity concentrations have been well below the
limit set in the Tech Specs (1,0E+8 kBq/m3). Since
1999, no fuel leakages have occurred at the Lovii-
sa plant units.
The effect of fuel leakages is obvious in the90
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1995 1996 1997 1998changing activity concentrations of the primary
coolant of the Olkiluoto plant units. Leaking as-
semblies were removed from the reactor in annu-
al maintenance outages following leak detection.
The activity increase caused by a leaking assem-
bly shows in the respective diagram for both the
year of detection and the year of the assembly’s
removal from the reactor. The I-131 activity con-
centration limit set in the Tech Specs (2,2E+6
kBq/m3) was not compromised during any of the
events.
The fuel leak detected on 27 February 2003 is
shown in the 2003 indicator for Olkiluoto 1. The
leaking assembly was removed from the reactor
in an annual maintenance outage. After the 2002
fuel leakage, the Olkiluoto 2 indicator has de-
creased to pre-leakage level.y concentration (kBq/m³)
nt of Olkiluoto units
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Definition
The indicators are international chemistry per-
formance indices used by the utilities, depicting
the effectiveness of water chemistry control in the
secondary circuits of PWRs and in the reactor cir-
cuits of BWRs. Also the amounts of identified and
unidentified leakages during the operating cycle
are followed as primary circuit integrity indi-
cators. The calculating method of the chemistry
index, revised in 1999, has resulted in the index
being ill suited to describing a Loviisa-plant-type
VVER facility. The commissioning of a new indica-
tor is under way at the Loviisa plant.
TVO used the below indices to follow primary
circuit leakages:
• total volume (m3) of identified (from contain-
ment to collection tank 352 T1 of the control-
led leakage drain system) and unidentified (to-
tal volume of leakages into the sump of the
controlled floor drainage system, 345 T33) con-
tainment internal leakages during the operat-
ing cycle, and
• highest containment internal leakage volume
during the year in relation to the allowed
leakage volume in the Tech Specs (outflow
water volume of water condensating in the air
coolers of the containment cooling system 725/
Tech Specs limit).
Source of data
The licensees submit indicators describing the wa-
ter chemistry control to the respective responsible
person at STUK. The licensee submits the leak-
age amounts of Olkiluoto to the respective respon-
sible person at STUK. Data gathering for the indi-Integrity of the primary circuit; chemistry index,
Loviisa
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003cator for Loviisa power plant is yet to be estab-
lished.
Purpose of indicators
To monitor and control primary circuit integrity.
Responsible unit/person
Power Plant Technology (VLT),
Kirsti Tossavainen (chemistry indices)
Safety Management (TUR),
Jarmo Konsi (primary circuit leakages)
Chemistry index
Interpretation of indicator
The value of the chemistry index for the Loviisa
plant has been the best possible, ie one, over the
past years, when using an index calculation meth-
od specific to VVER plants. The Loviisa plant has
developed their own chemistry indicators and ret-
rospective indicator calculations are under way.
The Olkiluoto plant units’ chemistry index has
reached its international target value (= 1). Sul-
phate originating in the condensate clean-up fil-
ters has increased the index in the past. Its
volume has been reduced ia by the use of sul-
phate-free ion-exchange resin in the filters. Dur-
ing the Olkiluoto 2 annual maintenance outage of
2003, the condensate system was modified such
that the temperature of water entering the con-
densate clean-up system ion-exchange filters was
reduced. This was to eliminate the disintegration
of cation mass in the filters, which increases the
sulphate concentration of reactor water. Olkiluo-
to 1, where this modification has not been imple-
mented, uses sulphate-free ion-exchange resin in
part of their filters.91
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Interpretation of indicator
Immediately after the 2002 outages, a leak was
detected at both plant units in a check valve of the
blow-down pipe of the relief system (314) of the
reactor building main steam lines (311). The leak-
ages continued until the 2003 outages during
which the check valves (vacuum breakers), which92
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96-97 97-98 9prevent a vacuum in the blow-down pipelines
(314), were serviced. The Olkiluoto 1 leakage was
considerably larger than that at Olkiluoto 2. The
valve type in question (8 pcs in total/plant unit)
has leaked even before this. Teollisuuden
Voima Oy is planning a new type of sealing to the
valves.
Definition of the above indicators for the Lovii-
sa plant is under way.s of primary circuit (m³), Olkiluoto
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Definition
As indicators, the below parameters are followed:
• overall as-found leakage of outer isolation
valves compared with the highest allowed over-
all leakage of the outer isolation valves
• percentage of isolation valves tested during the
year in question at each plant unit that passed
the leakage test at first attempt (ie as-found
leakage smaller than acceptance criteria of
valve and no consecutive exceeding of the so
called attention criteria of a valve without
repair)
• combined leakage rate of containment penetra-
tions and airlocks in relation to their highest
allowed overall leakage at each plant unit.
Combined leakage rate at Olkiluoto includes
leakages of personnel airlocks, the mainte-
nance dome and the containment dome. In
Loviisa, combined leakage rate is comprised of
the leakage test results of personnel airlocks,
the material airlock, the cable penetrations of
inspection equipment, the containment main-
tenance ventilation systems (TL23), the main
steam piping (RA) and the feed water system
(RL) penetrations as well as the sealings of
blind-flanged penetrations of ice-filling pipes
are included.
Source of data
Data is extracted from the utilities’ leaktightness
test reports submitted by the licensee to STUK
for information within three months from the
completion of an annual maintenance. STUK cal-
culates the overall as-found leakages, since the
reports give total leakages as they are at the end
of an annual maintenance outage (ie after comple-
tion of repairs and re-testing).
Purpose of indicators
To follow the integrity of containment isolation
valves, penetrations and air locks.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA),
Päivi SaloInterpretation of indicator
The overall as-found leakage of Loviisa 1 outer
isolation valves has grown but is still below set
limit. A leaking fire fighting water system valve
accounts for approx. 50% of the leakage rate. The
overall as-found leakage of Loviisa 2 outer isola-
tion valves has decreased, being below set limit.
The percentage of isolation valves, which
passed the leaktightness test at first attempt, has
remained high.
The overall as-found leakage of containment
penetrations, which at Loviisa includes leaktight-
ness tests of the bellows sealings of the personnel
airlock, the emergency personnel airlock, the ma-
terial airlock, the reactor pit, inward relief valves,
cable penetrations, the containment maintenance
ventilation systems (TL23), the main steam line
(RA) and the feed water system (RL), has clearly
grown but set limit remains unexceeded.
At Loviisa 1, approx. 77% of the overall as-
found leakage comes from a leaking main steam
piping bellows sealing. At Loviisa 2, approx. 86%
comes from a leaking penetration bellows sealing
of the maintenance ventilation systems.
The integrity of the Loviisa containment build-
ing has been good. The leaktightness of the rub-
ber bellows of penetrations has been problematic
over the past years. The idea of replacing them
with metal structures has been introduced at the
plant.
The overall as-found leakage of the Olkiluoto 1
outer isolation valves was, as in previous years,
below the limit set in the Tech Specs. At Olkiluo-
to 2, approx. 55% of the overall as-found leakage
rate of outer isolation valves is caused by one
leaking reactor pressure vessel spray system
valve, which is almost equal to the overall as-
found leakage rate allowed for outer isolation
valves (= overall as-found leakage would have met
the criteria without the aforementioned leakage).
The proportion of isolation valves passing the
integrity tests at first attempt has remained sta-
ble.
The overall as-found leakage rate of contain-
ment penetrations, which at the Olkiluoto plant
includes leakages of the upper and lower person-
nel airlock, the maintenance dome and the con-
tainment dome, has been small.93
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Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and
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APPENDIX 2 Safety improvements
Rauno Lehto, Veli Riihiluoma, Päivi Salo, Heimo Takala, Keijo ValtonenLoviisa nuclear power plant
Provision for severe accidents
Measures to mitigate the consequences of severe
accidents were carried out at both Loviisa plant
units during the annual maintenance outages of
2003. The modifications related to hydrogen man-
agement and management of containment leak-
tightness. In addition, measurement installations
not completed in the 2002 annual maintenance
were completed.
In severe accidents, hydrogen is released in-
side the containment. Catalytic recombiners were
installed inside the containment to burn hydrogen
without quick explosive fires. Installation of the
recombiners in the containment upper compart-
ment was continued during operation. The entire
installation work was completed by the end of the
year.
The steam generator room has glow plugs for
situations involving especially quick hydrogen re-
leases. The plugs were qualified for severe acci-
dent conditions and their placing was changed
when more recombiners were installed. In the
annual maintenances, 40 glow plugs were in-
stalled at both plant units.
The sealing material on the doors of the reac-
tor pit was replaced with material that better
withstands severe accident conditions. Additional
sealing could not be implemented according to
plan. The deviation has STUK’s approval until the
2004 annual maintenance.
In addition to those implemented previously,
the option of manual tripping was provided for one
more containment isolation signal necessary for
the maintenance of containment leaktightness.
These manually tripped special functions assure
containment leaktightness against system leaks.96Replacement of radiation measurements
Replacement of fixed radiation monitors was con-
tinued at Loviisa plant. During the Loviisa 2 an-
nual maintenance outage, 61 monitors were re-
placed. In addition, the radiation monitors of the
ventilation stack were replaced at Loviisa 2 to-
wards the end of the year. Corresponding modifi-
cations had been made at Loviisa 1 in 2002, ex-
cluding the ventilation stack monitors, which were
replaced in 2003.
The fixed measurement system of Loviisa nu-
clear power plant comprises a total of 140 inde-
pendently operating monitoring devices that fol-
low dose rates in the plant’s rooms, the radioactiv-
ity in processes and the amount of releases. Part
of the system is capable of functioning even in
severe accidents.
New radiation monitoring technologies yield
data more versatile and accurate than before on
the radiation levels of measured objects. In addi-
tion, measurement data from the new radiation
monitors is more efficiently available for use by
the plant personnel. Besides the control room and
the monitors’ local displays, the data can be di-
rectly utilised in the work locations of those
responsible to control radioactivity and those
working in the I&C unit. Some of the new devices
can be easily moved if needed, facilitating an
improved focusing of radiation measurements.
Supports of low pressure emergency cooling
system pumps were modified
High vibration values had been observed in the low
pressure emergency cooling system pumps of both
Loviisa plant units. To reduce them, the supports of
the pumps were modified in the annual mainte-
nance outages. Deviating vibration values had been
detected in one Loviisa 1 and three Loviisa 2
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emergency cooling system pumps.
The deviating vibration values were due to the
natural frequency of the entity comprising the
pump unit and its supports being ca 100 Hz, which
is identical to the frequency of the initiator from
the pump unit’s electric motor. Vibration levels
can be reduced by changing the natural frequency
of the structure and that of the initiator such that
they are not the same. A structure’s natural
frequency can be increased by making it stiffer
and decreased by reducing its stiffness. There
have been earlier attempts to reduce vibrations by
making the foundation stiffer, but its natural
frequency did not improve sufficiently. The foun-
dation’s stiffness was reduced by opening the
supports of the upper plate at the corners i.e. the
perpendicular walls of the foundation were sawn
open around the corners. After this, the natural
frequencies of the pump units were measured and
found to have decreased by ca. 10–15%. Test runs
showed a marked reduction in the pump units’
vibration levels.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Feedwater distributors were replaced at
Olkiluoto 2
Old feedwater distributors were replaced in the
Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance outage. The new
distributors are capable of handling post power
upgrade feedwater flow and their design takes into
account heat stresses exerted on ascending pipes
of the emergency cooling system located inside
the reactor pressure vessel. The pipes are located
directly under the feedwater distributors. Heat
stress is imminent when cold feedwater mixes
with warmer water returning from the steam sep-
arators. The new distributors are meant to mix
these flows as well as possible and to thus reduce
heat stresses exerted on the ascending pipes.The process interface of process computers
was modernised
In the 2003 annual maintenance outage of
Olkiluoto 2, the oldest process computers plus
their process interface equipment were upgraded
and provided with user interfaces. The process in-
terface gathers and transmits measurement and
condition data to the process computer system and
the process automation system user interface. For
analogue data gathering, the upgraded equipment
constitute a new “Data gathering and temperature
monitoring system”. The power supplies and data
buses of its processors have been doubled for en-
hanced availability. In addition, the new system
carries out temperature measurement-related ac-
tuations, monitors signal limits, carries out alarm
functions and further delivery of signals to the
control and alarm panels of the control room, con-
ducts operating time calculations for electric mo-
tors, and gathers and calculates trends.
The upgraded alarm computer constitutes a
system of its own. It collects binary event data on
processes and transmits them to the process com-
puter through the new “Data gathering and tem-
perature monitoring system”.
The Olkiluoto 2 system connects to two new
servers of the process computer system. These
servers, equipped with next generation software,
were commissioned for operation abreast with the
process computer system proper. Their two work-
stations were placed next to the user interfaces of
the process computer on the control room main
operation board, which was also upgraded.
Similar modifications were implemented at
Olkiluoto 1 in the 2002 annual maintenance out-
age but the control room was not equipped with a
new process computer user interface. The sys-
tem’s upgrading was continued in the annual
maintenance by arranging the connections be-
tween its process I & C stations.
The safety significance of the process computer
system and its data gathering system mainly
pertains to the provision of information and they
do not contribute to the actuation of safety func-
tions.97
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A delay in the repair of a high pressure
safety injection system pump at Loviisa 2
In connection with the periodic testing of a reac-
tor high pressure safety injection system pump at
Loviisa 2 on 3 March 2003, excess water was de-
tected in the water reservoir. It was attributed to
a leaking shaft gasket on the pump’s coupling side.
The pump was replaced with a reserve pump
whose functioning was problematic, too. The utili-
ty had to apply for two exemptions from the Tech-
nical Specifications from STUK to accomplish the
repairs and make the pump operational during
plant unit operation.
After leak detection, the gasket was tightened
without delay, with the pump running. The leak
was not reduced, however, and the gasket was re-
tightened, which resulted in smoke coming out of
the gasket housing. The gasket was loosened but
fuming and heating did not stop. The pump was
stopped for inspection on 4 March 2003. Its shaft
was found stuck and large cuts were found on the
coupling side of the gasket housing. In addition,
the shaft’s protective sleeve was almost broken
and had stuck to the shaft. A decision was made to
dismantle the entire pump for repairs.
The pump in question is part of the reactor
high pressure safety injection system and it pumps
boron water into the primary circuit in the early
stages of an accident. The system has two redun-
dancies, two parallel pumps in each. During nor-
mal operation the pumps are only operated for ca.
two hours for testing. The Technical Specifications
allow for a period of three days of subsystem
unavailability for repairs during plant unit opera-
tion.98This 3-day repair period would not have been
sufficient to find out the cause of the pump failure
and to repair it, so the utility applied for a 7-day
extension, which was granted by STUK.
It was evident from the parts of the dismantled
pump that the sleeve of its labyrinth shaft sealing
had stuck to the shaft and had to be machined off.
After its removal, the shaft was tested by liquid
penetrant and long circumferential cracks were
detected. A week would not have been enough to
repair the original pump and so it was replaced
with a corresponding spare pump. The operation
of the new pump was found problematic, too. It
was repaired and STUK decided on a 10-h trial
run more extensive than a regular periodic func-
tional test. The trial run was completed on 14
March 2003.
Although the pump seemed to be in good order
during the trial run, the vibration spectrum of the
coupling-side bearing of its electric motor indicat-
ed an imminent bearing failure. The utility ap-
plied for a 3-day extension to the deviation from
the Technical Specifications, which was granted by
STUK. The new permit was valid until 17 March
2003. The bearing in question was replaced but
the vibration spectrum was still found ambiguous.
The motor was replaced with a spare motor.
In addition to the motor failure, also the pump
was found defective, i.e. it jammed when manual-
ly run. The bearing and housing of the spare
pump were partially dismantled but the cause of
the jamming remained unclear and it was decided
to entirely dismantle, inspect and repair the
pump. The repaired pump unit was tested on 17
March 2003 with acceptable results.
The utility has purchased spare parts for the
pumps and initiated analyses to purchase new
pumps.
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measurements at Loviisa 2
During the weekly changing of sampling filters of
the sampling lines of the ventilation stack of Lo-
viisa 2 on 16 October 2003, the filter of one sam-
pling line was found to be in an incorrect position.
The other line was out of service due to measur-
ing device replacements. The situation was put
right without delay by replacing the incorrectly
positioned filter with a new one. The observation
was reported to the relevant foreman by email.
The event’s safety significance was only recog-
nised in December at what time it was re-evaluat-
ed and also reported to STUK.
Ventilation outflow from the controlled area of
both plant units at the Loviisa facility is chan-
nelled to the ventilation stack. The radioactivity
of outgoing air is monitored at each plant unit by
continuous-operation measurements and once-a-
week laboratory analyses. The release measure-
ment systems comprise two independent lines in
which the sampling filters and continuous-opera-
tion radiation monitors are located. The Technical
Specifications require that two out of three moni-
tors be operational. Due to the incorrect position
of the sampling filter, a representative sample
flow from Loviisa 2 was not obtained for the two
sampling line monitors in operation and the re-
lease measurement function thus was not opera-
tional as required in the Technical Specifications.
The plant unit’s radiation measurement system
was being upgraded at the same time and thus
also the third monitor of the release measure-
ment system was out of service. In addition to
this, a representative weekly sample for laborato-
ry analysis did not accumulate in the filter.
According to detailed utility analyses, the re-
lease measurements had been simultaneously in-
operable for ca. 20 hours. Based on the plant
unit’s operating statistics, it has been shown that
the unit operated normally during the time period
in question and no exceptional releases occurred.
A separate stand-by radiation monitor for accident
situations was in operation the whole time.
A definite reason for the incorrect filter posi-
tion has not been found. The old release measure-
ment system has been completely removed al-
ready, making reconstruction of the event causes
impossible. After equipment upgrading, recur-
rence of the event is impossible. Owing to theevent, the Loviisa utility has paid attention in
training to the procedure of reporting exceptional
observations.
The event was classified INES Level 0.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Deterioration of the containment isolation
function due to the failure to operate of a
steam line isolation valve at Olkiluoto 1
Periodic tests of the main steam line isolation
valves were carried out at Olkiluoto 1 on 8 Febru-
ary 2003 during which the outer isolation valve of
one main steam line failed to operate. These main
steam lines penetrating the containment are
equipped with isolation valves both within and out-
side the containment. The quick closure of the
valves, if a steam pipe breaks, is an important
safety function because it prevents level swelling
of the reactor due to a pressure decrease caused
by a pipe rupture and the subsequent rising of
water to the steam lines and the possible damag-
ing of steam piping. Periodic tests are conducted
every two months and they measure i.a. valve
closure times, which may not exceed 1.6 s. The
valve in question totally failed to close in the test.
The valve’s stem sealing was loosened after
the test and lubrication was applied on the stem
until the valve’s closure time was acceptable. A
total of six close-signals were sent to the valve. It
did not close on the first two signals and after the
next four signals it was made to close by lubricat-
ing the stem and loosening the stem sealing. The
valve was considered operational based on the
first below-the-approval-limit closure time and no
additional tests were performed to ascertain ap-
proval. The valve closed in 1.41 secs in the ap-
proved test, i.e. closure time was very close to
required value. Normal isolation valve closure
time is below one second in tests.
The valve that failed to close was previously
tested on 22 December 2002, with an acceptable
closure time. Its stem sealing had been tightened
on 27 December 2002 because it was leaking. The
valve had not been tested, and it may have been
inoperable, since then. The containment isolation
function was thus less effective for ca. six weeks.
During this time the containment isolation func-
tion for the steam line in question relied on the
containment inner isolation valve.99
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2003 annual maintenance. Nothing out of the
ordinary was detected on examining the removed
internal parts and after inspection the valve’s
failure to close was attributed to a stem sealing
that was probably too tight. In addition, the valves’
maintenance instructions and the procedure for
assessing the acceptability of the results of period-
ic tests have been made more specific.
The event was classified INES Level 1.
Inoperability of emergency coolant pumps at
Olkiluoto 2 during annual maintenance
During the annual maintenance outage of Olkiluo-
to 2, the emergency cooling pumps were not in
automatic start-up readiness for ca. 14 hours, in
non-compliance with the Technical Specifications.
This occurred during the maintenance of con-
trol rod actuators during which, according to the
Technical Specifications, at least one auxiliary
feed water system pump and at least two reactor
core spray system pumps must be operational.
Maintenance operations started on 12 May 2003 at
about 21 hrs. All four parallel pumps in each sub-
system were separated about 30 mins earlier. The
error went unnoticed during the night and morn-
ing shift changes. STUK’s inspectors noticed the
situation during inspection in the morning of 13
May. All the four redundant pumps were immedi-
ately restored to service.
During the maintenance of a control rod actua-
tor, a leak could occur in the bottom of the reactor
pressure vessel, which would, within 60 mins,
cause a 14 cm decrease in the reactor pool water
level. In the situation prevalent at the time, the
systems supplying emergency water would not
have actuated automatically. As there is an abun-
dance of water above the reactor core, there
would have been a long period of time available
for leak detection and restoration of the availabili-
ty of the pumps before the situation would have
become critical to safety. Any leaks would have
been easily detected both from the signals re-
ceived in the main control room and when work-
ing in the space beneath the reactor pressure
vessel.
The event was preceded by a situation in100which the pumps are to be separated in accord-
ance with the plant unit procedures. The plant
unit had been shut down for annual maintenance,
the reactor water level had been raised up to the
reactor pressure vessel flange and the bolts of the
reactor pressure vessel head were being unfas-
tened. The pumps are separated from switch-
plants to prevent their automatic starting and
manual starting from the control room. This pre-
vents their inadvertent starting when work is
done on the reactor pressure vessel flange. Should
the pumps inadvertently start, reactor cooling
water would end up on those detaching the reac-
tor pressure vessel head.
The pumps were separated in the morning of
12 of May. The raising of the level of the reactor
pool, which connects to the reactor pressure ves-
sel, was started on the same day, entailing, ac-
cording to the plant procedures, restoration to
operability of three reactor core spray system
pumps and of one auxiliary feed water system
pump. Once the reactor pool level had reached
overflow channel level the pumps were separated
again, which was against the plant procedures.
The shift manager concluded that the systems are
not needed since the reactor pool is full of water.
In case the pumps started accidentally, the reactor
water level would start to rise and could possibly
rise high enough for the water to enter the
reactor hall floor. One such near miss -situation
had occured once in the operating history of the
Olkiluoto plant units. A reactor core spray system
pump started and raised the water level close to
floor level.
The event was attributed to a deviation from
the procedures: the pumps were separated when
the reactor pool was full of water. The deviation’s
acceptability and appropriateness was not looked
into either and it was not reported to the next
shift during shift change. The plant’s other moni-
toring methods failed to indicate the event as
well.
The utility will review its procedures and the
Technical Specifications to prevent recurrence.
The event has been addressed in training given to
the operating personnel.
The event was classified INES Level 1.
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water nozzle of the Olkiluoto 2 reactor
pressure vessel
An indication, 12 mm in length and 9 mm in
depth, along the pipe center line was detected in
one of four feed water nozzles of the Olkiluoto 2
reactor presssure vessel in a periodic inspection
during annual maintenance. The flaw is located in
a welded joint between the reactor pressure ves-
sel nozzle and its safe-end. The feed water pipe is
welded to one end of the safe-end. New NDT tech-
niques were used in the inspection that was car-
ried out on the pipe inner surface. The examina-
tion, by both ultrasound and eddy current meth-
ods, was conducted by an independent company
specialising in inspection with NDT testing meth-
ods commissioned by the utility.
Corresponding Inconel 182 weld metal cracks
have been observed quite often also at foreign
nuclear power plants. The likely cracking mecha-
nism is Interdendritic Stress Corrosion Cracking
(IDSCC). Needle-like dendrites are formed when
molten metal reaches solid state in cooling. Crack
formation may be connected with a partial hot
crack that occurred during welding. A weld joint’s
stress level is high due to residual stresses formed
during manufacturing. Owing to operating experi-
ence from foreign plants, reactor presssure vessel
nozzle joints containing the filler material in ques-
tion are inspected every 3–5 years, whereas nor-
mal weld joint inspection interval in the interna-
tional standard applied here is 10 years.
Wall thickness in the area in question is
34 mm, i.e. over two times design norm minimum
thickness. Even if the crack penetrated the wall,
it would not lead to total pipe rupture but would
be revealed while still a very small leak, i.a. the
Leak Before Break (LBB) principle would apply.
The crack growth rate has been assessed as low
based on measurements made on test specimens
and on practical experience. There are less residu-
al stresses deeper into the joint and thus the
crack growth driving force is smaller. Crack longi-
tudinal growth is restricted by crack collision with
material that better withstands stress corrosion
cracking. On reviewing the measurement data on
an ultrasonic examination from the external sur-
face of the nozzle area in the year 2000, using an
improved interpretive programme, a weak indica-tion of almost equal size was detected. This shows
that the flaw has not noticeably grown in three
years.
The utility commissioned inspection of corre-
sponding welds in the feed water nozzles of the
Olkiluoto 1 reactor pressure vessel in the annual
maintenance outage, athough they were not in-
cluded in the 2003 inspection scope. No flaw
indications were detected.
The flaw is due for repair in the 2005 refuel-
ling outage, using a filler material that better
withstands stress corrosion cracking. In spite of
this, the indication will be inspected even in 2004
and will be repaired then in case of substantial
crack growth. In addition, the sufficiency of the
frequency of reactor pressure vessel nozzle inspec-
tion and the apprpoprateness of examination
methods will be re-evaluated. The utility will also
investigate the options of preventively repairing
Inconel 182 weld joints by cladding using im-
proved filler material.
A strainer clogged up at Olkiluoto 1 during
annual maintenance
At Olkiluoto 1 on 1 June, 2003 a reduced flow was
detected in one sub-system pump of the shutdown
reactor sea water system. The pump’s suction in-
let was checked and found clean. A strainer in the
same line was checked as well. A wealth of mus-
sels and other impurities was found. In addition, a
flow control flap essential for strainer flushing was
in a wrong position. The strainer thus did not
function properly. The flaps of three other sub-
systems and corresponding flaps at Olkiluoto 2
were checked without delay and found operation-
al.
The strainer may have become clogged when
sea water channels were commissioned during
annual maintenance. Impurities may have dis-
lodged then, some ending up in the strainer in
question.
All four lines of the shutdown reactor sea
water systems of both plant units were equipped
with strainers in 1992. They prevent the heat
exchangers that cool back-up diesel generators
from getting clogged up by mussels and other
impurities, which may dislodge from the sea wa-
ter channels. The diesel generators feed power to
components important to safety in a loss-of-grid101
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in question was replaced in 2002.
The event’s causes were multiple. Clogging
was attributed to the actuator of the flow-control-
ling flap having been installed 90 degrees incor-
rectly. The incorrect actuator position was not
disclosed in a post-maintenance functional test,
which is conducted to assure component function-
ality and to disclose any mistakes and defects. The
clogging of the strainer was not revealed in a
pressure difference measurement either.
The position of the control flap’s actuator was
corrected. Three other strainers in Olkiluoto 1
and all four Olkiluoto 2 strainers were inspected
and their correct installation ascertained. The
utility will also review working instructions such
that verification and recording markings for ascer-
taining strainer flap position will be recorded.
General instructions will be drawn up for the
maintenance of actuator-equipped flap valves. The
utility will check the pump’s flow graphs to assure
its post-maintenance operability.
Corresponding events relating to the installa-
tion of valve actuators have occurred at the
Olkiluoto plant. After the events, the procedures
were reviewed and training was given to mechan-
ics.
Three out of the system’s four sub-systems
were fully operational and thus the plant unit was
in a design-basis state; its safety would not have
been endangered in an accident. The event was
classified INES Level 0.
The rate-of-change limit for reactor water
temperature given in the Technical
Specifications was exceeded at Olkiluoto 1
On 4 July 2003 during the start-up of Olkiluoto 1
from the 2003 annual maintenance outage, a reac-
tor scram from low reactor water level occurred
during reactor cool-down to cold shutdown to re-
pair a water leak in the cable penetration of one
main circulation pump. The rate of reactor tem-
perature decrease momentarily exceeded the rate-
of-change limit in the Technical Specifications.
The reactor was cooled by using a control
valve of the pressure reduction system. The valve
opened fully during cooling, after which the reac-
tor pressure and level quickly decreased. The
reactor water temperature decreased ca. 30 °C in
ten minutes, whereas the Technical Specifications102allow for a reduction of 15 °C in ten minutes. The
reactor feed water pump in operation was on
manual drive and was not capable of compensat-
ing for the coolant flowing from the reactor
through the control valve; the reactor level thus
dropped low enough to actuate a scram. All four
pumps of the auxiliary feed water system started
and restored normal reactor water level.
Since the reactor control rods were inside the
reactor at the time of the event, no actual scram
occurred but only scram safety systems started.
They operated according to design. The maximum
limit on the reduction in reactor water tempera-
ture protects the reactor pressure vessel from
premature fatigue. Component fatigue analyses
have postulated a couple of temperature changes
quicker than this during the plant service life.
The temperature change-of-rate limit was exceed-
ed only briefly and primary circuit integrity was
not endangered.
The event was caused by an error that was
made in operating the control valve of the pres-
sure reduction system. The operator had not
updated the pressure set value for valve control
prior to adjusting the reactor pressure. It was 5
bar, which is used for outages, and the valve
opened too much. In addition, shortcomings were
found in the operating instructions for the control
valve, and the operator failed to adequately follow
reactor pressure and level behaviour during cool-
ing.
To prevent recurrence, the utility has reviewed
the operating instructions for the pressure control
system and given the operators plant stimulator
training on the matter.
The event was classified INES Level 1.
Inoperability of a fire damper in the
staircase of the Olkiluoto 2 reactor building
It was found out at Olkiluoto 2 on 25 August 2003
that a fire damper of the reactor building air-con-
ditioning system was not operational in the way
required in the Technical Specifications.
On Thursday 21 August 2003, a test in accord-
ance with a preventive maintenance programme
had been started at the plant unit to measure
pressure differences in the staircases of the reac-
tor building. In the test a blower with an intake
direct from outside blows an overpressure into the
stairway. The required overpressure was not
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into and it looked like that the fire damper in
front of the blower did not open. However, a
failure notification was drawn up for the blower
for which there are not requirements is the Tech-
nical Specifications. Instead, the Technical Specifi-
cations require the fire damper to be operational
or fixed closed. It was now closed but not fixed
closed although it was obviously inoperational.
The blower overpressurises the stairway in the
event of a fire, using fresh air taken directly from
the outside and facilitating exit in case the stair-
way is filled with combustion gases. The fire
damper must open in case of fire. In an accident
involving a release of radioactive substances with-
in the reactor building, an underpressure must be
established to prevent radioactive releases into
the environment. The fire damper must then be
in the closed position and leaktight to prevent
outdoor air from entering the reactor building
through it, which would prevent underpressurisa-
tion. In such a situation the off gas system han-
dles reactor building air conditioning and filtering.
The failure notification was entered in the
plant unit work order system and it was not
noticed that the Technical Specifications set re-
quirements for the failed damper. The situation
prevailed over the weekend. On Monday the fail-
ure of the test was attributed to the coil of the
motor of the fire damper’s actuator, which was
replaced. That the fire damper’s failure was con-
nected to the requirements of the Technical Speci-
fications was disclosed when STUK’s resident in-
spector paid attention to the matter.
During the time of inoperability of the fire
damper, spent nuclear fuel was transferred from
the plant unit to the spent fuel storage, using a
transport container specifically designed for this
purpose. The Technical Specifications require that
all fuel handling onsite must be stopped if compo-
nents important to the operation of the off-gas
system are inoperational.
An analysis of the event disclosed that the
preventive maintenance task in question, which
relates to the measurement of pressure differenc-
es in the stairway room, had been inactive in the
data systems of both Olkiluoto plant units for
about a year. From this followed that the 2002
maintenance had not been carried out. The data
base had been modified after which activation hadnot been carried out. The functioning of the
blower and the fire damper had been checked on
23 July 2003 and they were found to function
normally.
In 2003 the utility had planned and implement-
ed several measures to prevent corresponding
occurrences. The improvements focused, among
others, on reviewing the plant data system and on
making more effective the monitoring of inactivat-
ed preventive maintenance tasks. In addition, all
tests and inspections defined in the Technical
Specifications will be reviewed to ascertain that
they are active tasks in the pre-maintenance and
periodic testing system.
The event was classified INES Level 1.
Inoperability of a fire pump at Olkiluoto
nuclear power plant
One fire pump at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
was inoperational for 42 days due to a mainte-
nance error. A valve on the pump’s pressure side
was left closed after preventive maintenance. This
was not noticed in functional tests and inspections
of fire water valve positions. Two other fire water
system pumps were available and the extinguish-
er system would have operated, if necessary.
The event occurred during the pump’s preven-
tive maintenance during plant operation on 20 to
29 August 2003. The pump and its motor had been
isolated for safety for the duration of maintenance
operations. The maintenance staff found the sepa-
ration insufficient, however, and closed two valves
outside the safety isolation instructions. The valve
closures were not addressed and recorded in ac-
cordance with relevant utility instructions. When
safety isolations were restored after the work, one
valve was left unopened. It would have prevented
pumping of water by the pump to the fire extin-
guisher system piping. After the maintenance
operations, the pump was subjected to a function-
al test, which did not reveal the incorrect valve
position.
A fire water system visual inspection is con-
ducted weekly in which the status of the valves
should have been checked and the error detected.
However, it was only detected on fifth check up on
1 October 2003, after which the correct position
was restored without delay.
In connection with the event, shortcomings
were detected also in how the periodic inspection103
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knowledged as done, even if that was not the case.
To prevent recurrence, the utility will make
instructions more detailed and review how proce-
dures, data systems and the Technical Specifica-
tions correlate with one another. In addition, the
personnel will be given training on procedures
and requirements pertaining to safety engineering
components.
There was no imminent danger for plant safety
from the event. The fire extinguisher system has
three pumps one of which is capable of providing
sufficient extinguishing water for the facility. One
pump is electrically operated and two are diesel
operated. The event compromised the reliability
of the fire extinguisher system, however, and
indicated significant shortcomings in the organisa-
tion’s operation. It was classified INES Level 1.
The floor drainage level measurement
function at the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage
was not inspected
For several years, four floor drainage level trans-
mitters in the spent fuel storage of the Olkiluoto
facility had not been inspected. They are in rooms
not easily accessed that are assumed to have a
high radiation level. The Technical Specifications
require that they are functionally tested once a
year. Several rooms have been fitted with them to
assure detection of any water leaks from the fuel
pool cooling system. No problems relating to their
testing have been brought to the attention of the
organisation. The inspections were reported as
having been completed, however.
Three uninspected level transmitters are in
rooms accessed through a concrete hatch lifted
open by crane. Due to their high radiation level,
the rooms are subject to restrictions as regards
time spent working there. The fourth level trans-
mitter is in a room not easily accessed either. In
addition, the yearly measurements of the rooms’
radiation level had not been done. These facts
have, for their part, contributed to the assump-
tion, prevalent among inspectors, that the rooms
are not to be accessed. Inspection of the transmit-
ters has been acknowledged as done in the data
system, along with inspections of other corre-
sponding level transmitters. This is why the situa-104tion was only detected in October 2003 when the
problems were openly reported to the line organi-
sation.
To prevent recurrence, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
will ascertain that procedures, data systems and
the Technical Specifications correspond to one
another. In addition, new instructions on the
inspection of level transmitters in the spent fuel
storage will be drawn up. Procedures for making
room radiation measurements will be reviewed
and the personnel will be given additional training
on work methods as well as on requirements
pertaining to components covered in the Technical
Specifications.
The event had no immediate impact on the
safety of spent fuel storage. However, it indicated
shortcomings in the organisation’s operation and
in adherence to guidelines. It was classified INES
Level 1.
High vibration levels on emergency coolant
pumps at Olkiluoto 1
Periodic condition monitoring measurements in
the autumn of 2003 revealed high vibration levels
on the reactor core spray system pump units at
Olkiluoto 1. These were compared with corre-
sponding Olkiluoto 2 values, which were found to
be lower.
Operating together with other systems, the
reactor core spray system protects the reactor
core against overheating during emergency cool-
ing. The system’s pumps provide the spray water
needed. The core spray system is a stand-by safety
system for long-time core cooling. One of the
system’s four pump units has been evaluated as
having been fully available for long-term pumping.
Three pump units could have failed in long-term
pumping. In the early stages of an accident, two
pumps have to be available, and for long-term
cooling, one pump suffices. The plant unit’s safety
would not have been in immediate danger in an
accident, even if the cooling function was signifi-
cantly reduced.
Elevated vibration levels had been measured
on the pump units of the Olkiluoto 1 reactor core
spray system for several years already. The motor
of one pump unit was replaced in 2002 but it soon
reached the elevated, prior–to–replacement vibra-
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measurements that Teollisuuden Voima Oy start-
ed to look into the causes of the elevated vibration
levels. The matter was looked into by subjecting
one pump to extensive testing and vibration meas-
urements in early October 2003. During the tests,
even the structure of the pump unit’s mounting
base was investigated and the steel plate under
the motor was found not to be firmly attached to
the concrete. In addition, unfilled cavities were
found beneath the plate. The motor base’s behav-
iour was thus flexible. A flexible base can be
ascertained to cause vibration levels higher than astiff base. A component on a flexible base is
allowed higher vibration levels than one mounted
on a completely stiff base.
The defective bases of pump units at Olkiluoto
1 were repaired in early November 2003 by filling
out cavities beneath the steel plates with con-
crete. In verifying measurements, essentially low-
er vibration levels have been found. The utility
has also taken measures to inspect fastenings and
concrete castings of the bases of other systems
and pump units at Olkiluoto 2.
The event was classified INES Level 1.105
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Basic programme Inspections in 2003
Loviisa NPP Olkiluoto NPP
A Safety management X
B Main functions
B1 Assessment and improvement of safety X X
B2 Operation X X
B3 Plant maintenance and ageing management
C Inspections by functional unit and field of competence
C1 Plant safety functions X X
C2 Electrical and I&C systems X
C3 Mechanical engineering X X
C4 Structures and buildings X X
C5 PSA and safety management X X
C6 Document and information management X
C7 Chemistry X X
C8 Nuclear waste X X
C9 Radiation protection X X
C10 Fire protection X X
C11 Emergency preparedness X X
C12 Physical protection X X
C13 Training / Human resources and training X X
C14 Quality assurance X
C15 System line-up procedures X X
APPENDIX 4 Periodic inspection programme
Kaisa Åstrand
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APPENDIX 5 Licences and approvals in
accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act
Marko HämäläinenC214/241, 7 Febr. 2003,   Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Licence to export irradiated fuel samples (two
from a water channel and three from the corner
of a fuel assembly spacer grid, with a combined
activity of 380 GBq) from Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant Unit 1 to Sweden for hot cell analysis.
Valid until 30 April 2003.
C214/244, 20 March 2003, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of control rods (6 pcs) from Sweden.
Valid until 31 December 2003.
C214/245, 15 April 2003, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of control rods (8 pcs) from Sweden.
Valid until 31 December 2003.
C214/246, 21 May 2003, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Licence to import from Japan “Licenced Software”
– FINELOAD-3, including potential later updates.
Valid until 31 December 2018.
A214/40, 23 May 2003,
Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Generation)
Licence to export to Studsvik, Sweden, three irra-
diated nuclear fuel rods (max. 40 g of plutonium
and 3000 g of enriched uranium, max. 30 g of 235U)
for fuel tests.
Y214/72, 12 December 2003,
Geological Survey of Finland (GTK)
Retain, use, handle and store nuclear material for
analysis at the GTK (a total of max. 1.5 g of en-
riched uranium, in which the share of 235U is 0.8 g
max.).
C214/250, 22 Dec. 2003, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Sweden. A total
of max. 17 000 kg of enriched uranium. Provided
with the Euratom control stamp “P”. Valid until
31 December 2004.C214/251, 22.12.2003, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from the Federal
Republic of Germany. Max. 8 700 kg of enriched
uranium. The obligations of an exchange of notes
pertaining to the peaceful uses of nuclear
materials between the authorities of Finland and
the People’s Republic of China apply to the
uranium in 18 assemblies. Provided with the
Euratom control stamp “N”. Valid until 31
December 2004.
C214/252, 22.12.2003, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Max. 11 500 kg of enriched ura-
nium. Obligations of the Finnish–Russian co-oper-
ation agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy apply to the uranium used in the manufac-
ture of above fuel (55 assemblies). Valid until
31 December 2004.
C214/253, 22 Dec. 2003, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Licence to retain, store and use for training and
demonstration, specimen (a total of four specimen
manufactured of depleted uranium, with max. 10.3
kg of uranium) of depleted uranium. Valid until
31 December 2013.
C214/254, 22 Dec. 2003, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Spain. A total of
max. 1 500 kg of enriched uranium. Provided with
the Euratom control stamp “P” or “N”. Valid until
31 December 2004.107
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APPENDIX 6 STUK’s safety research projects
completed in 2003
Esko Eloranta, Harri HeimbürgerNuclear power plants
Research projects included in FINNUS
FINNUS/AGE; Fuel cladding corrosion mecha-
nism and its modelling, a continuation project;
VTT Manufacturing Technology
FINNUS/AGE; Environmentally assisted cracking
of NPP materials, a continuation project;
VTT Manufacturing Technology
FINNUS/AGE; Modelling of the behaviour of ox-
ide films with regard to their role in activity build-
up and different corrosion phenomena in NPPs, a
continuation project;
VTT Manufacturing Technology
FINNUS/FISRE; Fire safety research, 2001;
VTT Building Technology
FINNUS/FISRE; Fire safety research, 2002;
VTT Building Technology
FINNUS/FISRE; Effect of smoke and heat on elec-
tronics, modelling of fire scenarios for PSA, active
fire protection equipment;
VTT Building Technology
FINNUS/FISRE; Active fire protection equipment;
VTT Building Technology
FINNUS/INSMO; Usage of modelling in ultrason-
ic testing; VTT Manufacturing Technology
FINNUS/INSMO; Risk-informed periodic inspec-
tions; VTT Manufacturing Technology
FINNUS/METRI; Risk informed leakage frequen-
cy assessment; VTT Manufacturing Technology108FINNUS/METRI; Development of human error as-
sessment method for low power and plant shut-
down risk analysis; VTT Industrial Systems
FINNUS/PASSI; Ageing related failure modes of
modern I&C equipment; VTT Automation
FINNUS/PASSI; Reliability assessment and FMEA
of programmable automation, a continuation
project; VTT Automation
FINNUS/READY; The application of new reactor
physics models in criticality safety calculations, a
continuation project; VTT Processes
FINNUS/READY; FRAPTRAN-code:
Development of FRAPTRAN-GENFLO code, 2002;
VTT Processes
FINNUS/READY; FRAPTRAN-code; delivery
and validation of FRAPTRAN-GENFLO-code;
VTT Processes
FINNUS/READY; FRAPTRAN-code: Application of
statistical calculation methods in the FRAPCON 3
and FRAPTRAN-codes; VTT Processes
FINNUS/READY; Application of CDFPLIM-meth-
od in dynamic codes; VTT Processes
FINNUS/STIN; Research related to structural in-
tegrity of nuclear power plants, 2001;
VTT Industrial Systems
FINNUS/STIN; Modelling of loading to structures
and equipment, 2002; VTT Industrial Systems
FINNUS/STIN; Development of integrity analysis
for structures and equipment;
VTT Industrial Systems
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ods, 2002; VTT Industrial Systems
FINNUS/STIN; Development of applicable meth-
ods for defining fracture mechanism characteris-
tics of radiated steels; VTT Industrial Systems
Research projects included in SAFIR
SAFIR/CULMA; Organizational culture in Finnish
NPP maintenance; Development of an assessment
method, 2003; VTT Industrial Systems
SAFIR/IDEC; Interaction approach to the develop-
ment of control rooms; Preliminary development
of control room evaluation framework, 2003;
VTT Industrial Systems
Research activities pertaining to regulatory
decision-making
Development of NDT qualification; Provision of
QA documents; Serco Assurance Inc.
Numerical evaluation of effects to reactor core
caused by steam explosions in the reactor pres-
sure vessel lower plenum; VTT Energy
Fire analysis of Loviisa NPP turbine hall, a con-
tinuation project; VTT Energy
Studies in concrete technology for the construc-
tion, inspection and repairing of NPP structures,
a continuation project, 2002; VTT Building Tech-
nology
Ruthenium research; the behaviour of ruthenium
in severe reactor accidents, 2002; VTT Processes
FINFLO-code; Development of the code for the
analysis of two-phase flow; Finflo Inc.
Nuclear waste management
Research activities pertaining to regulatory
decision-making
IMGS (Investigations and Modelling of Geological
Structures) support group; Dr. John W. Cosgrove,
Imperial CollegeIMGS (Investigations and Modelling of Geological
Structures) support group; Sven A. Tirén,
Geosigma Ab
IMGS (Investigations and Modelling of Geological
Structures) support group; Prof. Jaakko Siivola
IMGS (Investigations and Modelling of Geological
Structures) support group; Paavo Vuorela, Geolo-
gical Survey of Finland
The national expert group for the safeguards of
final disposal (LOSKA); the use of geophysical
methods in the monitoring of final disposal; Uni-
versity of Helsinki, Institute of Seismology.
The national expert group for the safeguards of
final disposal (LOSKA); the use of environmental
surveillance and the monitoring of spent fuel cap-
sules; VTT Processes
The national expert group for the safeguards of
final disposal (LOSKA); the use of satellite surveil-
lance and aerial photography in the safeguards
monitoring of final disposal; VTT Information
Technology
Review of the reports by Posiva Oy and the evalu-
ation of the progress of Posiva’s R&D concerning
geohydrological issues; Prof. Auli Niemi, Uppsala
University
Review of Posiva’s development work, 2002;
Enterpris Ltd
Review of Posiva’s baseline studies at Olkiluoto;
Prof. David Read, Enterpris Ltd
Modeling flow and transport in heterogeneous
fractured media; Dr. Tsang, Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory
Independent verification of radioactive waste pack-
ages; VTT Processes109
ST U K - B - Y TO 2 3 3 STUK’S SAFETY RESEARCH PROJECTS COMPLETED IN 2003 APPENDIX 6Research pertaining to the development of
regulatory control
The geochemical indicators of the last ice age in
the bedrock. University of Helsinki, Laboratory of
Radiochemistry.
Evaluation of sensors to monitor the effect of ben-
tonite on the corrosion rate of copper in Olkiluoto-
type saline groundwater; Helsinki University of
Technology, Department of Materials Science and
Rock Engineering.
The geochemical behaviour of filled fracture; Hel-
sinki University of Technology, Department of Ma-
terials Science and Rock Engineering.
IAEA coordinated research project (CRP). Natural
geochemical concentrations and fluxes on the Bal-
tic shields in Finland as indicators of nuclear
waste repository safety; year 2002; Geological Sur-
vey of Finland
DECOVALEX III; the reporting of rock mechanical
simulations for BMT2 in the year 2003. Helsinki
University of Technology, Department of Materi-
als Science and Rock Engineering.110DECOVALEX III; The coupled thermo-hydro-me-
chanical modelling of bentonite in the year 2003;
Helsinki University of Technology, Institute of
Mathematics.
DECOVALEX III; BMT2 simulations and final re-
poting 2003; Uppsala University.
The interaction between radionuclides and the
corrosion products of copper in saline and reduc-
ing environment (KOSU); Helsinki University of
Technology, Department of Materials Science and
Rock Engineering.
The release of the results of the Palmottu project.
Geological Survey of Finland.
IAEA coordinated research project (CRP). Natural
geochemical concentrations and fluxes on the Bal-
tic shields in Finland as indicators of nuclear
waste repository safety; year 2003; Geological Sur-
vey of Finland
